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Introduction 
Shortly after war was declared in August 1914 the undisputed leaders of each 
alliance, Great Britain and Gennany, found they were unable to win the war outright 
and began searching for further means to secure victory; the fonnation of a blockade, 
the use of submarines, attacking the flanks (Allied attacks in the Balkans and Baltic), 
Gennan Zeppelin bombardment of British coastal towns, and the diplomatic search for 
additional allies in an attempt to break the stalemate that had ensued soon after fighting 
had commenced. Gennany, having spent decades working with the Ottoman Turks, 
convinced them to join the Central Powers and in October 1915 they did, declaring war 
on the Entente powers. Italy, having withdrawn from the Central Powers and declaring 
its neutrality, was persuaded by France and Great Britain into joining the Entente in 
April 1915. Still, no breakthrough occurred and the eyes of both Britain and Gennany 
fell on the United States, as the strongest remaining neutral, to provide the crucial 
support to break the deadlock. 
The U.S. had established its place among the great nations of the world when it 
defeated the aging Spanish Empire in 1898. Together with an ever-growing economy, 
America had established itself as an international player just behind Britain and 
Gennany.1 As one of the strongest nations still maintaining its neutrality when Europe's 
mighty annies clashed in August 1914, the United States was seen as the missing piece 
to ensure victory by both Britain and Gennany. Because the belligerent nations viewed 
the United States as a major factor in detennining the outcome of the war a new theatre 
of the war opened - a battle between the belligerents for American support. 
The United States, with its newly acquired status as a world power, was the 
strongest of the neutral powers. Despite the confidence of Europe's military and 
I lA.S. Grenville, A History of the World in the 20th Century (Cambridge, 1980), p. S. 
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political leaders that the war would be short, the Foreign Offices of both Great Britain 
and Germany understood that they had to take into account America's response to 
actions taken by all of the participants in the war in Europe. It is the contention of this 
dissertation that from early in the war, Great Britain and Germany did not view America 
as a sideshow of the First World War. To these two countries the United States became 
an important potential feature in their respective arsenals almost immediately. 
The diplomacy surrounding America's entry into the First World War has been 
studied from various angles with several historians focusing on German blunders, the 
apparent ineptitude of Germany's diplomacy, and the perceived success of Britain's 
diplomacy.2 In the nearly one hundred years since the end of the war, scholars have 
written innumerable articles and books concerning every aspect of the war. Just as 
tactics change over time, so does the emphasis of historical thought. An approach that 
for fifty years has shaped the discussion of Anglo-American-German relations during 
the First World War is Ernest May's The World War and American Isolation, 1914-
1917. 3 
May's work traces the policies of Britain's Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, 
Germany's Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, and America's Woodrow Wilson as they 
attempted to maintain America's traditional neutrality. He concluded that despite 
Bethmann Hollweg's efforts to harness his country's desire for unrestricted submarine 
warfare, it was Grey who successfully persuaded Wilson of the righteousness of his 
country's cause - it was Grey's success that led to the president's eagerness to tolerate 
Britain's violations of neutral rights and created and maintained a pro-Allied bias in 
America despite the blockade. May takes the position that Wilson's policy of watchful 
2 Examples include: Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New 
York, 1971); Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmerman Telegram (New York, 1958); Reinhard R. Doerries, 
Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count BernstorfJ and German-American Relations, 1908-1917 (Chapel 
Hill, 1989). 
3 Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 (Cambridge, 1963). 
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waiting coupled with Grey's diplomacy, along with Bethmann's loss of control in 
Germany led to a build-up of pressure among the three governments, finally leading to 
the end of American isolation. 
More recent examples of multinational scholarship are David Stevenson's The 
First World War and International Politics and Cataclysm: The First World War as 
Political Tragedy, and Niall Ferguson's The Pity ofWar.4 The common view of 
scholars such as David Stevenson and Niall Ferguson, and consequently the view of 
many readers of history, is that the First World War was a European affair that America 
was drawn into by the German use of unrestricted submarine warfare.5 The idea has 
long been that after years of German submarines violating international law with 
immoral attacks on neutral merchant ships and their innocent crews, Germany's 1917 
decision to allow its submarine force to indiscriminately sink merchant shipping is what 
finally drove the United States to break its neutrality. 
This idea is closely followed by German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman's 
decision to offer an alliance with America's troublesome southern neighbour Mexico. 
The telegram proposing this German-Mexican alliance - intercepted by the British and 
passed on to the American government - is often seen as being the ultimate act of 
aggression by Germany towards the United States, and therefore also a cause of U.S. 
entry to the First World War. This view ignores the work of diplomats, intelligence 
4 David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, 1988); David Stevenson, The 
First World War as Political Tragedy (New York, 2004); Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York, 
1999). 
S Authors who argue that it was Germany's use of submarines that led to Wilson's decision to involve the 
United States in the European conflict include: John A. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson (London, 2002); 
Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson. World War I, and America's Strategy for Peace 
and Security (Kent, 2009); Kendrick A. Clements, Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman (Chicago, 1987); 
Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World 
War I (Wilmington, 1991); J.M. Winter, The Experience of World War I (London, 1988); Kendrick A. 
Clements, 'Woodrow Wilson and World War J', Presidential Studies Quarterly 34 (2004), pp. 62-82; 
Edward H. Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power (Bloomington, 1955). 
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officers, politicians, and in some cases even the decisions of German and British 
military leadership in their attempts to acquire America. 
This thesis contends that the historian seeking a greater understanding of First 
World War diplomacy, and diplomacy in general, must look beyond the four years of 
war to understand why diplomats and politicians made some of the decisions that they 
did. The diplomatic policies Britain and Germany pursued to attempt to acquire 
American assistance during its period of neutrality followed the same patterns as those 
that had been formulated in previous decades. First World War diplomacy, I argue, is an 
extension of long established British and German diplomatic policy towards the United 
States, and that continuity of diplomacy played a determining role in the American 
entry into the war. 
Woodrow Wilson's initial desire to remain neutral is not in question, nor is his 
desire to mediate a peace; nor for that matter is the fact that belligerents were able to 
manipulate Wilson, his closest confidant and unofficial chief diplomat, Colonel Edward 
M. House, and the rest of his cabinet. What this thesis is concerned with is how British 
and German diplomats were able to essentially dismiss his calls for both countries to 
adhere to U.S. policies, how German diplomats were able to maintain American 
neutrality for almost three years, and how after calling on his countrymen to remain 
neutral for almost three years he decided to enter the First World War as an associate 
power of the Allies. 
Sources 
In order to pursue an in-depth analysis of the mid-level diplomacy used during 
this time period it is important to carefully examine British, German, and American 
sources. Despite a large number of German documents being destroyed during the 
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Second World War, all three countries have a wealth of information available for 
inspection. 
When dealing with British diplomacy towards the United States during the 
period of neutrality the National Archives in Kew contains the most complete collection 
of materials regarding diplomatic action toward the United States. Amongst the 
collections at Kew, are several which are of immense interest to those involved in 
understanding the diplomatic actions of Great Britain during the First World War. Of 
particular interest are the Records of the Foreign Office. These papers contain the 
communications of Foreign Office personnel including the Sir Edward Grey Papers, the 
papers of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Admiralty and War Office papers, and papers relating 
to the United States. While these papers are generally used as sources for analysis of 
British diplomacy during the First World War, other less used files contribute to an 
understanding of why decisions were made. 
Those files include the correspondence of the Foreign Office's Commercial 
Department, and particularly the United States Files. These files give an inside look at 
how the British Foreign Office was working with, and sometimes against, the 
Commercial Department when dealing with commercial decisions and attempting to 
placate the United States. The papers of the Foreign Office's Political and War 
Departments America General File, War file, contain information regarding the 
shipping of munitions from the United States to Britain as well as information about 
German telegrams that are being sent into America. The Foreign Office papers relating 
to the United States contains information relating to wartime issues and the Orders in 
Council involving the Blockade of Germany as well as the Political Intelligence 
Department's work in the United States. 
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The Cabinet Papers are important for the study of diplomacy because they quite 
clearly demonstrate the fact that Grey's policies towards the United States did not 
operate in a vacuum. Instead, Grey had to weigh the effects of decisions towards other 
neutrals on America as well as the effects of decisions towards the United States on 
European neutrals. Additionally, these papers offer some insight into the role of 
America on decisions made in War Council meetings. Because so much of the tension 
between the United States and Britain was due to British contraband rules in correlation 
to the blockade, the papers of the Foreign Office Contraband Department offers 
information on the tonnage of goods detained as well as economic deals struck with 
U.S. companies to limit or end the prospect of American retaliation, thus ensuring 
friendly relations between the two nations. These files also contain information relating 
to the effectiveness of the blockade, detailing the scarcity of items within Germany. 
The letters, briefs, notes, and memoranda from all sources within the British 
government regarding both actions taken towards the United States and actions taken by 
the United States, as well as how actions towards other countries might influence the 
relations between the most powerful neutral and Britain, help form a more complete 
view of how these two countries dealt with one another and the situations that occurred 
due to war. This day-to-day communication between the different officials regarding 
decisions concerning British policy and the United States allows for comparison and 
analysis with memoirs and autobiographies of many of these same individuals. 
Although German archives are spread out among several locations, when 
researching the diplomatic actions of the nation the place to begin is at the Politisches 
Archiv des Auswartiges Amt (Diplomatic Archive of the German Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, generally known by its abbreviation AA). The Politisches Archiv holds 
extensive material concerning German-American relations up to the entrance of the U.S. 
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into the war, the personal papers of Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff, ambassador 
to the United States, and the personal papers of German Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von 
Jagow, as well as documents concerning German intrigues in Mexico including the 
infamous Zimmerman Telegram. This archive also holds documents dealing with 
enterprises against German enemies that include the propaganda activities among Irish 
immigrants in the U.S., and rarely used series on the World War. 
The Bundesarchiv, much like the U.S. National Archives, is situated at different 
locations throughout the country. The Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde holds a small 
portion of the estate papers for Foreign Minister Jagow which, while small, are 
important due to the fact that they contain many memoranda written by Jagow 
pertaining to the United States. Lichterfelde also holds some of the estate papers of 
Alfred Zimmermann, father of Undersecretary of the Foreign Office Arthur 
Zimmerman. It is unfortunate that these papers have been rarely used when discussing 
the diplomatic decisions of the German government during the First World War because 
they contain letters from son to father where the younger Zimmerman discussed some 
of the decisions made within the Kaiser's court.6 
This thesis also draws on papers relating to the German Chancellor Theobald 
von Bethmann Hollweg, which can be found at the Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Due to the 
destruction of Bethmann Hollweg's personal estate papers or Nachlass, during Soviet 
occupation of Germany, documents concerning the Chancellor's position and decisions 
must be pieced together by the use of other sources in correlation to the remaining 
papers from Bethmann himself. The Bundesarchiv Koblenz provides no less than six 
additional individuals' personal papers that should be viewed in order to gain a deeper 
6 The personal papers of Arthur Zimmerman that are held by the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin at Potsdamer 
Platz contain correspondence, speeches and articles by Zimmerman before 1914, and while they would be 
of great value to someone studying the desire for colonies by Imperial Germany, they are of little value to 
the study of German diplomacy towards America during the war. 
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understanding, and therefore more accurate analysis, of Bethmann's decisions - the 
papers of Friedrich von Payer, adviser to the Kaiser, George von Hertling, Foreign 
Minister for the Bayern region, Rudolf von Valentini, Max Sering, Friedrich von Berg, 
minister for East Prussian, and Kurt von Lersner, Commander of the Political Section of 
the Supreme Military Headquarters. With so much of the historical debate surrounding 
German diplomacy during the First World War focusing on the decisions of Bethmann 
Hollweg, and so few of his personal papers to be found, it is surprising to find that these 
papers have been virtually excluded from published research. Bethmann's surviving 
papers contain correspondence with various ministers as well with his father, plus 
documents concerning German politics and the issue of unrestricted submarine warfare. 
All of these add to an understanding of Bethmann's decisions concerning the U.S. 
As mentioned above, U.S. archives are spread out among several institutions, 
and locations. Because this analysis deals with the decisions of President Woodrow 
Wilson the obvious place to start is with the Papers of Woodrow Wilson housed at the 
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University. Along with the detailed 
organization and analysis of Wilson's papers by Arthur S. Link, this holding contains 
the papers of many of Wilson's cabinet members, including a small but important 
portion of Secretary of State Robert Lansing's papers, and some papers of William 
Jennings Bryan during his time as Wilson's Secretary of State. The largest collection of 
Bryan's papers can be found at the U.S. Library of Congress with duplicates found at 
National Archives. 
More of Robert Lansing's files can be found at the U.S. Library of Congress, 
including his desk diary and correspondence to and from family members, the president, 
other cabinet members, and the general public. This collection also provides 
information from American officials who dealt with issues concerning both British and 
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German diplomacy, such as Chandler Anderson, counsellor for the State Department 
and Joseph Tumulty, secretary to the president. Tumulty's papers contain frequent notes 
and memoranda that were passed between the president and his secretary providing yet 
another view into the thoughts and actions of Wilson. Aiding in the understanding of 
actions taken in Wilson's cabinet meetings are the papers of Secretary of the Navy 
Josephus Daniels, also in the Library of Congress. While Daniels rarely had any direct 
dealings with diplomacy, his participation in and recording of cabinet meetings and 
correspondence provides yet another account by which to deconstruct the development 
of U.S. policy. 
It is also important to examine the many papers held at the Department of 
Manuscripts and Archives at Yale University. Of particular interest are the Edward M. 
House Papers, including Colonel House's diary. This diary is an important source for 
understanding U.S. diplomacy because House was meticulous at recording the facts 
surrounding events, even ifhe did tend to exaggerate his importance. The House papers, 
in conjunction with the Charles Seymour papers, which are essentially a narrated and 
edited version of House's papers, provide essential source of information regarding 
decisions made by the U.S. government during the First World War. 
Yale University'S other holdings on this subject include the Arthur Willert 
Papers, and the Sir William Wiseman Papers. Both are of importance to Anglo-
American relations because, as in Willert's case, he was able to provide insight about 
American officials' attitudes as well as that of the American public to British officials 
as they formed pro-Allied propaganda for American consumption. Wiseman's 
importance comes from his work as a diplomat and liaison between the British 
government and Wilson's administration. Wiseman's association with House, due to his 
becoming the conduit through which many of the most important messages between 
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officials of Britain and the United States ran, demonstrates the value of these papers to 
the study of the diplomatic actions of both governments. 
Four printed primary sources of immense value to First World War scholars 
have been utilized. The Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States are 
375 volumes of records from the U.S. State Department concerning foreign policy 
decisions from 1861-1960. These volumes can be found at the U.S. National Archives 
and on-line at the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections site. Also of interest are 
the Investigation of Mexican Affairs, the Official German Documents Relating to the 
World War, and British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papersfrom the 
Foreign Office Confidential Print. 7 These publications contain committee interviews 
with individuals associated with the events each publication is covering.8 
Methodology 
This thesis will begin with a brief examination of the diplomacy prior to the 
First World War, analysing how British and German construction of diplomacy 
regarding the United States laid the groundwork for the battle for America from 1914-
1917. It will then proceed to analyse four key diplomatic battlegrounds where British, 
German, and American diplomats fought to determine what the United States would 
contribute: the first diplomatic battleground to be covered is the role of the British 
Foreign Office in developing the mind-set of neglect in the United States regarding the 
British blockade of Germany; the second battleground is how the German decision to 
7 United States Senate Documents, Foreign Relations Committee, Investigation of Mexican Affairs. 
Report and Hearings (2 vols.), 66th Congress, 1 sl Session, Senate Document no. 62 (Washington, D.C., 
1919); Official German Documents Relating to the World War, Published by the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, (New York, 1923); Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, eds., British 
Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print 
(Frederick, 1987-1991). 
8 In the cases of the Official German Documents and British Documents on Foreign Affairs the bulk of 
the volumes is devoted to reproductions of official letters, memorandums, and speeches all leading the 
reader to a greater understanding of events. Concerning the Investigation of Mexican Affairs by the U.S. 
Congress, as well as a large portion of the Official German Documents the publication is simply a 
transcript of hearings; what questions were asked and the answers given. 
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use the submarine affected German and American diplomacy focusing on Wilson's 
'strict accountability' policy and why the United States remained neutral in the face of 
continued infractions; the third battleground covered deals with the policies of the 
Wilson administration towards Mexico and how they induced Germany into offering an 
alliance that would bring Mexico into the war against the United States. The final 
battleground to be examined by this dissertation is the peace initiative and how the hope 
of peace was used as a means manipulating the potential American intervention. 
The focus of this thesis primarily surrounds Great Britain, Germany, and the 
United States. The reasoning behind this is largely due to the fact that Britain and 
Germany were clearly the leaders of their respective alliances; therefore France, Russia, 
and Austria-Hungary do not figure prominently in this analysis. This should not be seen 
as a reflection of the role these countries played in the war, or in their role in diplomatic 
decisions. It is, however, a reflection of the decision of each of them to defer to their 
more powerful ally. As members of the Triple Entente, France and Russia repeatedly 
claimed to follow Britain's lead when it came to recruiting the services of the United 
States. Additionally, France needed Britain's navy to protect its northern coast in case 
of war with Germany; France had also needed Britain's army to protect its northern 
flank in the land war; and finally, France needed Britain's money (as well as American 
money) to help finance its war effort. Perhaps most important, when discussing the 
acquisition of America, was the perceived American Anglophilia. France may have 
been loved for its service to the United States during the American Revolution, but 
Americans in the seat of power still looked to Britain, with its common language, for 
direction.9 
9 One example of France deferring to Britain can be found their willingness to follow British directions to 
seize the freighter Dacia allowing the Anglo-American relations a reprieve from the ship-purchasing 
dispute. 
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There are various methods used by historians to analyse German, British, and 
U.S. diplomacy over the course of the First World War. Analyses have focused on the 
diplomacy surrounding particular periods from the assassination of the Archduke and 
the crucial first months while others have focused primarily on the diplomacy between 
European powers over the lifetime of the war. Still others tend to focus on the 
proceedings at Versailles. A few have looked at the impact of official propaganda on 
both population and government, and others have taken a look at specific events in the 
war and attempted to build a case on that one event. 
This thesis argues that what has become lost in the research of First World War 
diplomatic history is the significance of the mid-level diplomacy, in the continuity of 
long-term policy employed by the British and Germans, as they attempted to shape U.S. 
President Woodrow Wilson's decisions. At the heart of First World War diplomatic 
exchanges were conversations and relationships developed between the Foreign 
Ministers, Ambassadors, and special envoys. It is precisely because it was these 
diplomats carrying the diplomatic load, and not the individual leaders of each nation, 
that an analysis of mid-level diplomacy is so crucial to understanding the success' and 
failures of the belligerent attempts to acquire American assistance. When Wilson 
requested that Congress declare war on Germany in April 1917 , Great Britain and the 
Allies had clearly won the battle for American support, but this was far more complex 
than historians have considered. The objective of this project, therefore, is to examine 
the mid-level diplomacy between Britain, Germany, and the United States prior to the 
outbreak of hostilities in August 1914 and during the period of American neutrality in 
order to understand its full complexity. 
Because this thesis concentrates on mid-level diplomacy, it will argue that the 
work of the diplomats was far more important - arguably decisive - than the role played 
12 
by non-state actors in the decisions regarding American entry into the war. Inevitably, 
non-state actors did weigh on the decisions of the politicians, but it is the decisions and 
actions of individual diplomats that, in the final account, affected American policy. 
Therefore the aim of this thesis is to increase the understanding of the degree of the 
efforts made by the diplomats of Great Britain and Germany to influence U.S. policy 
vis-a-vis the European war. 
It was not until after May's 1963 work that the emphasis really shifted from the 
role oflow- and mid-level diplomatic actions to the role of non-state factors such as 
economics, agriculture and race. 10 Charles Tansill's America Goes to War published in 
1938 was one of the first works to emphasise the influence of economic factors on U.S. 
decisions. II These accounts of the diplomacy surrounding the First World War continue 
to contribute to the base of knowledge about this discussion, but they also tend to focus 
on determinants other than diplomacy. Non-state actors, however, do not make 
decisions. People made the decisions that led to the death and destruction of the First 
World War, so therefore it is important to have an understanding of what those 
10 Historians that have branched out from mid-level diplomacy to study how agrarian, social, and 
economic issues within countries affected diplomacy from Avner Offer, The First World War. an 
Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford, 1989); Avner Offer, 'The Working Classes, British Naval Plans and the 
Coming of the Great War', Past & Present No. 107 (May, 1985), pp. 204-226; Avner Offer, 'The 
Blockade of Germany and the Strategy of Starvation, 1914-1918: An Agency Perspective', in Great War. 
Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front. 1914-1918, ed. Roger Chickering and Stig 
Forster (Washington D.C., 2000), pp. 169-188; Theo Balderston, 'War Finance and Inflation in Britain 
and Germany, 1914-1918' in The Economic History Review New Series, Vol. 42, No.2 (May, 1989), pp. 
222-244; David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, 1988); Louis L. 
Gerson, 'Immigrant Groups and American Foreign Policy', Issues and Conflicts: Studies in Twentieth 
Century American Diplomacy. ed. George L. Anderson (Lawrence, 1959), pp.171-191; John Milton 
Cooper, 'The Command of Gold Reversed: American Loans to Britain, 1915-1917', The Pacific 
Historical Review. vol. 45, No.2 (May, 1976), pp. 209-230; Marjorie M. Farrar, 'Preclusive Purchases: 
Politics and Economic Warfare in France during the First World War', The Economic History Review 
(1973), pp. 117-133; Roberta A. Dayer, 'Strange Bedfellows: J.P. Morgan & Co., Whitehall and the 
Wilson Administration During World War 1', Business History Review (1976), pp. 127-151; Martin 
Hom, 'A Private Bank at War: J.P. Morgan & Co. and France, 1914-1918', Business History Review vol. 
74, No. 74 (Spring, 2000), pp. 85-112; John Singleton, 'The Cotton Industry and the British War Effort, 
1914-1918', The Economic History Review. New Series Vol. 47, No.3 (August, 1994), pp. 601-618; Tor 
Egil Ferland, 'The History of Economic Warfare: International Law, Effectiveness, Strategies', Journal 
of Peace Research. vol. 30, No.2 (May, 1993), pp. 151-162; Alice M. Morrissey, The American Defense 
Of Neutral Rights. 1914-1917 (Cambridge, 1939). 
11 Charles Tansill, America Goes To War (Boston, 1938). 
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individuals believed was occurring at the time they were making momentous 
judgements. 
The research being done on the influence of non-state actors on leaders, politics 
and policy is important insofar as it set parameters within which diplomats could 
operate, and therefore cannot, and should not, be discounted. However, due to the 
constraints of time and space, this thesis is focused, primarily, on analysing the 
decisions of the diplomats and the impact those decisions had on American entry into 
the war. Although public opinion is a non-state actor it is important to the understanding 
of diplomacy. For both the British and German foreign offices U.S. public opinion was 
not decisive in the decision making process, but something to be exploited. 
The scholarship of the interwar period covered both the military and diplomatic 
aspects of the war and was focused primarily on establishing arguments that would 
salvage the reputations of those involved. 12 Eventually, historians branched out, 
analysing the diplomacy involved in Europe's spiral into the tragedy and largely writing 
about the descent into the abyss of war, the diplomacy between the belligerents, and the 
Versailles Treaty. Those who have written about the period of U.S. neutrality tend to 
focus on President Wilson's view of the war, or the debate over the Versailles Treaty. 
Yet there has been no adequate discussion of the methods used by the British and 
German Foreign Offices as they attempted to direct U.S. policy. As discussed earlier, 
this leaves the topic needing to be re-examined with fresh archival research to fill gaps 
12 Memoirs of particular importance to this thesis include: Rear-Admiral, Sir Douglas Brownrigg, 
Indiscretions of the Naval Censor (New York, 1920); Alfred W. Ewing, The Man of Room 40: The Life of 
Sir Alfred Ewing (Hutchinson, 1939); Walter Garlitz, The Kaiser and His Court: The Diaries, Note Books 
and Letters of Admiral Georg Alexander von Miiller, Ch ief of the Naval Cabinet, 1914-1918 (New York, 
1959); Grey of Fallodon, Viscount, Twenty-Five Years (London, 1925); Theobald Von, Bethmann 
Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1919), trans. as Reflections on the World War 
(London, 1920); Stephen Gwynn, ed., The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice (Boston, 
1929); Count Bemstorff, My Three Years in America (New York, 1920); Memoirs of Count BernstorfJ 
(New York, 1936); Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, four volumes (Boston, 
1926); David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 2 vols. (London, 1936); William 
Jennings Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan (Philadelphia, 1925). 
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in the debate. The standard answer given in textbooks, scholarly books, and classrooms 
around the world is that the callousness of the German submarine blockade in the North 
Atlantic caused even a stem moralist like President Woodrow Wilson to grind his teeth 
and jump into the abyss. 
As historical analysis caught up with the historiography already underway 
biographies began adding to the understanding of the forceful personalities involved in 
the decision making processes. Konrad H. J arausch looks at aspects of First World War 
diplomacy in The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial 
Germany.13 While essentially a biography of the German Chancellor, The Enigmatic 
Chancellor covers many of the aspects of German diplomacy towards the United States 
during the war, as well as internal decisions, but amazingly does not deal with the 
problems created for German diplomacy by British diplomatic action. 14 Burton Jesse 
Hendrick's two-volume study The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page utilizes the 
ambassador's letters to give scholars a starting place from which to gain a perspective of 
the American ambassador to Great Britain's views on the war. IS 
13 Konrad H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial 
Germany (New Haven, 1973). 
14 Reinhard R. Doerries delves into German diplomacy with the United States in his book Imperial 
Challenge: Ambassador Count BernstorfJ and German-American Relations, 1908-1917 (Chapel Hill, 
1989). Doerries details German-American diplomatic relations prior to Wilson's decision to break 
relations with Germany in 1917. By focusing on Germany's ambassador to the United States, Doerries 
limits the analysis of the period to Bernstorffs decisions, omitting decisions made in Germany and how 
they affected or were affected by Britain's diplomacy. Bismarck: A Life (Oxford, 2011) by Jonathan 
Steinberg and Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy (Bloomington, 20 11) by Patrick J. Kelly take a look 
at the inner workings of the German Empire and two of its more forceful personalities. Steinberg'S work 
gives readers a new look at Bismarck's decisions and the reasoning behind them. For the purposes of this 
thesis it provides important information concerning the creation of German foreign policy traditions and 
how they laid the foundation for the decisions and work of Bethmann Hollweg, Jagow, and Zimmerman. 
Adding to this, Kelly's book is an in depth look at the founder of the modem German navy, the power he 
wielded and the concerns his positions created for those responsible for Germany's foreign policy. 
15 Burton Jesse Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, 2 vols. (New York, 1924); Other 
authors studying the impact of individual American diplomats include Ross Gregory's Walter Hines 
Page: Ambassador to the Court of St. James's (Lexington, 1970); Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's 
Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M House (New Haven, 2006); Robert W. Cherny, A Righteous 
Cause: The Life of William Jennings Bryan (Norman, 1985); Michael Kazin, A Godly Hero: The Life of 
William Jennings Bryan (New York, 2006); Kendrick A. Clements, William Jennings Bryan, Missionary 
Isolationist (Knoxville, 1982); Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1914-
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American diplomacy during the period of neutrality is most commonly 
discussed when dealing with the person most responsible for it, Woodrow Wilson. 
Studies dealing with the president have been churned out at an astonishingly high rate, 
the most obvious and longest study of which is Ray Stannard Baker's eight-volume 
biography Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters. 16 This was followed by the sixty-volume 
compendium of Wilson's writings edited by Arthur S. Link and David Hirst, The 
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, which contains a massive amount of material including 
Wilson's personal papers, but also includes select extracts from a few foreign 
archives. 17 Other early biographies of Wilson and his diplomacy include more work by 
Link. His 1957 work Wilson the Dip/omatist: A Look At His Major Foreign Policies 
reasserts the idea that Wilson's ideals and ambitions were the keys to U.S. involvement 
. h 18 In t e war. 
Two important themes that are elemental to most accounts regarding Wilson 
during the First World War are American isolation and internationalism. From the time 
of George Washington through to Wilson the United States had avoided becoming 
involved in European troubles. This did not preclude the United States from expanding 
its holdings at the expense of nations such as Spain and France, or signing trade 
agreements with European powers. But American isolationism hamstrung diplomats as 
they attempted to utilize American force to gain diplomatic success, forcing U.S. policy 
to be one of neutrality. 
1917(Berkley, 1958); Daniel M. Smith, 'Robert Lansing and the Formulation of American Neutrality 
Policies, 1914-1915', The Mississippi Valley Historical Review Vol. XLIII, No.1 (June, 1956), pp. 59-81. 
16 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, 8 vols, (Garden City, 1927-39). This series is 
most noted because of the author's personal relationship with the president, but is also weak because of 
the uncritical nature of the study. While old, it is still considered a starting point for anyone who wishes to 
understand Wilson's decisions. 
17 Arthur S. Link, et aI., The Papers o/Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, 1966). 
18 Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look At His Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore, 1957). Link, 
like so many others, does not look at the work of the British and German diplomats as crucial to 
American involvement in the war - he does not even mention either country's meddling in Mexican 
affairs as part of the diplomatic scheming that took place as they battled to acquire American assistance. 
16 
Wilson and internationalism are often paired in the sense that Wilson's 
intellectual background led him to believe that the countries of the world could work 
together to achieve a greater good. International law was, in Wilson's view, designed to 
maintain peace, prosperity, and morality among nations. Wilson desired the United 
States to be the driving force that would lead the rest of the world to a future of peace 
and harmony. 
Leading modem Wilson historians, John Milton Cooper and Thomas J. Knock 
focus on U.S. neutrality and Wilson's internationalism during the various stages they 
went through before U.S. entry to the war. 19 But neither Cooper nor Knock examines 
the impact of influence on Wilson's thought. Yes, Knock does point out in To End All 
Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order, that the ideas of Lillian 
Wald and Jane Addams influenced Wilson's ideas on the Fourteen Points, but they do 
not investigate the impact of House, or any of the diplomats who were working 
feverishly to guide American policy. 20 This is endemic of the scholarship on First 
19 John Milton Cooper, The Vanity of Power: American Isolationism and the First World War. 1914-1917 
(Westport, 1969); John Milton Cooper, ed., Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism. 
Internationalism. War and Peace (Washington, D.C., 2008). Cooper quickly followed this up with 
Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York, 2009) where he does an exemplary job of explaining the 
foundations of Wilson's thoughts. An odd aspect of Cooper's analysis of Wilson's diplomacy is that 
while consistently recognizing what he terms as 'the diplomatic fencing match' between Germany and the 
United States he, like so many others, does not allow American diplomacy to interact with that of the 
British or Germans. It is, instead, as if American diplomacy acts in a purely American vacuum as German 
submarine warfar drove Wilson to war. John Milton Cooper, 'The Shock of Recognition: the Impact of 
World War I on America'. The Virginia Quarterly Review vol. 76 (2000), p. 574. 
20 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wi/son and the Quest for a New World Order 
(Princeton, 1992). Knock points to left leaning organizations such as the Woman's Peace Party, as well as 
activists including Lillian Wald and Jane Addams as having communicated regularly with Wilson and 
whose ideas impacted the president's decisions on the role the U.S. would play in the war and his 
development of the Fourteen Points. Other authors who focus on isolationism and Wilson's desire to form 
a new world order are: Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe (Kent, 2009); John A. Thompson, Woodrow 
Wilson (London, 2002). Thompson's book is essentially an expansion of the article he wrote 'Woodrow 
Wilson and World War I: A Reappraisal', Journal of American Studies 19 (1985), pp. 325-348; Robert 
W. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War, 1914-1917 (Charlottesville, 2007); For a good critical 
view of Wilson's alleged tendency to moralize issues there is, John Morton Blum, Woodrow Wilson and 
the Politics of Morality (Boston, 1956); Malcolm D. Magee, What the World Should Be: Woodrow 
Wilson and the Crafting of a Faith-Based Foreign Policy (Waco, 2008); Mark Benbow, Leading Them to 
the Promised Land: Woodrow Wilson. Covenant Theology. and the Mexican Revolution. 1913 -1915 
(Kent, 2010). Authors who tend to focus on Wilson's internationalism include: Lloyd E. Ambrosius, 
Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge, 
17 
World War diplomacy. It focuses on either the individual or the event, but rarely both, 
and never on the larger context of British and German strategic thought and diplomatic 
practice. 
Charles Seymour's American Diplomacy during the World War gave readers a 
good initial look at Wilson's diplomacy but fell far short of explaining how British or 
German diplomacy was used to direct the American efforts, and perhaps more 
important, he did not have access to documents that would be declassified decades 
later. 21 Ross Gregory's The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War 
focuses on Wilson and his desire to remain neutral.22 While Gregory does address some 
of the problems caused by both Britain and Germany, his research is limited to British 
and American archives. This does not allow for a more intricate view of German 
attempts to control the administration and therefore control America's movement away 
from belligerency. Additionally, Gregory maintains the common theory that Wilson was 
forced to bring the United States into the war as a result of his desire to play 
peacemaker to the world. 
This narrow academic focus is continued in John W. Coogan's 'Wilsonian 
diplomacy in war and peace', published in American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 
1890-1993.23 In his chapter, Coogan focuses on nuances within the historical argument 
about Wilson's intent. In doing so, he does not focus on the impact of British and 
1987); Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I 
(Wilmington, 1991); Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations 
(New York, 2002); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to 
War and Revolution (London, 1968); David M. Esposito, Woodrow Wilson: American War Aims in 
World War I (Westport, 1996); Robert D. Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900 (New York, 2002) .. 
21 Charles Seymore, American Diplomacy During the World War (Baltimore, 1934); Thomas A. Bailey's 
1964 opus A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York, 1964) offers a strictly American 
perspective on First World War diplomacy consisting oftwo and a half chapters covering America's 
neutrality. One chapter of which is devoted to Wilson's issues with Mexico. Bailey must be given credit 
for treating Wilson's issues with Mexico as more than a mere training ground for his diplomacy. That 
being said he fails to connect the Mexican-American issues with the war in Europe and as a major 
contributor to the United States' entry into the war. 
22 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York, 1971). 
23 John W. Coogan, 'Wilsonian diplomacy in war and peace', in American Foreign Relations 
Reconsidered, 1890 -1993, ed. Gordon Martel (London, 1994), pp. 71-89. 
18 
German diplomatic acts or on the potential impact of non-state actors. Instead, he 
focuses on Wilson and his advisors' thought process as they blundered through 
neutrality and war, turning success into failure and failures into successes by both 
brilliance and luck. 
In Colonel House and Sir Edward Grey, A Study in Anglo-American Diplomacy 
Joyce Grigsby Williams takes an interesting view.24 William's conclusions tum out to 
be two-fold: first that Colonel House was deliberately manipulating the president to 
direct U.S. support towards Britain during neutrality with an eye on entering the war on 
the side of the Allies, and secondly that Grey manipulated House in an attempt to direct 
u.s. foreign policy. While Williams' arguments ring true, neither takes into account the 
effects of German diplomacy on the situation. 
Coogan and Williams' arguments, like those mentioned earlier, falls short of 
analysing the broader diplomatic thinking along with the role of the diplomat himself. 
This thesis places First World War diplomacy firmly into the long-term diplomatic 
strategies of Britain and Germany and then focuses on the impact individual diplomats 
had on the out-come of that diplomacy. 
Often treated as a sideshow to the concerns in Europe, Mexico's role in the 
diplomatic actions concerning America's entry into the war is covered most in depth by 
Friedrich Katz in his 1981 masterpiece, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, The United 
States and the Mexican Revolution.25 Katz masterfully covers how the rivalry between 
24 Joyce Grigsby Williams, Colonel House and Sir Edward Grey: A Study in Anglo-American Diplomacy 
(Lanham, 1984); Another study dedicated to Colonel House's role in First World War diplomacy is: 
David M. Esposito, 'Imagined Power: The Secret Life of Colonel House', The Historian vol. 60, issue 4 
(Summer 1998), pp. 741 - 756; Alexander L. George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel 
House: A Personality Study (New York, 1956) is another unflattering look at the relationship between 
Wilson and House and rests more on psychoanalytic than historical insight. 
25 Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe. The United States and the Mexican Revolution 
(Chicago, 1981). Other works of relevance dealing with Mexican-American-European diplomacy include: 
Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict 
(Cambridge, 1968); Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of 
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Britain, Germany, and the United States led to a covert war in Mexico and how the 
activities of these outside nations affected the Mexican nation and the diplomacy of the 
First World War. What is important about this work is that recognizes the importance of 
the strategic thought of the European powers and how this affected the United States 
and eventually the outcome ofthe First World War. 
So much of the literature dealing with the diplomacy of the war concerns its 
perceived failure leading Europe into the wasteland of trench warfare, its continued 
failure to end the slaughter, and the failure that becomes the debacle ofVersailles.26 But 
amongst all of the military maneuvers, battles, and blockades, amongst all decisions to 
widen the war and bring in new allies, the entry of the United States has been largely 
relegated to that of a sideshow and therefore written about in a very haphazard fashion. 
In most cases, British diplomacy is treated as a secondary theme when explaining the 
Wilson Administration's position on the British blockade of Germany, while German 
diplomacy - in relation to the United States - is primarily depicted as reflexive to their 
use of unrestricted submarine warfare.27 U.S. diplomatic policy is quite often seen as an 
avenue for Woodrow Wilson to play the 'saviour' by mediating an end to the war.28 
However, in Politicians, Diplomacy and War in Modern British History, Keith 
Robbins spends a considerable amount of time covering Sir Edward Grey's reign as 
Foreign Minister and First World War diplomacy.29 In doing so Robbins discusses 
Veracruz (New York, 1962); Jack Sweetman, The Landing at Veracruz: 1914 (Annapolis, 1968); William 
Weber Johnson, Heroic Mexico: The Violent Emergence of a Modern Nation (Garden City, 1968). 
26 Some examples of this are Marc Ferro, The Great War, 1914-1918 (London, 1969); James Jol1, The 
Origins Of The First World War (London, 1984); Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete 
History (New York, 1914); David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy 
(New York, 2004). 
27 A prime example is Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1914-1917 (New York, 
1972). More modern examples are Reinhard R. Doerries, Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count 
BernstorfJ and German-American Relations, 1908-1917 (Chapel Hill, 1989); Godfrey Hodgson, 
Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M House (New Haven, 2006). 
28 Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York, 2003); David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World 
War as Political Tragedy (New York, 2004). 
29 Keith Robbins, Politicians, Diplomacy and War in Modern British History (London, 1994). 
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British diplomacy over time, and how the British Foreign Office approached not only 
the coming of war in Europe, but the United States, the peace movement, and other 
neutral nations. In doing this, Robbins gives insight into how Britain dealt with the 
diplomatic issues it faced and how the Foreign Office utilized the same pattern of 
thinking over time. 
Essays that are of particular interest to the establishment of policy and how it 
was implemented during the period leading up to the First World War and the war itself 
are John Charmley's 'Splendid Isolation to Finest Hour: Britain as a Global Power, 
1900-1950', and T.G. Otte's 'Old Diplomacy: Reflections of the Foreign Office before 
1914,.30 Admittedly Otte spends a considerable amount of time refuting the claims that 
the Foreign Office was a place of play for the elite, but in the later portion of the article 
he does take the time to discuss the creation and tradition of British diplomatic strategy. 
Charmley's article looks at the Anglo-German antagonism and how British foreign 
policy worked in conjunction with the European continent and not in 'splendid 
isolation' . 
Erik Goldstein and B.J.C. McKercher also look at the continuity of foreign 
policy in Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy, 1865-1965.3\ Chapters such as 
Zara Steiner's 'British Power and Stability: The Historical Record' looks at the British 
Foreign Office in the build-up to both world wars, and while giving some insight into 
the issues facing British diplomacy in the early twentieth century she tends to focus on 
the post-First World War and pre-World War Two era.32 Brian Holden Reid's chapter 
30 T.G. Otte, 'Old Diplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Office before 1914', in The Foreign Office and 
British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. ed. Gaynor Johnson (London, 2005), pp. 31-52; John 
Charmley, 'Splendid Isolation to Finest Hour: Britain as a Global Power, 1900-1950', in The Foreign 
Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. ed. Gaynor Johnson (London, 2005), 130-146. 
31 Erik Goldstein and B.J.C. McKercher, Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy. 1865-1965 
(London, 2003). 
32 Zara Steiner, 'British Power and Stability: The Historical Record', in Power and Stability: British 
Foreign Policy. 1865-1965. eds. Erik Goldstein and B.J.C. McKercher (London, 2003), pp. 23-44. 
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'Power, Sovereignty, and the Great Republic: Anglo-American Diplomatic Relations in 
the Era of the Civil War' is a good discussion of how relations developed between the 
two nations up to the end of the nineteenth century and the British-American 
rapprochement that followed the Venezuelan crisis of 1896.33 T.G. Otte also contributes 
a chapter, 'Almost a Law of Nature'? Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Office, and the 
Balance of Power in Europe, 1905-12,.34 As the title suggests, the chapter is dedicated 
to the diplomacy surrounding the balance of power in Europe, but it also gives the 
reader insight into the inner workings of European diplomacy, something that one needs 
to understand in order to fully appreciate the diplomacy surrounding the U.S. period of 
neutrality. 
Historians, such as Karl Birnbaum in his book Peace Moves and U-boat 
Warfare, focus on one country's diplomatic moves during a select period of time during 
the war?5 Birnbaum focuses on the inner-workings of the German government as the 
military and diplomatic branches battled over the best method of bringing the war to a 
successful conclusion. But Birnbaum does not give the reader the ability to understand 
why so many of the German peace moves failed because he does not correlate them to 
what the British were doing. It is details such as those missing in Birnbaum's discussion 
about the diplomacy involved in both Great Britain and Germany's attempts to acquire 
33 Brian Holden Reid, 'Power, Sovereignty, and the Great Republic: Anglo-American Diplomatic 
Relations in the Era of the Civil War'. in Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy. 1865-1965. eds. 
Erik Goldstein and BJ.C. McKercher (London, 2003), pp. 45-76. 
34 T.G. Otte, 'Almost a Law of Nature'? Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Office, and the Balance of Power 
in Europe, 1905-12', in Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy. 1865-1965. eds. Erik Goldstein and 
BJ.C. McKercher (London, 2003), pp. 77-118. 
35 Karl Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-boat Warfare (Stockholm, 1958); Maurice Parmelee's Blockade 
and Sea Power: The Blockade. 1914-1919. and Its Significance For A World State (New York, 1924) is 
one ofa handful of books that were published so close to the war's end that it is hardly able to discern 
historical fact from propaganda fiction. That beings said, during its time, it served the purpose of 
introducing many Americans to some of the details surrounding Britain's interference in America's trade 
during the war. Other books that focus on the blockade are: Marion Siney, The Allied Blockade of 
Germany. 1914-1916 (Westport, 1957); A.C. Bell, The Blockade of the Germany and of the Countries 
Associated with Her in the Great War. Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria. and Turkey (London, 1937: published 
1961); Eric Osborne, Britain's Economic Blockade of Germany. 1914-1919 (London, 2004). 
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American favour during The Great War that this paper intends to pull out of the 
periphery and into the spotlight. 
John W. Coogan's unconventional look at the blockade in The End of 
Neutrality: The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899-1915 addresses the 
diplomacy of maritime policies, astutely placing the Anglo-American fight over 
blockade into the context oflong-term grand strategy.36 In doing so Coogan expands the 
discussion of First World War diplomacy outside of the 1914-1918 time frame 
historians have confined it to for almost one hundred years. Much of Coogan's analysis 
surrounds the Declaration of London which came about as a result of the 1908 London 
Conference. The Declaration of London was a compromise between leading maritime 
powers to find a judicial means to end maritime disputes that was never ratified by any 
of the nations that had crafted it but was nonetheless held-out as legal by the United 
States during the early years of the First World War. 
A much older look at U.S.-British relations during the first few years of the war 
is Richard W. Van Alstyne's 'The Policy of the United States Regarding the 
Declaration of London, At the Outbreak of the Great War,37 Even though this article is 
considered out of date, it is often referred to as it is a well-written analysis of early war 
diplomatic attempts by Britain to use its strongest weapon and not lose U.S. support. 
That being said, it is limited in its scope and through the availability of sources. 
Rodney Carlisle provides a fresh view of the cause of U.S. entry into the war in 
his book Sovereignty At Sea: U.S. Merchant Ships and American Entry Into World War 
36 John W. Coogan, The End of Neutrality: The United States. Britain. and Maritime Rights. 1899-1915 
(Ithaca, 1981). 
37 Richard W. Van Alstyne, 'The Policy Of The United States Regarding The Declaration Of London, At 
The Outbreak Of The Great War', The Journa/ of Modern lIistory 7 (1933), pp. 434 - 47. 
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l. 38 Carlisle's position focuses on the sinking of several U.S. flagged merchant ships 
after the United States had broken relations with Germany, citing Wilson's belief that 
an attack on these ships was an overt act of war. Carlisle's focus is on the diplomacy 
that surrounded the submarine war and on that he does an admirable job, but without a 
focus on other diplomatic work being done during this time period his narrow focus 
places other elements of diplomacy secondary (at best) to the submarine, and does not 
allow for the impact of British diplomacy in pushing Wilson to war. 
A long term study of a mix of naval history and diplomacy is found in Holger H. 
Herwig's Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-
1941.39 In the midst of documenting the mounting issues that led to German-American 
mutual distrust, Herwig discusses internal German deliberations about the U-boat 
campaigns and the United States' reactions. 
Along this same line of thought is Dirk Bonker's recent book, Militarism In A 
Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States Before World War 1.40 
While clearly dealing with issues between the two nations prior to the outbreak of the 
First World War, Bonker's analysis of the issues stressing the bonds of friendship 
between the United States and Germany provides a base for understanding the 
continuity of policy Germany used in dealing with the United States. 
This thesis will show that this is too simple an answer, too easy of a leap, and 
one that has been accepted far too often. In order to take a fresh look at the diplomacy 
of this time it is essential to analyse the careful management or 'handling' of Wilson, 
his confidante Edward M. House, and other members of the United States government 
38 Rodney Carlisle, Sovereignty At Sea: U.s. Merchant Ships and American Entry Into World War I 
(Gainesville, 2009); Another book of interest on this subject is: Jeffrey J. Safford, Wilsonian Maritime 
Diplomacy 19/3-1921 (New Brunswick, 1978). 
39 Holger H. Herwig, Politics o/Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning. 1889-1941 
(Boston, 1976). 
40 Dirk Bonker, Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States Be/ore 
World War I (Ithaca, 2012). 
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by the British Foreign Office (most notably Sir Edward Grey) in helping ensure that 
America would support Britain financially and eventually as a co-belligerent. Because 
this clearly did not occur in a vacuum the work of the German Foreign Office as it 
attempted to maintain American neutrality must be taken into account. The feverish 
work of Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Ambassador Count Bemstorff and other 
members of Auswartiges Amt cannot be discounted as simple ineptitude and event-
driven diplomacy. After all, Germany was successful at appeasing American interests 
from August 1914 to April 1917, a span of nearly three crisis-filled years. 
By using British, German and American documents this dissertation will present 
a more complete picture of British and German diplomacy used to influence American 
policy during the period of U.S. neutrality. This study of diplomacy does not cover 
absolutely every factor involved, but by utilizing the sources of the three major powers 
involved in American neutrality it goes beyond what has already been done, forcing 
scholars to re-examine existing conclusions as to the causes of the U.S. entry into the 
Great War. 
Chapter one of this thesis is an analysis of how prior British and German 
diplomacy towards the United States laid the groundwork for the diplomatic battle for 
America that would occur during the American period of neutrality. Specifically, this 
chapter will focus on how the British Foreign Office was able to successfully blend 
America's decision to charge U.S. coastal shipping a different rate than that of the rest 
of the world's shipping (commonly known as the Panama Tolls controversy) and 
Wilson's obsession to remove Victoriano Huerta from the Mexican presidency in order 
to sway American policy to benefit British interests. This chapter will also focus on the 
pre-war German-American diplomacy surrounding the issues of Samoa and the 
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perceived Gennan interference in the Spanish-America war, and how Americans began 
to view Gennan as a result of those issues. 
Chapter one goes on to analyse the first meetings between members of the 
Wilson administration, in particular Colonel Edward M. House, and members of the 
British and Gennan governments. These initial meetings took place prior to the 
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and therefore represent an opportunity for a closer 
analysis of how the diplomats were staking out their positions with the United States. 
House's trip to Europe was ostensibly to help Europe avoid war and this chapter focuses 
on how Grey and Bethmann Hollweg attempted to down-play their countries role in 
heating up the tensions in Europe while at the same time exaggerating the role of the 
other. 
Chapter two examines the role of the British Foreign Office regarding the 
American response to the blockade of Gennany. In their attempt to keep supplies from 
reaching Gennany, Britain's naval activities brought howls of protest from the U.S. 
government and businesses as Britain's blockade delayed and confiscated American 
cargos, potentially hanning America's economy. In particular it analyses the policies 
put in place by Grey, and carried out with the help of Ambassador Spring Rice, to 
change the focus of U.S. complaints about the blockade from one of international 
legality, to a concern for American public opinion. This chapter will reveal the extent of 
the success the British Foreign Office had in creating a mind-set of neglect in the United 
States regarding the British blockade. In doing so, this chapter will effectively answer 
the question of why Wilson and Lansing responded so lightly to British interference of 
American commerce on the high seas. 
The third chapter examines the use of the submarine and its effect on Gennan 
and American diplomacy. The American response upon being notified of Gennany's 
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intent to use the submarine to blockade the British Isles, resulted in Wilson declaring 
that the u.s. would hold Germany to 'strict accountability' in the event that U.S. lives 
or property were lost to submarine warfare. This chapter will demonstrate how the 
diplomacy of Bethmann Hollweg and Ambassador Bernstorff was used to frame the 
submarine war debate with the United States. The analysis will show that Bethmann's 
policy was effective in allowing submarines to operate while maintaining friendly 
relations between the two countries. Evidence in this chapter will also show that 
Wilson's 'strict accountability' policy turned out to be the American policy expected by 
German diplomats based on prior diplomatic interactions. To that end, this chapter 
provides evidence that German diplomats successfully blunted the threat of American 
entry into the war provided by controversies surrounding the sinking of merchant ships. 
Chapter four is an analysis of the Wilson administration's policies towards 
Mexico and how the history between the two countries led German leaders to believe 
that a German-Mexican alliance could keep America out of the fighting European. The 
evidence provided will demonstrate that the long history of distrust in Mexican-
American relations played a key role in creating an atmosphere of distrust that Germany 
sought to exploit through the use of her diplomacy. This chapter will analyze Wilson's 
policies towards Mexico and how they were perceived by the Mexican people. It will 
then demonstrate how Germany's consistency in diplomacy mixed with the Mexican 
reaction to American interference led to Germany's decision in 1916 to offer an alliance 
to Mexico. The analysis will show that Zimmerman's famous telegram of 16 January 
1917 was a sound decision based on German diplomatic history and the needs of the 
German military. 
The fifth and final chapter analyses how the hope of peace was used as a means 
of manipulating the Wilson administration by both the British and German Foreign 
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Offices. Beginning with the initial peace discussions that stretched from September 
1914 into June 1915, and which created the framework for all future peace offers this 
chapter examines the belligerents' use of peace as a diplomatic strategy. This chapter 
also analyses the motivation behind the distinctly one sided peace initiative between the 
United States and Great Britain in the House-Grey Memorandum and examines the 
reasoning for Bethmann' s peace initiative of 12 December 1916 that pre-empted 
President Wilson's long awaited call for peace. 
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Chapter One: 
Pre-War Diplomacy 
In his farewell address to the American nation on 17 September 1796 U.S. 
President George Washington cautioned the United States to 'steer clear of permanent 
alliances with any portion of the foreign world. ,41 According to Robert Kagan, 
Americans viewed Washington's speech as a call for the young American nation to 
isolate itself from the rest of the world and not entangle itself with foreign treaties.42 
Henry Kissinger believes that the American people saw the phrase as an 'injunction 
against foreign entanglements' by America's most venerated Founding Father.43 
Although the United States acquired vast amounts of territory on the North American 
continent American leaders did create and maintain a commercial relationship and only 
a commercial relationship with the European powers, foregoing the use of any military 
alliances. But with its growing population and ever increasing industrial output, the 
United States' influence expanded and, correspondingly, its role in the world expanded. 
As war clouds loomed and eventually unleashed a storm of unprecedented 
proportions in Europe, the vast majority of Americans were opposed to becoming 
militarily involved in what was termed a European war. During the early months of the 
war it was clear that they wanted their country to take action against attacks on U.S. 
interests at sea (by both Britain and Germany). It was also abundantly clear that outside 
of the American eastern seaboard and the eastern elites most Americans preferred that 
the United States remain neutral. 44 Historians such as David Stevenson, and L.L. 
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Farrar, Jr., when discussing the early months of the war and the potential American role, 
focus on the perception of a lack of involvement by the U.S. - assuming that because of 
the United States' historical reluctance to intervene militarily in European conflicts, and 
its small military, that the country would be of little consequence in a short war.45 
Despite a belief that the war would be short, the reality was that British and German 
diplomats realized the potential impact of the U.S. on the outcome ofthe war and began 
immediately working to influence the United States for their gain. 
Too often, America's role during its period of neutrality is viewed in a vacuum 
as historians focus on individual events during the war years rather than tying the issues 
to events that preceded Germany's invasion of Belgium.46 Diplomacy, as eloquently 
explained by Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond, is the recognition of events and 
trends as they are filtered though previous experiences.47 Therefore, to effectively 
analyze how and why Britain and Germany wrangled diplomatically for America's 
support during the First World War, the history of the relations among these three 
countries must be considered. 
It was shortly after the end of the Spanish-American war that Britain and 
Germany fully recognized that the United States had the potential to be stronger than 
almost any of the European powers. It was this potential that scared Great Britain and 
Germany into taking steps to strengthen their ties with the United States.48 Maurice 
Pearton notes that a fundamental problem in the diplomacy among these nations was the 
45 David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy (New York, 2004), p. 6; L.L. 
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46 Historians such as John Milton Cooper, Jr., Ross Gregory, and John A. Thompson to name only a few. 
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Americans' rejection of the 'traditional European notion' of diplomacy.49 He goes on to 
explain that the American view was that diplomacy was an evil that had to be dealt 
with; therefore each international event leading to a diplomatic crisis was seen by the 
Americans as a single episode to solve and move away from, while the European 
position was that foreign policy was fluid and continuous.50 These differences would 
lead to some of the early confusion about agreements as well as distrust of Britain and 
Germany, as Americans became aware of the work being done by foreign diplomats on 
u.s. soil. 
Britain, popularly viewed by Americans as a long time antagonist, and despised 
by the large Irish-American population, had the natural bond of a common language and 
culture with the United States. Nevertheless, it was Britain's history with, and policies 
toward, America that led to several minor quarrels between the two countries. It was not 
until after the Venezuelan Crisis of 1896 that the British government decided that the 
best policy for dealing with the United States was one which recognized America's 
importance in the Western Hemisphere in particular and the world in general, and began 
promoting friendship between the two countries. 5 I 
In contrast, Germany had a long and relatively pleasant history with the United 
States. In 1785 Prussia became one of the first countries to recognize the newly born 
nation. Friendly relations continued virtually uninterrupted until about 1877 when 
Germany and the United States would confront each other over the control of the tiny 
Pacific island nation of Samoa. 52 Adding to the feelings of friendship were the large 
numbers of German-Americans living in the United States during this time. Germany's 
49 Maurice Pearton, Diplomacy, War and Technology Since 1830 (Lawrence, 1982), p. 14. 
50 Ibid., p. 14. 
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quick ascension to continental power status in Europe and her desire to become a world 
power at virtually the same time as America was entering the world stage brought about 
numerous confrontations between the two burgeoning powers. These confrontations and 
how the diplomats handled them would set the stage for the manner in which many of 
the diplomatic battles for America would be fought during the First World War. 
This chapter will briefly examine several diplomatic clashes during the years 
preceding 1914, and analyse how the British and German construction of diplomacy 
regarding the United States laid the groundwork for the 1914-1917 battle for America. 
This will help explain why Britain and Germany approached the United States as they 
did and how this affected America's decision to leave the relative safety of neutrality. 
This chapter will provide a basis for explaining Britain and Germany's method of 
dealing with the United States. It will address the background and early manoeuvres of 
diplomats in the first few months of the war outlining the reasoning behind each 
Foreign Office's plan toward dealing with United States. Addressing this aspect of 
Great War diplomacy will help our understanding of why the belligerent governments 
worked so hard at appearing to appease the American government and her people. 
The first section will be devoted to explaining the German attempts at 
rapprochement with the United States and how the two countries dealt with the growing 
rivalry associated with the two countries emerging as world powers at the same time. 
Section two describes how the British Foreign Office interacted with the United States 
in the years prior to 1914, focusing on the Panama Tolls controversy and the Mexican 
presidency. Issues concerning Mexico plagued the British-American relationship 
throughout the war. Section three is dedicated to an analysis of the initial problems 
faced by the German Foreign Office in their attempts to maintain American friendship 
while preparing their own economic war against Britain. The fourth section deals with 
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Grey's work to place the Wilson administration in a favourable position towards 
Britain's developing policy of economic warfare against Germany. 
A Latent Animosity: German-American Relations 
America's association with the German people began in earnest in September 
1785 with Prussia's recognition of the young American nation by way ofa commercial 
treaty that would last, in various forms, for almost a century. During the U.S. Civil War, 
the Frankfurt exchange supported the U.S. government by granting billions of Marks of 
American bonds, in contrast to Britain and France who refused to grant bonds to the 
Union.53 By the end of the U.S. Civil War in 1865, Germany was in the midst of her 
wars of unification that ran from 1862 - 1870. The leaders of both countries saw their 
own ideals in the trials of the other. 54 Between the founding of the American republic 
and 1914 approximately 1.5 million Germans immigrated to the United States, of whom 
approximately 750,000 immigrated to the United States between 1848 and 1850, giving 
the two countries some common cultural roots. 55 It was not until the two countries were 
looking to expand outside of their continental regions that conflicts were to arise. 
Since America entered the First World War in 1917 there has been considerable 
scholarship focusing on German military blunders but take little account of the greater 
diplomatic picture.56 To be sure, Germany did make mistakes diplomatically as they 
dealt with the United States, but it was their incapacity to learn from those mistakes that 
would become Germany's downfall during the period of American neutrality. 
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S4 Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History (Ithaca, 1984), pp. 18-19; Hans 
W. Gatzke, Germany and the United States: 'A Special Relationship?' (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 38-39. 
55 Ibid. p. 30. 
S6 Several authors that fall into this rut include: David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The First World War as 
political Tragedy (New york, 2004); David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics 
(Oxford, 1988); Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York, 1998); Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the 
United States, 'A Special Relationship?' (Cambridge, 1980). 
33 
Citizens of both the United States and Germany viewed the diplomatic 
groundwork displayed under Bismarck's Chancellery after Germany's unification in 
1871 as the standard for which relations between the two countries would be conducted. 
To understand Germany's foreign policy during this time period it is necessary to 
understand Bismarck's position on Europe and European colonies. Historians such as 
Erich Brandenburg, Fritz Stem, and William Young point out that Bismarck's 
philosophy was that Germany's foreign policy was Europe centred - it must solidify 
Germany's place in Europe first and foremost - and colonialism was a private issue to 
be supported by the government.57 Bismarck believed that foreign policy's role was to 
'exploit and moderate' European adversaries in order to strengthen Germany's 
influence.58 It is precisely because Bismarck's diplomacy was the basis, and the bar, for 
which all future Chancellors would rate their diplomacy that his philosophy is the key to 
the Gennan diplomatic difficulties from 1890-1917. 
Christopher Clark points out in Kaiser Wilhelm II: Profiles in Power that 
Bismarck had considerable influence on Wilhelm's development beginning in 1884, 
creating what was essentially a diplomatic tutelage. 59 William Young concurs with 
Clark's conclusion, noting that Bismarck was 'given the responsibility to train Prince 
Wilhelm in foreign affairs. ,60 With Wilhelm II's ascension to the throne in 1888 he 
envisioned having more direct influence on the foreign affairs of his country, and in 
1890, with the removal of his former teacher from the Chancellor's office the Kaiser 
57 Erich Brandenburg, From Bismarck To The World War: A History of German Foreign Policy. 1870-
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was assured of being the primary voice in the development and actions Germany took in 
its foreign policy initiatives.61 
Edgar Feuchtwanger observes that Bismarck viewed colonialism as yet another 
means to embroil Germany's rivals in peripheral battles, weakening them on the 
European continent and allowing Germany to build or maintain alliances that would 
benefit Germany within the confines of Europe proper.62 Therefore the theory that it 
was not until Wilhelm II came to power that Germany began a frantic and undisciplined 
attempt to find its 'place in the sun' does not hold up under scrutiny. Bismarck began 
Germany's foray into colonialism in 1884-1885 by acquiring colonies in Africa and the 
Pacific, and Kaiser Wilhelm II continued this practice with the seizure of Kiaochow Bay 
in China in 1897.63 Several of Germany's post-Bismarck foreign policies are absolutely 
Bismarkian in their practice, in particular the Kaiser's decision to remain neutral during 
The Boer War with the idea of enmeshing Britain in a distant and costly war.64 It was 
Bismarck's penchant for embroiling others in conflict, mixed with his decision to 
dabble in colonialism, that set the stage for the future of German-American relations. 
Because the United States was also seeking to expand its colonial holdings at the 
same time as Germany, conflict between the two was bound to occur, but it would be 
Germany's European centred foreign policy that would poison the waters of friendship. 
The Samoan affair that began in the 1870s and continued until 1889 is an excellent 
example of how Germany's foreign policy and American imperialism led to early 
cracks in the German-American relationship. 
Germany's position in Samoa followed Bismarck's view of colonial holdings 
with German commercial interests establishing a foothold in South Seas. Thus by the 
61 Edgar Feuchtwanger, Imperial Germany. 1850-1918 (London, 2001), p. 106. 
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1860s Germans controlled approximately 70 percent of commerce in the region.65 
Problems arose after the United States, Britain, and Germany all secured rights in 
Samoa between 1877 and 1879.66 Negotiations among the three powers ensued over 
how to solve the division of Samoa, with the British willing to cede control to Germany, 
and the United States lobbying for Samoan autonomy. In order to ensure German 
commercial interests were maintained German marines forcibly removed the Samoan 
King and installed a pro-German leader in his place. This action led to sensationalist 
articles appearing in several prominent American newspapers calling for war against 
Germany and complaining about the lack of action by the U.S. State Department.67 This 
public pressure soon translated into a direct threat when Senator Carl Schurz sent 
Bismarck a letter threatening the destruction of Germany if war were to ensue over 
Samoa. In pressing its commercial interests in the Pacific, American citizens saw 
Germany's actions as jeopardizing U.S. interests.68 Due to his position on colonial 
holdings and his belief that war with America would only weaken Germany, Bismarck 
worked to defuse the situation as much as possible, without giving up Germany's 
commercial interests in the islands. 
Beginning in November 1887, Bismarck had numerous exchanges with 
American officials in which he attempted to dispel American worries by expressing his 
regret that 'the two nations should differ as to the affairs on those remote and 
unimportant islands.'69 In January of 1888, German charge d'affaires in the United 
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States, Baron von Zedtwitz, carried out Bismarck's directions by reminding Secretary of 
State Thomas Bayard that Germany had always recognized the rights of other countries 
in Samoa and 'aspired to no political advantage' in the country.70 The Samoan issue was 
finally laid to rest in 1899 with Britain renouncing its rights to the Island in return for 
German territory in West Africa and the Solomon Islands, the United States maintaining 
its naval station at Pago Pago, and Germany acquiring Western Samoa and keeping its 
naval station at Apia.71 Bismarck's actions had helped ease tensions between the two 
counties for a time, but the stage was set for Americans to view Germany as a 
militaristic country that was interfering with America's growth. Germany's next run-in 
with the United States would do nothing to change this view. 
The Spanish-American War began in 1898, less than ten years after the issues of 
Samoa in 1889, and brought about yet another disagreement between German and U.S. 
foreign policy. Germany's initial reaction to the Spanish-American conflict was to 
maintain neutrality, avoiding even the appearance of anti-American sentiments.72 The 
Kaiser did finally give Germany's support to the Spanish in an attempt to preserve 
continuance in their foreign policy and maintain the balance of power in Europe. 73 
While the Kaiser's support was relegated to a tacit support of Spain, and matched that 
of the continental powers, to the American leadership it appeared as if Germany was 
once again taking a position contrary to America's. 74 
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Despite the supposed mistreatment of the Cuban people by the Spanish as the 
catalyst for the United States war with Spain, it was the German military actions in the 
Philippine Islands that really drew American ire. Shortly after the U.S. navy destroyed 
the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, the German High Seas Fleet sailed a sizeable force in 
to the bay, ostensibly to protect its citizen's interests. The act of sending a large naval 
force to the Philippines is yet another example of Germany's European-based foreign 
policy leading to a misunderstanding with the United States. Manfred Jonas points out 
that Germany did not intend to take over the Philippines but they did expect a 'division 
of the SpOilS.'75 To the German leadership this seemed to be a perfectly natural request 
by one world power to another, but many Americans saw this as yet another example of 
German aggression and interference in United States interests.76 
The American public's view of Germany as a militant bully was further fed by 
German actions in China in 1900 and Venezuela in 1902, when German warships 
bombarded the port of Maracaibo while involved in ajoint blockade of the country with 
Britain in an attempt to force payment on debts owed. Confusion and misunderstanding 
concerning Germany's move in the spring of 1914 to ship weapons to Mexican 
President Victoriano Huerta also did not settle well with the United States. Not only did 
it seem that Germany was violating the Monroe Doctrine, but it occurred at the same 
time as America's spat with Britain over the Huerta presidency, giving the appearance 
that Germany was attempting to take advantage of the situation. 
Britain and the U.S.: The Intimacy of Attraction and Repulsion 
By the time Sir Edward Grey took over as Foreign Secretary in 1905, the desire 
for friendship between Britain and the United States had become a staple of British 
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diplomacy.77 During his tenure in office, Grey was determined to continue this policy, 
and as a result, he immediately began cultivating his American counterparts, setting the 
cornerstone for his future dealing with the country. Much has been written about Grey's 
character and abilities or inabilities, but Ross Gregory's description of Grey as 'wise 
and experienced in the ways of diplomacy ... ideally suited to influence Americans ... ' 
depicts Grey as the embodiment of the type of person with whom Americans wanted to 
do business.78 Grey's approach was to use his skills as a diplomat to get what he wanted 
from the United States without jeopardizing the two countries' budding friendship. A 
perfect example of this practice and often quoted utterance of Grey's is his remark 
during the First World War that 'The object of diplomacy ... was to secure the maximum 
of blockade that could be enforced without a rupture with the United States. ,79 
Experience had taught Grey that successful diplomacy required the use of his 
ambassadors and other agents of the British government to provide him with insight into 
other countries' actions, before that country could respond negatively to Britain. It had 
also taught him that friendly conversation often led to information. 80 
Upon meeting Walter Hines Page, the new American Ambassador to St. James' 
Court in 1913, Grey turned on his charm and put his diplomatic expertise to work. Grey 
was intent on giving the impression that he would work with the United States as much 
as he could without putting his country's position at risk. The Foreign Secretary did so 
by holding frequent discussions with Page where both men seemingly withheld nothing, 
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while in reality Grey was gaining Page's trust and creating a friendship based on the 
F . M·· , d 81 oreIgn mIster s nee s. 
Before Wilson's election in 1912, Britain and the United States had come to 
disagree on two issues whose resolution would set the tone for the diplomacy between 
the two countries - the revolution in Mexico and the Panama tolls controversy. Both 
events flared into controversies between the two countries in 1913. In regards to 
Mexico, Grey had taken a wait and see attitude to the change in leadership - his main 
objective being to ensure the protection of British commercial interests in the country. 
The Panama tolls controversy began during the Taft administration, with the passage of 
the Panama Canal Tolls Act of 1912 exempting America's coastwise shipping from 
paying tolls when utilizing the Panama Canal. 82 Grey dutifully lodged a stem and 
formal complaint with the United States, but deftly decided against submitting the 
matter for arbitration, leaving room for discussion between London and Washington.83 
As Wilson's administration came into the White House in the winter of 1913, these two 
diplomatic issues quickly came to the front burner. 
President Wilson's position regarding who held the presidency in Mexico would 
be the catalyst for concern in both the United States and Britain. Due to the bloodshed 
and losses in American property caused by Victoriano Huerta's deposal of Francesco 
Madero, Wilson refused to recognize Huerta as the rightful leader of Mexico, and 
expected other countries to follow suit. Initially, Grey had promised U.S. Charge 
d' Affaires in London, Irwin Laughlin that he would follow Wilson's lead, but because 
the British Navy was somewhat dependent on oil from Mexico, he had to take a more 
practical approach and, within only a few weeks of making his promise, recognized 
81 G.M. Trevelyan, Grey ofFallodon (London, 1937), p. 114; Ross Gregory, Walter Hines Page, 
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Huerta - who promised stability and a continued flow of oil. This apparent about-face 
both surprised and rankled Wilson and his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan. 
Generally covered by historians as an issue unrelated to U.S. neutrality in the 
war years 1914-1917, the Panama Canal Tolls issue and the Mexican issue were very 
much tied together as part of Sir Edward Grey's diplomatic plan.84 As early as 4 
November 1912 Grey had stated to his Ambassador in America that if the United States 
was not willing to hold to the obligations of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, he was willing 
to submit the disagreement over the tolls to Arbitration, a threat he did not take lightly.85 
In October 1912, only a month earlier, Grey had confided to then ambassador to the 
United States Lord Bryce that he feared that if the U.S. refused Arbitration it would 
harm the general cause of Arbitration. 86 The change in Grey's attitude matched the 
change in the presidency ofthe United States. As Wilson took office, Grey's diplomatic 
pressure over the Tolls issue did not slacken, for in this case, a new administration did 
not mean a change in policy as Wilson had actively supported the Canal Act in order to 
win the Irish-American vote.87 
Grey was now seemingly battling with the United States over the Panama toll 
issue and the Presidency of Mexico. The importance of Grey's actions concerning 
Mexico and the Panama tolls was not apparent at the time, but it later proved to be a 
precursor to his actions towards and dealings with the United States during America's 
period of neutrality. The strategy Grey utilized was to press the U.S. as far as he dared 
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without provoking retaliation - a technique that would prove to be of immense value 
during the war. Grey's method was time consuming in that it tended to draw disputes 
out over a long period of time, thus allowing Britain to continue its actions while the 
United States attempted to formulate a response. Grey's offensive over the Panama tolls 
was a successful diplomatic tactic that also allowed him to gain knowledge of the power 
structure within Wilson's administration.88 
While seemingly unrelated to the issues of Mexico and Panama, Colonel 
Edward M. House, Wilson's most trusted confidant, had convinced Wilson of the need 
for a trip to Europe and in the spring of 1913, set out to use American prestige to quiet 
the rumblings between Germany and Britain. Within the United States House was 
considered a master at local politics and administration, and although he had absolutely 
no diplomatic experience he dreamt of diplomatic predominance.89 
Upon first meeting Colonel House in July 1913, Grey deftly dispensed with the 
European diplomatic pageantry so despised by Americans and talked freely with House 
about a wide range of items, just as he had with Page - all the time discreetly directing 
his conversation with House to the subjects of Mexico and the tolls.90 House was so 
unaware of Grey's tactical move in the conversation that he mentioned in his diary that 
the two 'fell to talking of the Mexican situation' and again later that the conversation 
'drifted to the Panama Canal tolls question. ,91 Grey allowed House talk freely, simply 
asking questions, leading House and allowing him to unintentionally expose U.S. 
positions. In the case of Mexico, Grey led House into telling him that the United States 
was not as concerned with the fact that Huerta was in power as it was that he (Huerta) 
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had reneged on his promise to call for early elections.92 Grey intimated that Britain had 
only recognized Huerta provisionally, and that if the Mexican president did not keep his 
promise that recognition could easily change. 93 
Simply put, Grey got House to tell him what the United States' position was, 
and then gave House what he wanted to hear - a tacit offer to withdraw British support 
for Huerta in exchange for Americas' repeal of the Canal Act. 94 In the midst of the 
conversation Grey was able to discern that it would be a prudent diplomatic move to set 
the Panama ToU's question aside for the time being and he told House as much.95 This 
apparent friendliness and honesty gained House's trust. 
Grey's manipulation of House was not to stop there. A few days later he would 
stop Ambassador Page for the expressed purpose of telling him how happy he was to 
meet House, thereby padding the inexperienced diplomat's ego and priming him for 
future meetings.96 While this seems innocuous enough, to an inexperienced diplomat 
such as House, it is exactly the kind of adulation that makes a huge impression. To 
House, Grey's willingness to discuss items informally and to table some items until a 
future date seemed to be an indication that Grey was someone to be trusted and with 
whom the United States could work. House had no way of knowing that this was part of 
Grey's diplomatic agenda. Grey followed this up when he sent his personal secretary, 
Sir William Tyrrell- a man with whom House had spent considerable time while in 
London and with whom House felt he could discuss items candidly - to the United 
States in November 19l3. It was also during this time that Grey became fully aware 
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that House had the President's ear - knowledge that would prove golden in the coming 
years. 
Safe in the knowledge that the Wilson administration was favourable towards 
Britain, Grey took a position of opposition to that of the United States and held it only 
as long as he needed to get what he wanted. Grey gambled that the United States would 
help guarantee that Mexican oil would continue to flow to the Royal Navy, while at the 
same time giving Wilson and his cabinet the feeling that they had a true friend they 
could work with in the world. 
By January 1914, House would secretly tell British Ambassador Spring Rice 
that there was a fair chance that the Tolls Act would be repealed.97 Based on 
information that continued to pour in from Spring Rice, Grey learned that his Minister 
to Mexico, Sir Lionel Carden, had become very unpopular with members of Wilson's 
cabinet. 98 Grey intended to continue to pressure the United States over the issue of 
Panama Tolls by utilizing the American obsession with Mexico. Grey intentionally held 
Carden in London while the U. S. Congress was debating the Panama Tolls issue, and 
while he had not officially cut a deal with the United States, he let it become known to 
the President that Carden would not return to Mexico until after congress had reached a 
decision.99 This action freed Wilson to browbeat congress into matching Britain's 
unselfish act and repeal the Panama Canal Tolls Act. Grey's tactics had proven 
successful, and what's more, he had learned an immense amount about how the Wilson 
administration would react to pressure and foreign policy. 
The diplomatic tactics developed by Grey to deal with the United States and, in 
particular, the Wilson Administration set the stage for future engagements between the 
97 Telegram from Spring Rice to Grey, 29, January 1914. PRO 170, FO 800/84, Sir Edward Grey Papers, 
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two countries. By dispensing with traditional European pageantry, using flattery, and 
speaking plainly with American Ambassador Page and presidential advisor Edward 
House, Grey had created a dynamic between the British Foreign Office and the 
Presidency ofthe United States based on a sense of friendship and frankness that 
seemingly aligned British and American interests. In dealing with Grey over the 
Mexican presidency and Panama Tolls issues Wilson, House, and Page all felt at ease 
with Grey and the way he handled diplomacy. As tensions in Europe began to boil over 
in the summer of 1914 Grey and the British Foreign Office would continue to cultivate 
the good feelings developed between the two nations in order to maintain U. S. support 
for British policy. Additionally, these experiences would provide a comfortable 
background for Grey to draw from as he worked to neutralize U. S protests over British 
policy during the period of American neutrality. Through a combination of discreet 
pressure, friendly conversation, and adulation Grey had successfully brought about a 
sense of concinnity between the United States and Great Britain. But amity with 
America was not solely a British policy, for Germany was also attempting to sow the 
seeds of friendship with America. 
Rapprochement a la Kaiser Wilhelm II 
As noted earlier, the simultaneous rise of the United States and Germany on the 
world scene led to a number of disputes between the two countries. Despite this 
competition, Kaiser Wilhelm understood that Germany was not in a position to confront 
the U.S. directly. Just as Britain was working diplomatically to create a closer 
relationship with the United States, so was Germany. Regardless of the reason behind 
negative views of Germany held by the non-German-American public, or the German 
misunderstanding of American views on foreign policy, the Kaiser understood the need 
to re-establish a positive German-American relationship. Although the Spanish-
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American war marked the point that the United States was recognized as a power on the 
world stage, Germany had already begun a policy of detente. 
When the Dominican Republic offered Germany a naval base in 1897, the 
Kaiser declined citing his desire to maintain good relations with the United States, and 
again in1899, while negotiating the purchase of the Caroline Islands from Spain, the 
Kaiser instructed State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von BUlow that 'it is the 
task of diplomacy to avoid difficulties and misunderstandings with the U.S. as long as it 
is compatible with the dignity of the Empire. ,100 In 1899 Germany started the 
construction of a cable link between the two countries that he hoped would break the 
one-sided flow of information the Americans were getting from Britain. 101 An exchange 
program for professors from Germany and the United States was created in the hopes of 
producing an intellectual connection between the two countries. 
In a further attempt to grow the bonds of friendship with America the Kaiser 
appointed Herman Speck von Stemburg, who had good relations with President 
Roosevelt, as Ambassador to the United States during Roosevelt's administration. 
Manfred Jonas describes Stemburg's diplomatic credentials as paltry at best and argues 
that he did little to represent Germany's views, failing at his primary purpose to 
improve German-American relations. 102 Reinhard Doerries counters Jonas' claim by 
stating that Stemburg was 'very popular in the United States and thus well suited to 
prepare the way for establishing friendly relations between the two countries.' 103 While 
Stemburg was able to create a stronger personal friendship with President Roosevelt, he 
was not able to create a stronger bond between the two countries. 
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Upon Sternburg's death in 1908, Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorffwas 
appointed Ambassador to the United States. He was clearly dispatched to the United 
States to continue the work of Sternburg for as he left for his new post he was instructed 
by both the Kaiser and Chancellor to 'enlighten [American] public opinion ... [as to the] 
friendly intentions of German policy.'l04 Bernstorffwas able to maintain cordial 
relations with Roosevelt in the waning days of his presidency as well as with President 
Taft. With Wilson's move into the Oval Office cordial relations did not necessarily end, 
but they did change due to Wilson's penchant for seclusion. Nevertheless, Bernstorff 
strove to follow the wishes of his sovereign and worked tirelessly to understand the 
American mind while preaching the closeness of the two countries. German attempts at 
rapprochement with the United States were not limited to political circles. 
With the understanding that there was much more to the United States outside of 
New York City and the Eastern seaboard, German officials, including the Kaiser's 
brother Prince Henry, criss-crossed the country meeting with German -American 
organizations and communities attempting to allay the fear of German aggression. lOS 
Nevertheless, constant newspaper reports of German naval activity around the world 
gave the average American the impression that Germany was bent on world domination. 
Regardless of how hard Germany tried to rebuild its relationship with America, it was 
unable to get past the steadily increasing American perception of a Germany bent on 
world hegemony. 
At the same time that Germany was failing at creating a strong bond of 
friendship with the United States, Britain was succeeding. Following the advice of 
Sternburg and Bernstorff, the Kaiser did not put much faith in the apparent Anglo-
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American rapprochement that was occurring. Germany's friendship with the United 
States, he believed, would survive due to indifference towards Britain by the vast 
majority of people in the American Midwest and West and the large German-American 
I · . th t \06 popu atton m ose sta es. 
As tensions began to rise in Europe Colonel House, personal advisor to 
President Wilson journeyed to the continent in an attempt to stave off disaster. As 
mentioned earlier he made his first stop in Germany before moving on to France and 
Great Britain. Godfrey Hodgson notes that in a meeting prior to the trip Wilson gave 
House his blessing stating 'The object you have in mind is too important to neglect. ,107 
On 7 May 1914, about two weeks before House was to leave for Europe he had a brief 
run-in with German Ambassador Bemstorff in which he told the Ambassador of his 
impending trip to Germany. The Ambassador's reply points to Germany's desire to 
impress House and create a greater bond of friendship. Bernstorff told House that he 
already knew about the impending trip and had been asked to send a report on the 
Colonel to the German Foreign Office, then attempting to flatter House, stated that he 
b d· rt 108 would e sen mg two repo s. 
The German Foreign Office was playing the same game as the British Foreign 
Office - gathering information on the people they deemed most valuable to their own 
success and passing it on to the men at the top, in this case, Bethmann Hollweg and the 
Kaiser, in order to warn them about what was important to the American President. 
Once House began his journey he had a chance meeting with the nephew of the 
head of the German Army, Count von Moltke. House and Moltke, met while aboard the 
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Imperator as they both travelled to Germany, established a good rapport enjoying each 
other's company during the cruise, and joined each other for lunch upon arriving in 
Hamburg. 109 The value of this accidental meeting rests with the perception von Moltke 
left with House who described the Count as progressive and stating that he received 
'valuable information concerning the political conditions in Germany' from him. I \0 
Once in Germany House had two prime engagements, the first of which was a 
dinner hosted by the U.S. Embassy and the second a luncheon with the Kaiser at his 
Potsdam palace. The guest list for the Embassy dinner included among others, Admiral 
Tirpitz, Foreign Secretary Jagow, and the very same Count von Moltke that House had 
found so enjoyable earlier. During the course of the dinner House found himself in deep 
conversation with Tirpitz. Historians have tended to focus on the bellicosity of Tirpitz 
when writing about this discussion, but in doing so they miss some valuable insight into 
,. fd· I III House s VIew 0 Ip omacy. 
According to Colonel House's diary, the conversation covered everything from 
both countries' policies regarding Mexico to the anti-German feeling in U.S. 
newspapers. 112 In the course of the conversation House stated that he attempted to sooth 
Tirpitz' complaints of American anti-German feeling and at the same time set Wilson 
up as man of 'courage and inflexible will' in order to influence future German decisions 
should the need arise. I 13 House also claims to have made similar statements in 
109 23 May 1914, Edward M. House Diary, E.M. House Papers, 1885-1938, HM 236-1, Vol. 1-2, 
Department of Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 
110 23 May 1914, Edward M. House Diary, E.M. House Papers, 1885-1938, HM 236-1, Vol. 1-2, 
Department of Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 
III Joyce Grigsby Williams, Colonel House and Sir Edward Grey: A Study in Anglo-American Diplomacy 
(Lanham, 1984), pp. 39-40; Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel 
Edward M House (New Haven, 2006) 
\12 26 May 1914, Edward M. House Diary, E.M. House Papers, 1885-1938, HM 236-1, Vol. 1-2, p. 86, 
Department of Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 
113 Ibid. 
49 
conversations with Jagow, Zimmerman, and even the Kaiser at different points during 
h· . 114 IS tnp. 
What is interesting is House's complaint that while Tirpitz insisted that 
Germany wanted peace he was clearly anti-English, and at the same time the Admiral 
spoke of England, Germany, and the United States being the 'only hope of advancing 
Christian civilization', giving House the opportunity to speak to the point of his 
mission, a coalition of these three powerhouses and France to end war, and develop the 
'waste places' of the world. lIS The fact that House did not seize the opportunity can 
only be explained as yet another example of his lack of skill in the diplomatic realm. 
House did not focus on the militant phrases that Tirpitz uttered during this 
conversation until his letter to the president on 29 May 1914 when he referred to 
'militarism run stark mad' based in part, one would assume, on his discussion with 
Tirpitz. 116 Interestingly, in June 1913 House commented to Page that if people knew 
that Wilson was not really averse to war it would almost certainly go a long way to 
ensuring peace but when Tirpitz defends Germany's need for a large military as 'the 
way to maintain [peace] ... was to put fear into the hearts of her enemies' echoing 
House's message, House denounces it as unbridled militarism. 1 17 
The second engagement of House's time in Germany was the Schrippenfest 
luncheon at the Potsdam Palace outside of Berlin. The Kaiser honoured House by 
ensuring that he and U.S. Ambassador to Germany Gerard were the only two guests to 
attend the luncheon and having them seated opposite of him during the meal. Seated 
next to Colonel House, and therefore personalities the American would spend 
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considerable time with that afternoon, were Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
Alfred Zimmerman, whom House found to be 'quite responsive and sympathetic' and 
General Erich von Falkenhayn, who House 'enjoyed.' 118 
It was during this luncheon that House finally had the chance to speak directly to 
the Kaiser about the idea ofa group of powers anchored by Germany, Great Britain, and 
the United States to prevent war. The Kaiser's manner of speaking caught House off 
guard in the respect that the conversation was private, with no other government 
officials within ear-shot, and it was natural- the two men spoke quickly and with 
animation as if they were of equal stature. 119 This manner of speaking deeply impressed 
House and the Kaiser's charm and forcefulness reminded him of former U.S. President 
120 Theodor Roosevelt. 
The two men spoke about the German naval program, and of Germany's fear of 
being surrounded as well as the tensions between Britain and Germany. Kaiser Wilhelm 
assured House that Britain had a friend in him and had nothing to fear from German 
military might. 121 In the course of the discussion Wilhelm agreed that America was in a 
position, as an outsider, to help ease tensions on the European Continent and supported 
House's overture to take up the matter with England in a few days' time.122 
House's time in Germany had multiple effects. Initially House considered his 
time in Germany a success. Discussions with German leadership had given him 
valuable insight into the fears and therefore the policy decisions of the German nation. 
For the Kaiser, House's time in Germany was also a success. The German diplomatic 
tactics were much the same as those of Sir Edward Grey in that they believed in the 
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power of frankness, building trust and friendship in order to gain information. By 
instructing Ambassador Bernstorff to gather information on House before he reached 
Germany the Foreign Office was attempting to gain insight on the personal advisor to 
the president of the United States. By flattering House as a special guest at a military 
festival at the Kaiser's Potsdam Palace, German officials placed him in close contact 
with members of the Imperial government. More importantly, the Kaiser had made time 
to speak with House personally and in private. German hopes would be placed on the 
personal relationships House was building with German officials. House's final stop on 
his European trip would be Great Britain, where Grey and the Foreign Office would 
continue their relationship building. 
The SetUp 
On the very day that Britain declared war on Germany, President Wilson 
declared American neutrality and offered his services to mediate an end to hostilities. 
American neutrality did not surprise either Great Britain or Germany, but both countries 
understood that any type of United States intervention could affect the outcome of the 
war. Britain's military leaders turned to their Navy to strangle Germany's war effort. 
Grey and the rest of Britain's political leaders sprang into action to subdue any 
problems that might occur with the United States due to the Royal Navy's actions, and 
even to enlist U.S. assistance if required. To understand Britain's decision concerning 
its prosecution of the war, one must first understand how she viewed herself. 
L.L. Farrar claims in his book The Short War Illusion that all of the belligerents 
in 1914 believed that the war was going to be short and therefore none of them needed 
to take non-European neutrals, such as the United States, into consideration. 123 He goes 
on to identify this as the reason Grey made risky decisions regarding the United States, 
123 L.L. Farrar, Jr., The Short War Illusion: German Policy. Strategy & Domestic Affairs. August-
December 1914 (Santa Barbara, 1973), p. 60. 
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specifically the implementation of a blockade to cease the flow of supplies from around 
the world into Germany.124 But he does not take into account British policy going into 
the war. By 1902 Britain considered herself more of a colonial than a European power, 
and as such she based her strength and foreign policy on the ability of the Royal Navy 
to protect the seaborne commerce that sustained Britain's economic growth and Great 
Power status. Under this policy there was no need for a large standing army by 
European standards, and if Britain were to find herself embroiled in a war, as she now 
did, it would be the Royal Navy to which the country would tum in order to win it. 125 
The idea behind this policy was that Britain's political leaders had intended to stay out 
of continental affairs. 
Unfortunately, what the Foreign Office planned and what the War Office 
planned were two entirely different strategies. While Britain's politicians had been 
designing policy based on the colonial power line of thought and staying out of 
continental affairs, in 1912 the military began secretly negotiating with the French 
military on how to defend against an attack from Germany. The plan called for the 
British Navy to safeguard the channel and for British troops to cover the French 
northern flank. And while these negotiations, upon coming to the attention of the 
politicians, angered many, Grey recognized the treaty with the caveat that England 
would not guarantee that it would support France in the event of war with Germany. 126 
Grey's recognition of the treaty all but committed Britain to the support of France, and 
more importantly allowed him to maintain at least the impression that Britain was still 
looking to stay out of continental disputes. 
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It was Germany's invasion of Belgium that brought Britain into the war, but it 
was the mass carnage of the war that made it evident that the Entente's armies would 
not, by themselves, be able to defeat Germany. In order to be victorious the Royal Navy 
would have to do more than merely guard the French coast and keep the channel open -
Germany would have to be cut off from any outside supplies, such as those coming 
from the United States. In this respect, according to her policy and contrary to Professor 
Farrar's analysis, Britain was prepared for entanglement in continental affairs and put 
Grey in a position to have to deal with the United States. Consequently, the Royal Navy 
was immediately dispatched to stop the import of supplies to Germany, and the Foreign 
Office went to work on the United States. 
The fact that Britain was reliant on its navy makes the Kaiser's desire for 
Germany to become a naval power problematic for both countries. It is perhaps an 
irony that the writings of an American naval officer influenced much of Imperial 
Germany's diplomacy under Kaiser Wilhelm II. The Kaiser was so taken by Captain 
Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence olSea Power on History that by 1894 he wrote to 
a friend that he was 'not reading but devouring' the book and had ordered all of his 
naval officers to read it.127 Mahan's writings coincided with Wilhelm's dreams for 
Germany, making the case that a country needed a strong navy, overseas colonies, and a 
large presence in the Pacific in order to be considered a world power.128 
What is more, it was not just the Kaiser that believed in what Mahan had to say. 
Patrick Kelly notes that Mahan's writings seem to have also influenced Admiral 
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Tirpitz's ideas of 'peacetime seapower ideology' .129 Because Mahan's book did not deal 
solely with naval battle tactics but with the use of a navy to ensure that commercial 
shipping lanes were kept open during times of peace and war The Influence of Sea 
Power on History was read by leaders other than just those in the navy. Shortly after 
returning from his consular position in China in 1910 to become the Under Secretary of 
State in the German Foreign Office, Arthur Zimmerman commented in a newspaper 
article that Mahan's book was 'one of the few books in world literature [that] proved the 
importance of sea power.' 130 Mahan's writings were also very influential within the 
United States with American leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt, Congressman Henry 
Cabot Lodge, and Secretary of the Navy (in 1889) Benjamin Tracy among those listed 
h· 'd d' 131 as IS most aVI a mlrers. 
Advancing British Interests 
Britain's diplomatic assault on America was an extension of the work that had 
been done in the previous two years. This new offensive began by addressing issues that 
Grey knew would drive President Woodrow Wilson to support the British cause. It was 
well known through Wilson's writings and speeches that he felt the United States 
carried a moral burden to 'serve mankind and progress' in the world. 132 
With the knowledge of Wilson's beliefs, Grey had the angle he needed; next he 
needed a way to get to Wilson. The difficulty with attempting to sway Wilson was that 
outside of one or two trusted advisors, he kept his own council. His thoughts were 
enough of a mystery that it frustrated British diplomats who were trying to find a way to 
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influence him. British Ambassador Sir Cecil Spring-Rice once complained to Grey that 
' ... hardly anyone has access to him and no one seems to be consulted except those 
whose opinions are known to be the same as his own.' 133 However, as discussed earlier, 
it quickly became evident that there were chinks in Wilson's isolationist armour-
namely his love for England and Colonel Edward M. House. 
Wilson's love for England was relatively well known, but his comments to 
members of his own cabinet as well as British officials betrayed the depth of his 
Anglophile nature. Additionally, Wilson and Grey had several things in common, one of 
which was their reading list. In a discussion between Wilson and the British ambassador 
in early September 1914, Spring Rice alluded to Grey's love for the writings of 
Wordsworth. The president responded by tearfully noting that he knew them by heart, to 
which Spring Rice cleverly stated, 'You and Grey are fed on the same food and I think 
you understand.'134 Spring Rice knew immediately that Wilson's heart was with Britain 
and reported to Grey that he was confident that when the moment came, Britain could 
depend on Wilson. If this was not convincing enough, in a conversation with Spring 
Rice later that same month Wilson bluntly stated that while he would do everything he 
could to maintain absolute neutrality, he believed that in Britain's war with Germany 
'Everything I love the most in the world is at stake.' \35 
The importance of these statements tends to be overlooked by historians such as 
Ross Gregory, who claim the statements are oflittle importance outside of the fact that 
it shows Wilson as the Anglophile he was. While the statements do reveal his love for 
Britain they also and more importantly conveyed to Grey and the other members of the 
British Foreign Office a measure of safety, in that they knew they had some room to 
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manoeuvre when it came to dealing harshly with the United States. However, Wilson's 
determination to maintain United States neutrality despite his affinity for Britain forced 
the Foreign Secretary to continue to move cautiously. 
The second, and possibly more important, chink in Wilson's armour was House. 
The closeness with which these two men worked is evident in Wilson's much quoted 
statement that 'House is my second personality. He is my independent self. His thoughts 
and mine are one.' 136 House was the one man whose advice Wilson seemed to listen to 
when making decisions and he had his hands in all facets of U.S. foreign policy. Armed 
with that knowledge it was evident to Grey that in order to influence Wilson, he would 
first have to influence House, with whom he had previously created a good friendship. 
House's previously mentioned second trip to Europe where he visited Germany, 
Paris, and then England, held special importance to Britain's diplomats. 137 A week after 
arriving in Britain, House lunched with Grey and Tyrrell to discuss the growing 
tensions in Europe, his conversation with the Kaiser, and to offer a plan to avert any 
possible disaster. 
Because so many historians have not dealt with the continuity of Grey's 
diplomacy in regards to the United States the initial discussions Grey and House had 
during this trip are overlooked. As noted earlier, Grey preyed on House's ego by 
utilizing flattery to disarm the inexperienced diplomat, and when the two men sat down 
to discuss House's visit, Grey began by bringing up the Panama Tolls repeal bill and 
'expressing pleasure to the fine way in which the President did it' and proposing that he 
pay tribute to Wilson in Parliament. 138 While seemingly innocuous, this bit of flattery 
directly referenced the successful work the two had done previously, essentially 
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reminding House that he and Grey were working towards the same end. During the 
course of conversation House had commented on the militancy of Germany and the 
Kaiser's desire to maintain peace and his belief that a coalition of England, the United 
States, and Germany would be beneficial. 139 House recorded in his diary that a great 
many things were discussed and that Grey had been impressed, sympathetic, and 
candid. 140 Grey's charm and candour were, as always, a large part of his diplomatic 
repertoire and he used them skilfully to befriend House, even going so far as to have 
House stay with Tyrrell, for whom House had shown obvious affection, while waiting 
h 141 for the next lunch date between t e two men. 
House's time on Tyrrell's country estate was spent with Sir William Tyrrell and 
Sir Cecil Spring-Rice discussing 'big and little affairs'. 142 Aside from the obvious point 
of befriending House that was intended by the weekend, Tyrrell and Spring-Rice spent a 
good deal of the conversation relating stories to House about the Kaiser's diplomatic 
instability, effectively weakening House's opinion of the German leader. 143 
Grey's wooing of House and Wilson played on the basic vanity of the men and 
placed House in the midst of the power brokers of British government. Each time Grey 
met with House, he listened quietly, never saying anything negative about whatever 
House was intent on discussing. Toward the end of House's visit Grey was able to 
mention almost off-hand how he planned to pay the president a tribute by mentioning 
on the floor of the House of Commons what Wilson had done for 'international 
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14221 June 1914, E.M. House, Diary, Edward Mandell House Papers, 1885-1938, HM 236-1, vol. 1-2, pp. 
105-106 Department of Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 
143 21 June 1914, E.M. House, Diary, Edward Mandell House Papers, 1885-1938, HM 236-1, vol. 1-2, p. 
106 Department of Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 
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morals.' 144 When House returned to the United States shortly thereafter, he was stronger 
in his faith that the British were open to his ideas and that Grey was a man he could 
work with and trust. Now that Grey had strengthened his relationship with the most 
influential man in Wilson's White House, he went straight to work moulding House's 
mind. 
Wilson's belief that the United States held a moral position in the world, and 
that in order to be effective he must listen to and follow the will ofthe American people 
was admirable, but it was Wilson's self-imposed isolation from advisors other than 
House, on which Grey played. As the wheels of the war chariots began to tum in 
Europe, Grey had successfully ingratiated himself, and the British people, with the one 
man capable of influencing the American president. 
Conclusion 
On the eve of the First World War Great Britain and Germany had an 
established diplomatic plan of action regarding the United States with both counties 
employing the same basic diplomatic tactics in attempting to befriend America. These 
tactics employed the building of personal relationships between the leaders of the 
countries, the gathering of information in order to facilitate the building of these 
relationships, and drawing out debates over issues in order to get the best possible 
outcome without harming the relationship with America. 
Although he had inherited Britain's policy of cultivating friendship with the 
United States, Grey's wholehearted embrace of the policy made it an absolute success. 
As we have seen above, despite British opposition to Wilson's positions on Mexico and 
the Panama Tolls, the work done by Grey and the rest of the Foreign Office to create a 
144 Charles Seymour, cd., The Intimate Papers a/Colonel House p. 263. 
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bond of friendship based on common goals and desires led to the strengthening of 
Anglophilic feelings with the United States leadership of the period. 
Britain, under Grey, furthermore, had created a rapport with the United States 
that seemed to recognize America's potential, and the two countries' similarities. The 
strategy of pressing the United States and dragging out the debate on issues to gain an 
advantage had proven to be a reliable and relatively safe diplomatic method. 
Additionally, the seemingly unorthodox friendship the British Foreign Office had 
created with the U.S. Ambassador Page and House as President Wilson's closest 
advisor granted them insight into American foreign policy and allowed for a measure of 
safety in their dealings with the United States. 
This chapter has also shown that relations between Germany and the United 
States gained intensity shortly after German unification in 1871, when German 
diplomats had to work against the idea of a Germany bent on world domination, and 
more importantly, a Germany that had designs on the Americas. Germany's biggest 
diplomatic failing regarding the United States was that it simply could not seem to 
break from the age old European diplomacy that had moulded the German states into 
the most powerful force on the European continent. German policy concerning the 
United States was based on the exact same principles as its policy involving the 
European powers, demonstrating Germany's lack of understanding of American foreign 
policy values. Nevertheless Germany attempted to create a diplomatic understanding, 
first under Bismarck and then under the auspice of the Kaiser. Like Britain, Germany 
believed in a continuity of diplomatic actions, but the Bismarckian and European-
centred policies that the Germans doggedly followed had the tendency to put off 
American leaders. 
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Nevertheless, by the summer of 1914, German diplomats were diligently 
constructing relationships with American leaders based on flattery and frank discussions 
that they would build on in the coming years. The arrival of Colonel Edward M. House 
in Germany in May 1914 allowed German leaders from the Kaiser to Admiral Tirpitz 
the opportunity to befriend the one man that had the ear of the American president. 
When fighting broke out across Europe the Foreign Offices of Britain and 
Germany felt they were in a strong position to navigate and direct U.S. policy to best 
suit their interests. As war-time events led to disagreements with the United States, both 
countries would put their faith in the relationships they had built with American leaders 
during the previous years, as well as the policy of consuming time to get the most out of 
the situation without harming relations. 
Diplomatic histories of the First World War such as the works by John Milton 
Cooper, Ross Gregory, and John A. Thompson do not give the diplomacy of the war 
historical grounding. This chapter has established the background of the diplomatic 
relations Britain and Germany had formed with the United States in the decades prior to 
the outbreak of First World War. Grey's diplomatic tactics regarding the Panama Tolls 
and the Mexican Presidency created an atmosphere of cooperation between Britain and 
the United States that served the immediate British interests. The importance of this is 
to underline the fact that diplomacy does not work in a vacuum. This chapter has 
demonstrated that British diplomatic action prior to 1914 had laid the groundwork with 
the United States for the good relations and trust that Grey and Wilson were able to 
work with during the American period of neutrality. 
By contrast, this chapter has also revealed that despite Germany's attempts to do 
the same, they were unable to break the perception that they were bent on world 
domination at most or violating America's Monroe Doctrine at the very least. A string 
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of issues involving the Samoan Islands, Venezuela, and the Philippines, while 
successfully brought to a close, continued to give Americans the idea that German 
interests were at odds with American interests. 
This chapter has also provided documentation that on the eve of the First World 
War Britain and Germany worked diligently to sway U.S. envoy Edward M. House, and 
therefore President Wilson, to support their cause. Both countries used their previous 
knowledge of Wilson and House, as well as using past diplomatic events, in their 
attempt to gamer favour. This thesis contends that from very early in the war Britain 
and Germany understood the impact the United States could have on their potential for 
victory. Having placed British-German-American relations in the proper context prior to 
the First World War in this chapter, the next chapter will focus on the role the British 
Foreign Office had in directing American policy regarding its blockade of Germany 
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Chapter Two 
The United States and Britain's Blockade 
This chapter will cover how Grey and Spring Rice were able to change the focus 
of U.S. complaints from one of international legality, to a concern for American public 
opinion in order to keep the United States from effectively challenging the blockade. In 
doing this, the chapter will reveal the extent of the success the British Foreign Office 
had in creating a mind-set of neglect in the United States regarding the British blockade. 
H.C. Allen points out that since 1776, the time of Adam Smith and his 
masterpiece The Wealth a/Nations, the majority of trade was maritime trade.· For the 
newly formed American nation this maritime trade was no-less important to its well-
being than it was for the European based Empires, and by 1812 the United States was at 
war with Britain ostensibly due to British violations of maritime law. As Britain set the 
Royal Navy to its wartime task of strangling German commerce, and with it Germany's 
ability to wage a successful war, British policy once again came into conflict with 
American interests. Had it not been for the diplomatic actions of Foreign Secretary 
Grey, American insistence of freedoms of the seas could have seriously harmed British-
American relations, and more germane to the issues of August 1914, it could have 
wrecked the British war effort. 
Understanding why the United States dropped its objections to the rules by 
which Britain had chosen to prosecute the war is directly related to the extent of the 
influence Britain had over America. By the time Sir Edward Grey first took office in 
1905, the promotion of friendship between the United States and Britain had become a 
staple of British foreign policy. Under Grey's direction, the British Foreign Office had 
I H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States (New York, 1955), p. 277. 
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gone from simply promoting friendship to influencing U.S. foreign policy decisions to 
support British interests. 
By September 1914 British influence had reached, as Historian Ray Stannard 
Baker correctly characterised, 'the point of domination - over American diplomacy. ,2 
Though domination does not guarantee victory, Britain wielded this diplomatic 
domination as yet another tool in its arsenal throughout the Great War. It was Foreign 
Minister Grey's understanding of this power of persuasion, his deftness at timing and 
his understanding of America's tendencies in diplomatic matters that led him 
successfully to assure U.S. complacency in British naval strategy. 
Historians David Stevenson, Ross Gregory, and Robert W. Tucker tend to 
simplify the historical debate over the impact the Declaration of London had on 
international relations, particularly those between the United States and Great Britain, 
during the First World War. They comment on the slowness of America's response and 
the acquiescence to the British interpretation of the declaration as either U.S. fear ofa 
confrontation with Britain or the largely anglophilic leanings of the Wilson 
administration.3 Gregory has given the debate over the declaration a bit more coverage 
than Stevenson, and while he makes brief remarks about Grey's approach toward the 
United States and the effect it had on Wilson and his advisors, he still limits the 
discussion to Anglophilia. 
John W. Coogan, on the other hand, does a masterful job of discussing the 
American shift from the legality of Britain's modification of the declaration to concerns 
about public opinion, but does not address the role played by the British Foreign Office 
2 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters: Neutrality, 1914 -1915 Vol. V (New York: 
1940), p. 211. 
3 David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford: 1988); Ross Gregory, The 
Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: 1971); Robert W. Tucker, 
Woodrow Wilson and the Great War (Charlottesville, 2007). 
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in developing the interest in this subject by Wilson and his cabinet. 4 Instead, he too, 
places the onus for this change on pro-British sentiment within the White House. While 
not addressing the Declaration of London directly, John A. Thompson and Robert W. 
Tucker point out that Wilson, like many Americans, was educated in British classics, 
but was nevertheless intent on leading the United States based on public opinion and not 
as a result of any sympathy for Britain or her customs.5 
This chapter examines the role of the British Foreign Office in developing a 
mind-set of neglect in the United States' policy regarding the British blockade of 
Germany. It does so by investigating why Wilson responded so lightly to the blockade, 
and why Lansing, who was initially vehement in his opposition to the blockade, 
changed his tone and dropped his battle over the strict legality of the action to focusing 
on the American public's perception of it. The first section deals with the U.S. 
neutrality, and the importance placed upon keeping it as a friendly neutral by Grey. The 
second section concerns Britain's modification of the Declaration of London, 
specifically looking at how Grey's diplomacy allowed Britain to manoeuvre the United 
States from being a strict opponent to the British scheme on legal grounds to opposing it 
due to the potential of public backlash. The third section addresses the issue of freedom 
of the seas, or the freedom of trade and how Grey was able to stymie American 
diplomats and their efforts as he detained U.S. ships and cargo. This section will also 
consider Grey's ability to not alienate the American public while at the same time 
interfering with their maritime trade. 
Neutrality and the Declaration of London 
At the outset America's sole interest in the war was neutral rights and the 
freedom of the seas. The decision to get all belligerent nations to accept the Declaration 
4 John W. Coogan, The End o/Neutrality: The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899 -1915 
(Ithaca, 1981). 
S John A. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson (London, 2002). 
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of London, a treaty that had not been observed since its inception in 1909, as the code 
by which to resolve controversies on the high seas was merely an attempt at ensuring 
American neutrality and its ability to trade with all nations. It was this decision that led 
to the United States' first major controversy in the war - one with Great Britain and not 
Germany. 
However, it was the British Foreign Office that was to set the tone and direction 
of the debate that followed. Wilson's response to Britain's blockade of Germany was 
timid at best. His declaration of neutrality was pointed but his defence of American 
maritime commerce was tempered by British diplomatic skill. It is because of Grey's 
understanding of both diplomacy and America's diplomatic history that he was able to 
manoeuvre the United States, a nation considered by many to be the defender of neutral 
rights, not to stand up to the nation that was a historical violator of neutral rights. It was 
here that the lack of diplomatic knowledge within the ranks of Wilson's cabinet both 
hindered and helped Grey. 
By 1902 Britain considered herself more ofa colonial than a European power, 
and as such she based her strength and foreign policy on the ability of the Royal Navy 
to protect the seaborne commerce that sustained Britain's economic growth and Great 
Power status. Under this policy there was no need for a large standing army by 
European standards, and if Britain were to find herself embroiled in a war as she now 
did, it would be the Royal Navy to which the country would tum to win it.6 In August 
1914 the British Cabinet confirmed its continued belief in this policy by declaring, as 
David French so succinctly states, ' ... that Britain's main war effort would revolve 
around her navy and her economy.' 7 
6 John w. Coogan, The End Of Neutrality: The United States. Britain. and Maritime Rights. 1899-1915 
(lthica, 1981), pp. 70-71. 
7 David French, 'The Meaning of Attrition, 1914-1916', The English Historical Review. Vol. 104, No. 
407 (April, 1988), p. 386. 
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The Gennan anny's rapid advance through Belgium and France, the slow 
deployment of the undersized British Expeditionary Force in northern France, and the 
bogging down of men and material in trenches by the end of second month of war led 
Grey to reassess Britain's policy regarding the conflict on the European continent. As a 
full supporter of the Cabinet's war policy, Grey understood that the British blockade 
would hinder the Gennan economy and war effort, not to mention the morale of the 
Gennany citizenry, but the simple fact that Gennany was located in central Europe, 
meant it was not as dependent on seaborne commerce as Britain. Therefore the Gennan 
military was less susceptible to strangulation by blockade.8 This led him to the dual 
conclusions that the war would be longer than expected and that in order to win, the 
United States would have to be brought into the war on the Entente's side. 
Accordingly, Grey knew that while a longer war could enhance the effects of a 
blockade, it also meant a greater potential to rile neutrals. He also understood that the 
longer the war, the larger the potential that battlefield losses could compel the Allies 
into an unsatisfactory ending of hostilities. For those reasons, Grey knew that he had to 
maintain relations with the United States that could ultimately result in America's entry 
in the war on Britain's side. 
Therefore, if Grey's conclusion was correct (and in this instance it is generally 
considered to be) that the U.S. would be the decisive factor in winning the war, then the 
tactics Grey established from the beginning of the war were the decisive element in the 
defeat of Gennany and the Central Powers, and historians such as Robert Osbourne are 
incorrect to ascribe to the Admiralty's position in 1915 and 1916 that Grey was 
8 There is, to some extent conflicting views on Germany's ability to wage war effectively while under 
blockade. For arguments for Germany's ability to survive a blockade see: Paul A. Papayoanou, 
'Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War 1', 
International Security, Vol. 20, No.4 (Spring, 1996), pp. 42-76; David French, 'The Meaning of 
Attrition, 1914-1916', (April, 1988), pp. 385-405. For arguments about Germany's problems as a result of 
blockade see, Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1998). 
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worrying too much about neutral rights. Grey's strategy is supported by Lord 
Kitchener's own war plan. As David French points out, although it was unknown by 
Grey at the time, Lord Kitchener's plan was to wait until the Germans were worn down 
by fighting and blockade before committing the bulk of the British Army.9 
Even before Britain declared its intent to stop goods from arriving in Germany 
the United States was placed in a position to choose either remaining true to the 
President's pledge of neutrality or of succumbing to British demands. In spite oflong-
standing U.S. policies safeguarding the rights of neutrals during war, and the objections 
of European neutrals, the Wilson administration did not vigorously defend its right to 
ship to any belligerent. The United States suddenly found itself in a unique position. But 
how was it that the United States became cornered and forced to choose either to defend 
neutral rights or submit to British demands? 
As a candidate, Wilson had run on a platform of reform at home 'never once 
mentioning a foreign issue that was not primarily a domestic concern' .10 He had, as a 
point of fact, wanted to focus on domestic issues so badly that at his inauguration he 
commented that it would be an 'irony of fate' ifhis tenure in office were hijacked by 
foreign policy. I I Wilson's entire career had been dedicated to domestic politics with 
only casual attention being given to 'the mechanisms and history of foreign relations.' 12 
As America's role in the world began to grow so did Wilson's thinking about the 
country's role in foreign affairs. His understanding of international law began to take 
shape as he taught a few courses and wrote articles on the subject during the early 
1 890s. Wilson's interpretation of international law as principles oflaw was not ofa law 
designed to maintain peace and prosperity, it was, as Thomas 1. Knock describes 
9 David French, 'The Meaning of Attrition, 1914-1916', The English Historical Review, Vol. 103, No. 
407 (April, 1988), pp. 386-388. 
10 Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore, 1957), p. 11. 
II H.W. Brands, Woodrow Wilson (New York, 2003), p. 42. 
12 Link, Wilson the Diplomatist. p. 5. 
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Wilson's interpretation, a ' ... system ... [that] promoted a moral sense of community 
among states.' 13 
Almost immediately upon entering the White House, Wilson found his fear 
realized as events in Mexico forced him to deal with foreign policy from the outset of 
his presidency. Wilson's early attempts at diplomacy are characterized by John Milton 
Cooper Jr as 'fumbling' and 'ill-thought' while Arthur S. Link describes his policy 
regarding Mexico as 'blundering ... [due to] his tendency to take insufficient account of 
hard realities and to oversimplify the complexities of international life. ,14 It would be 
unfair to say that Wilson was not learning about the realities of diplomacy' on the job,' 
but it would also be fair to state that once the war in Europe started and the belligerent 
nations began their assault on American neutrality Wilson found himself still in a world 
about which he knew very little. According to Godfrey Hodgson, in August 1914 
President Wilson had become aware 'of how ill-equipped he was to deal with the war in 
Europe.,ls With his lack of realistic and concrete knowledge on international law and 
diplomacy, he was forced to rely on the thoughts of the even less experienced Secretary 
of State William Jennings Bryan. 
Bryan's appointment was essentially forced upon Wilson as repayment for his 
political support during Wilson's run for the presidency. Ross Gregory characterizes 
Wilson's decision to appoint Bryan to the office of Secretary of State as finding a 
position where he 'could do the least harm.'16 Bryan's diplomatic skill was suspect 
enough that Wilson relied on his personal confidant Colonel Edward M. House, who 
\3 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest/or a New World Order 
(Princeton, 1992), pp. 8-9. 
14 John Milton Cooper Jr., 'Making A Case For Wilson', in Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: 
Progressivism. Internationalism. War. and Peace, ed. John Milton Cooper Jr. (Baltimore, 2008), p.15; 
Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore, 1957), pp. 17-20. 
IS Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life O/Colonel Edward M House (New 
Haven, 2006), p.11. 
16 Ross Gregory, Walter Hines Page: Ambassador to the Court a/St. James's (Lexington, 1970), p. 22. 
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was not fixated solely on domestic politics, for most important diplomatic missions to 
Europe. 17 
Bryan's time as America's head diplomat was marred by criticism of his 
unorthodox and unsophisticated mannerisms and his decision to supplement his official 
pay by continuing his speaking on the Chautauqua lecture circuit. These lapses in 
judgement only fuelled the position of many European heads of state and foreign offices 
who, when referring to Bryan, referred to him as a 'jelly fish' or 'a bad smell.' 18 
According to Michael Kazin and Thomas J. Knock the area of Bryan's work as 
Secretary of State that truly deserves praise was his dealings with the Central and South 
American states as he worked toward the ultimately doomed Pan-American Pact, and 
the 'cooling off treaties that he negotiated with nearly thirty nations ranging from EI 
Salvador to Great Britain. 19 The United States had worked to establish a hegemonic 
diplomatic relationship with the countries of Central and South America since President 
Monroe declared the Western Hemisphere the country's playground in 1823. Wilson 
and Bryan soon found that their knowledge of the diplomatic tact - proven to work so 
well with small countries under U.S. hegemonic control- was not sufficient when 
dealing with the great powers of the world. Due to this lack of knowledge, and the time 
the Secretary of State spent away from Washington on his speaking engagements, both 
men had to rely a good deal on Robert Lansing. 
Lansing's credentials made him the clear candidate to advise on foreign policy 
issues. His twenty years of experience negotiating disputes regarding international law 
17 Kendrick A. Clements, 'Woodrow Wilson and World War I', Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 34, 
No.1 (March, 2004), p. 64. 
18 Letter from Wickham Steed to Arthur Willert, 11 May 1914, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale 
University Library, The Arthur Willert Papers, Correspondence, General Correspondence, Steed -
Wrench; Group No. 720, Series No. I, Box No.5; Spring Rice to Grey, 15 August 1914, Sir Edward Grey 
Papers, PRO 170, FO 800/84. 
19 Michael Kazin, A Godly Hero: The Life oj William Jennings Bryan (New York, 2007), pp. 217-218; 
Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars (Princeton, 1992), pp. 21-22. 
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were unequalled within Wilson's administration at the time, and his lawyerly and 
scholarly approach combined with his distinguished look made him the ideal 
counterweight to Bryan.2o Much of Wilson's foreign policy dealing with America's 
neutrality was a result of Lansing's interpretation and definition of international and 
maritime law.21 The combination of Wilson's lack of diplomatic experience with the 
pressing nature of the Mexican problem, and the death of his wife Ellen just two days 
after the war in Europe had started, meant that in August 1914 the American ship-of-
state found itself sailing without a captain. This is a crucial point often touched upon but 
generally glazed over by historians concerned with the positions taken by the United 
States early in the war. 
The depression that Wilson found himself in following Ellen Wilson's death due 
to kidney disease more often than not left the President broken, filling his time reading 
detective stories, and according to his most trusted confidant unfit to hold his office 
because he 'did not think straight any longer, and had no heart in the things he was 
doing. ,22 While Wilson did make several speeches declaring U.S. neutrality, and was 
apprised of what his cabinet members were doing, he was generally out of the decision-
making process during the early months ofthe war. Wilson seemingly allowed his 
cabinet to run things while he dealt with his grief. When Bryan initially requested 
pennission to push for all belligerents to adhere to the Declaration of London, Wilson 
readily agreed and Bryan issued the request on 6 August, the same day that Ellen 
Wilson died. 
20 Kendrick A. Clements, 'Woodrow Wilson and World War 1', Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 34, 
No.1 (March, 2004), p. 65. 
21 Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing And American Neutrality. 1914-1917 (New York, 1972), p. 17; John 
W. Coogan, The End Of Neutrality: The United States. Britain. and Maritime Rights. 1899-1915 (Ithica, 
1981), pp. 172-173; Robert W. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War (Charlottesville, 2007), pp. 
30-31. 
22 Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand, (New Haven, 2006) p. 110; H.W. Brands, Woodrow Wilson 
(New York, 2003), p.65. 
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As Richard W. Van Alstyne and Marion Siney point out, the Central Powers 
realized that the declaration favoured their weak naval status, and, wisely, their reply 
was quick and to the point - if all other belligerents accepted the Declaration of London, 
Gennany and Austria-Hungary would also respect it. The simple and deft stipulation 
was the request that all nations abide by the rules laid out in the declaration?3 When 
Grey spoke to Ambassador Page regarding Bryan's request he merely asked if 
Gennany's decision was known and what the decision was.24 For Grey, this was a 
strategic move. If Bryan would tell him what the Gennans were going to do, he could 
then attempt to find a way to make the issue work in his favour. In addition, the time 
spent in waiting for messages to be sent between Washington and Gennany as well as 
the deliberations as to the wording of those messages would give Britain time to put 
their blockade into practice. The rest of the Entente powers followed England's lead and 
plainly stated that they would observe the Declaration of London if England did. 
From almost the first moment of the war the Royal Navy had begun to seize 
ships carrying goods to Rotterdam and other European ports and as Britain began to 
turn the screws on Gennany's commerce, Grey was working on the legality of the Order 
in Council that was to be delivered on 20 August, and carefully setting the stage for 
U.S. complacency in naval matters. While Grey was attempting to make the Order in 
Council appear appealing to the United States, he was also dealing with Bryan's 
requests for all warring nations to abide by the Declaration of London. Two days before 
the Order in Council was announced Grey executed a pre-emptory move aimed at 
gaining time and American acquiescence to the Order in Council by having the 
23 Richard W. Van Alstyne, 'The policy of the United States regarding the Declaration of London at the 
outbreak of the Great War', The Journal of Modern History 7 (1933), p. 436; Marion Siney, The Allied 
Blockade of Germany, /914-/9/6 (Westport, 1957), p. 21. 
24 Page to the Secretary of State, 19 August 1914. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United 
States, 1914. Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), 
http://digital.library.wisc.edul1711.dllFRUS.FRUS1914Supp, p. 217. 
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Admiralty issue orders to treat U.S. ships as friendly neutrals when encountering them 
at sea. Grey followed this order with assurances to Ambassador Page that Britain would 
attempt to purchase 'innocent contraband' in American ships instead of confiscating 
it.25 Grey also promised that '[all] due consideration [would] be given to American 
claimants. ,26 The effect this statement had was to give America a false sense of security 
in that U.S. maritime commerce would not be subject to severe interference while 
Britain conducted their strangulation of Germany. This sense of security was important 
to the United States because, as almost every historian of this time period has pointed 
out, the country had been on the verge of a recession and the onset of hostilities in 
Europe was looked at as an answer to the nation's economic woes. Because complaints 
from shipping companies, while numerous, were not flooding into the State 
Department, and Britain was purchasing perishable goods and agreeing to pay for losses 
incurred by their actions, Grey had seemingly kept his word.27 
The Order in Council of 20 August 1914 
On 26 August Ambassador Page relayed England's response, in which Grey 
agreed to follow the laws of the Declaration of London with certain modifications.28 
Included in the response was the Order in Council of August 20 that Grey had laboured 
to get approved by Parliament. Grey's stance caught the State Department completely 
by surprise. As Ross Gregory has argued, Bryan and Lansing were so taken aback that 
they were unsure as to their next step; but he mistakenly claims that they simply let the 
subject drop for a month or more. What Gregory declares to be a pause in American 
2S Grey to Spring Rice, 29 August 1914, Sir Edward Grey Papers, FO 372/600. 
26 The Consul General at London (Skinner) to Secretary of State, 27 August, 1914, Papers relating to the 
foreign relations of the United States, 1914. Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), 
http://digital.library.wisc.edulI711.dllFRUS.FRUSI914Supp, p. 307. 
27 Page to Bryan, 13 August 1914. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1914. 
Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), 
http://digital.library.wisc.edul1711.dllFRUS.FRUSI914Supp, p. 305. 
28 Page to the Secretary of State, 26 August 1914. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United 
States, 1914. Supplement: the World W ar (Washington, 1928), 
http://digital.library.wisc.edulI711.dllFRUS.FRUSI914Supp, p. 218. 
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diplomatic action is actually a flurry of internal action by Lansing and the Joint 
Neutrality Board aimed at attempting to formulate an effective diplomatic response to 
the new issues created by the Order in Council and modifications to the Declaration of 
London.29 
Gregory's argument is based on the fact that the United States government did 
not respond instantly. The reality was that the apparent lack of a U.S. response had 
more to do with Lansing attempting to find a legal response to what he deemed a legal 
issue. Instead ofan immediate and rash reaction to Grey's answer, Lansing, along with 
James Brown Scott and Eugene Wambaugh of the Joint Neutrality Board, immediately 
began dissecting the British Order in Council to find a legal basis and therefore a legal 
rebuttal for it in internationallaw.30 Furthermore, as the United States was constantly 
attempting to assist U.S. shipping companies in dealing with the perils of wartime 
commerce, they continued to put pressure on Britain to recognize the rights of neutrals. 
This pressure began on 28 August 1914 as the U.S. State Department pressured Britain 
to release those ships and their cargoes that were already at sea when the war started.31 
Lansing's opposition to Grey's modifications was initially aided by Germany's 
strict adherence to the Declaration of London. Conversely, his position was hindered by 
Grey's continued requests for information on Germany's position and repeated claims 
that Britain was following the Declaration of London.32 Germany pointed out that 
Britain was not following the Declaration, pointing out each instance in detail, and 
29 Coogan, The End 0/ Neutrality, p. 173. 
30 Acting Secretary of State to President Wilson, 27 September 1914, United States Department of State / 
Papers relating to the Foreign Relations o/the United Slates. The Lansing papers, 1914-1920 (in two 
volumes) Volume I (1914-1920), pp. 247-248. 
31 Secretary of State to the Ambassador in London (Page), 28 August 1914. Papers relating to the foreign 
relations of the United States, 1914. Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), 
http://digital.library.wisc.edulI711.dllFRUS.FRUSI914Supp, pp. 306-310. 
32 Page to Secretary of State, 1 September 1914. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United 
States, 1914. Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), 
http://digital.1ibrary.wisc.edulI71I.dIIFRUS.FRUSI914Supp,p.22I.GreytoPage,31AugustI914.Ibid, 
p.224. 
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questioning whether or not the United States was going to allow such infractions to 
continue.33 On September 18 Lansing issued a memorandum addressing contraband 
vessel and cargo policy. The importance of Lansing's memorandum comes from his 
statement that all belligerents had 'indicated their intention to abide closely by the 
provisi ons of the Declaration of London.' 34 Based on the understanding that Britain 
would follow a modified declaration Lansing's memorandum was an attempt to force 
the use of the Declaration of London's language in respect to the policy of putting into 
Prize Court and confiscating vessels and cargo. Gregory, VanAlstyne, and Smith all 
fail to discuss Lansing's memorandum in any capacity.35 Instead they confuse Lansing 
not addressing Britain's decision to modify the declaration as simply dropping the ball, 
when in fact, he was working on maintaining the legal language of the declaration. The 
State Department continued to question the British Foreign Office about neutral rights 
and ships cargoes currently being detained, and while not directly confronting the Order 
in Council, one must still consider it a response. 
Additionally, Lansing, in conjunction with the Neutrality Board, was drafting a 
response to Britain's note. In reality, it was Grey's diplomatic skill once again 
prevailing in dealings with the United States. The delay in direct action by the State 
Department allowed Britain time to implement its blockade with minimal U.S. 
interference. In fact, from the time Grey announced Britain's intent and the Order in 
Council on 20 August until Lansing's note was completed on 28 September, the only 
3J Gerard to Secretary of State, 28 August 1914. Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United 
States, 1914. Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), p.221. 
34 Memorandum, 18 September 1914, The Papers of Robert Lansing: 1914, Aug 31 - Oct. 2,1911 -
1928, Container 4, Library of Congress. 
3S Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York, 1971); 
Richard Van Alstyne 'The policy of the United States Regarding the Declaration of London at the 
outbreak of the Great War', The Journal of Modern History (1933); Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing and 
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interference Britain had to deal with was the U.S. State Department's requests for 
information and a few protests by Bryan. 
The fact that all policies coming out of Washington had to manoeuvre the maze 
of Wilson's administration before being acted upon soon led to another diplomatic 
victory for Grey. By the end of September Lansing had written a note, based on the 
findings of his work with the Joint Neutrality Board, to be presented to Foreign 
Secretary Grey by Ambassador Page in London outlining the United States' problems 
with Britain's actions, reiterating the United States' disappointment that the Declaration 
of London had not been accepted and criticizing Britain for their anti-neutral actions. 
Lansing went on to recommend to Wilson that the U.S. refuse to accept the Order in 
Council on legal grounds stating that the Order was so far out-of-bounds legally that it 
. d A ." l'fi d fu I ,36 reqUIre menca s unqua 1 Ie re sa. 
In an article written for The .Mississippi Valley Historical Review, and again in 
his book Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1914-1917, Daniel Smith states that 
based on the details of the note, Lansing clearly understood that the United States had to 
defend its rights as a neutral if it was going to continue its growth on the world stage.37 
It is also evident from the note that Lansing also understood that British friendship was 
an important aspect of that growth. It was due to his understanding that those items 
were not mutually exclusive that he wrote the note in the first place, and as counsellor to 
the Secretary of State and acting Secretary of State at the time, Lansing sent the note on 
to Wilson for his approval before sending a final copy on to Page. 
36 Acting Secretary of State to President Wilson, 27 September 1914, United States Department of State / 
Papers relating to the Foreign Relations o/the United States. The Lansing papers, 1914-1920 (in two 
volumes) Volume I (1914-1920), pp. 247-248. 
37 Daniel M. Smith, 'Robert Lansing and the Formulation of American Neutrality Policies, 1914-1915', 
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Upon reading Lansing's note, House detennined it to be 'exceedingly 
undiplomatic' and with Wilson's approval, met with Spring-Rice to discuss the issue.38 
As mentioned earlier, it was Spring-Rice's reaction to the note, described as 'thoroughly 
alanned' and his comment that it was 'amounting almost to a declaration of war 
[against Britain],' that led House to not only re-write the note right then and there with 
Spring-Rice's input, but to construct a note to Grey concerning the subject as well.39 
Because he understood that the United States was at that time nowhere near ready to 
become involved in any war and had only the month prior stated that their goal was to 
remain neutral, Spring-Rice had only to mention the possibility of war between the 
United States and Britain in order to gain House's acquiescence in watering down the 
notes to Page and Grey. 
The new note Lansing created made it clear that Wilson understood the 
reasoning behind the British position, but that the United States could not stand for 
violations of its commerce with neutral nations of this type, and therefore strongly 
urged the British to accept the Declaration of London without modification as well as 
mentioning that the president had not wanted to fonnally protest the matter. More 
importantly the telegram stated that if' ... the matter becomes the subject of public 
discussion ... it will arouse a spirit of resentment among the American people ... '. 40 
Grey noted his appreciation that Wilson had not fonnally protested the British 
Order in Council, but he refused to accept the Declaration of London without 
modification due to the fact that parliament had never ratified it; therefore it did not 
legally bind Britain to follow it as written. Grey then deftly declared that not one of the 
detained cargos had been confiscated. Each had, instead, been 'sold at full value with no 
38 Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston, 1926), p. 307. 
39 Ibid., p. 307. 
40 Lansing to Page, 28 September 1914, Papcrs relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1914. 
Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), pp.232-233. 
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loss to the exporter. ,41 Grey's statement was a crushing blow to the United States's 
position. No longer could the Wilson administration claim that British practices on the 
high seas were harming American commerce. Despite the fact that goods were not 
reaching their intended destination shippers were receiving full value for their goods, 
something the most ardent supporter of neutral rights had to take into account. 
Regardless of the tweaking done to Lansing's note by House and Spring Rice, 
the position of the Wilson administration and therefore of the United States was 
becoming one that would be dictated by the British. While Wilson's point was made -
that the U.S. would not tolerate violations against its shipping - Grey's tactics had 
manoeuvred the discussion from the strict legality of the Order in Council to the how 
the American public would receive it. That was precisely what he wanted. 
The very evening the telegram was sent to the American ambassador in London, 
Wilson requested that Lansing meet with Spring-Rice and discuss the issue directly with 
him. According to Lansing's own memorandum of the meeting, he began the meeting 
by pressing Spring-Rice about how the Order in Council was affecting American public 
opinion. Only once in Lansing's account of the meeting does he address the legal rights 
of neutrals, and only then in its relation to public opinion.42 Instead, he sticks to the 
directive given to him by Wilson - to discuss, with Spring-Rice, the issue as covered in 
the telegram in an attempt to come to a settlement. Historian Ray Stannard Baker 
criticizes Lansing's approach in this meeting, stating that the Counsellor set the stronger 
argument of legality aside and concentrated on the effect British actions were having 
and would have on U.S. public opinion.43 But Baker got it wrong. While he places the 
41 Grey to Spring-Rice (Handed to U.S. Secretary of State), 28 September 1914, Papers relating to the 
foreign relations of the United States, 1914. Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), p. 237. 
42 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, 29 September 1914, Papers relating to the foreign 
rclations of the United States, 1914. Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), pp. 233-234. 
43 Ray Stannard Baker, fVoodrow Wilson. Life and Lellers: Neutrality 1914-1915 (Garden City, 1940), pp. 
210-11. 
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blame for U.S. acquiescence to the British blockade on Lansing's dropping of the legal 
argument he had set forth from the beginning of the war to a discussion of public 
opinion, Lansing complained directly to the president that he was 'not satisfied with 
[ the letter]' because too much had been left out.44 
Based on Lansing's letter to the president on 28 September condemnation for 
American acquiescence to the British blockade should not be applied to Lansing, but 
instead must be given to Spring-Rice and House. Lansing's initial letter - which relied 
specifically on the illegality of Britain's Order in Council of20 August according to 
intemationallaw and established practices of both the United States and Great Britain-
was deemed a virtual act of war, and was re-written and softened by Spring-Rice and 
House. This new letter was based on the importance of public opinion in America -
something the British had been working to control and guide since their declaration of 
war on August 5.45 In contrast to Mr. Baker, Daniel Smith correctly asserts that the new 
letter 'threw away a good legal case. ,46 
Clearly the British Ambassador's influence on the language of the telegram of 
28 September explains Lansing's approach in the meeting with Spring-Rice that same 
evening, and the change in the United States' position. Even as he lays the blame at 
Lansing'S feet, Baker does acknowledge, somewhat begrudgingly, that Britain's 
diplomats thoroughly dominated their American counterparts.47 
44 Acting Secretary of State to President Wilson, 28 September 1914, United States Department of State / 
Papers relating to the Foreign Relations o/the United States. The Lansing papers, 1914-1920 (in two 
volumes) Volume I (1914-1920), p. 248. 
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Spring-Rice played his role to perfection in the meeting, seemingly acquiescing 
and agreeing with Lansing on the idea that the public criticism was a danger. He stated 
that he would do what he could to assist in bringing the issue to an end, claiming that he 
had telegraphed the Foreign Office several times on the subject and would do so again. 
Spring-Rice then suggested to Lansing the means to solving the U.S. Government's 
problem with public opinion and keeping the 'blockade' intact: Britain could rescind the 
Order in Council of20 August and add the items in question (copper, petroleum, and 
iron) to the absolute contraband list, thus removing the item inciting American ire. 48 
For British purposes, this allowed Britain to continue to stop these items from making 
their way to Germany while appeasing the United States and her people without 
effectually giving up anything. 
Based on this meeting and his previous meeting with House, Spring-Rice was 
able to send a telegram to Grey stating that Wilson would not object if Britain were to 
withdraw the Order in Council of 20 August, and add items to the unconditional 
contraband list with the acceptance of the Declaration of London.49 Ambassador Spring-
Rice's telegram reached Grey just as he met with Page the following day. Page went 
into the meeting with the impression that the ideas expressed in Lansing's telegram to 
him were the Counsellor's own thoughts, not those of the British Foreign Office, and 
when he broached the subjects of the order in council and a new list of absolute 
contraband, Grey immediately agreed with the understanding that the Declaration of 
London had never been ratified by parliament and therefore should not be mentioned, 
nor formally protested. Grey's purpose was to continue to follow the path he had 
already set, but now he had U.S. support to add more items to the absolute contraband 
list. 
48 Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State, 29 September 1914, Papers relating to the foreign 
relations of the United States, 1914. Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), p. 234. 
49 Spring-Rice to Grey, 28 September 1914, Sir Edward Grey Papers, PRO 170, FO 800/84. 
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Although debate continued within the American diplomatic corps as to the 
importance of the Order in Council in relation to the provisions already included in the 
Declaration of London, Grey acted decisively to minimize discussion and maximize his 
diplomatic victory. On October 9 the British Foreign Minister handed Page a draft 
Order in Council that rescinded the Order in Council of 20 August and clearly defined 
twenty-one items to be considered absolute contraband and another fifteen conditional 
b d · 50 contra an Items. 
Lansing seized on the added items as modification to the declaration as well as 
objecting to the fact that the new order in council did not rescind all offensive items. 
From this point forward Page, for all practical purposes, assisted Grey by constantly 
protesting Lansing's continued pressure for the acceptance of an unmodified 
declaration. Page continued to attack seemingly oblivious of the fact that Lansing's 
memos indicated that he felt the Declaration of London gave Britain all the protection it 
needed to legally strangle Germany, while satiating U.S. public opinion.51 
For the next month Grey continued to kindly, but forcefully, turn down 
American requests to abide by the declaration without modification. Lansing's efforts 
were hampered by Page's decision that the United States was in the wrong on the issue. 
Not only did Page not fulfil his duties as Ambassador by vigorously pushing the 
declaration as instructed, but frequently he informed Grey that he did not support the 
avenue the United States had taken and had 'urged [the] President strongly to 
accept ... [the British] Proclamation.'52 Page's hindrance of his government's attempt to 
get an unmodified Declaration of London to be used as the basis of naval warfare - and 
50 Ambassador in Great Britain to Secretary of State, 9 October 1914, Papers relating to the foreign 
relations of the United States, 1914. Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), pp. 244-45. 
51 Telegram Lansing to Page, 5 October 1914, Correspondence File with Walter H. Page, Lansing Papers. 
Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
52 Grey to Spring Rice, 17 October 1914, Sir Edward Grey Papers, PRO 170, FO 800/84. 
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Grey's resistance - eventually led the United States to stop pursuing the declaration 
altogether. 53 
Regardless of the fact that Grey had won the battle over the Declaration of 
London, he continued to lay the groundwork for favourable responses from those 
making United States foreign policy and the majority of American public opinion while 
all the while not giving up the potential means of winning the war. In discussion with 
Page he listed items he was planning to add to the contraband list, and Page, unwittingly 
playing to Grey's tactics, suggested that the contraband list be published to ease the 
worries of the U.S. shipping industry. 54 But the debate over British interference with 
U.S. trade continued. The British Foreign Office did not consider the fact that the debate 
continued a failure. They had succeeded in turning the Wilson administration's protests 
from a question of the legality of British actions to one of U.S. public opinion. Because 
Britain used the pretext of German violation of law as a pretext for going to war -
claiming to be the defender ofthe laws of civilization by having gone to war in order to 
preserve 'poor Belgium's' independence - she could not be seen as violating the very 
same laws of civility at sea. Grey understood that violations of international law gave 
countries the justification needed at home to go to war. 55 If the United States persisted 
to debate Britain's violation oflaw the possibility for hostile U.S. action, including the 
possibility of war, increased, but if Wilson's administration was spending its time 
arguing about the public's opinion toward the blockade then they were less likely to 
take aggressive actions. 
To be sure, Grey still had to work to ensure that the majority of Americans 
favoured supporting Britain in one way or another, but he now had the U.S. government 
53 Lansing to Page, 22 October 1914, http://digital.library.wisc.edulI711.dVFRUS.FRUSI914Supp, pp. 
257-258. 
54 Page to Bryan, 24 October 1914, http://digital.librarv.wisc.edu/1711.dIIFRUS.FRUSI914Supp, p. 259. 
55 Avner Offer, 'Morality and Admiralty: 'Jacky' Fisher, Economic Warfare and the Laws of War', 
Journal o/Contemporary History, Vol. 23, No.1 (January, 1988), p. 111. 
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focused on it as well. This seemingly insignificant victory for Britain's diplomats 
loomed large as the war continued. With this change in focus, Grey now had more 
flexibility in administering the blockade because the focus would be on the impact on 
the American people and not on the legality of British actions. As long as the United 
States was committed to debate the merits of maritime rights, Grey would not have to 
seriously worry about the possibility of negative action by the American government. 
At this point in the war, debate and the appearance of negotiation ensured a benevolent 
and neutral United States. 
Freedom of the Seas 
American interests rested not in the Declaration of London, but in the hindrance 
of trade by the British. The crux of the matter was that Britain's list of contraband 
interfered with the United States' trade not only with the belligerent nations but with all 
European nations. For the Wilson administration it was still about the freedom of the 
seas - the same issue over which the United States had been fighting with Britain since 
1812. Grey realized that while he wanted to choke off supplies from Germany, he still 
had to keep in mind his strategy of not alienating the American public. In his memoirs 
he states that he had to start his list small for the diplomatic reason of keeping the 
United States from challenging the list. Grey goes so far as to name the items he felt 
were of the most importance to the German military machine to which the United States 
might be opposed - copper, rubber, and cotton. It was Grey's skill as a diplomat that 
made him confident enough of U.S. reaction - or inaction - to make the decision to 
initially withhold cotton from the list. 56 The arguments that were to surround the 
placement of copper on the absolute contraband list would act as a mild precursor to the 
firestorrn of cotton's placement. 
S6 Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 vol. 1I. (London, 1928), pp. 39-40. 
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But at the time, Grey was more willing to have to deal with American 
complaints about copper shipments being held up than to allow copper to reach 
Germany where it would be converted into munitions to kill British soldiers. 57 A large 
part of Britain's problem lay in the fact that Germany was getting supplies from many 
of Europe's neutral states. Britain's issues over the United States association with 
neutral states such as Sweden, Norway, and Denmark was that U.S. exports, such as 
copper, were shipped to these neutrals which then shipped much of it on to Germany. In 
an attempt to stop this trade, the Royal Navy was ordered to stop ships on the high seas 
that were not only destined for Germany, but for neutral nations as well. It was this 
attempt to stop these items that brought British policy into conflict with U.S. interests 
and caused, what seemed to many, undue pressure on the two countries' relations. 
Listed as conditional contraband on 30 September, by 9 October Grey had 
moved copper to the absolute list. As expected, from the time it made its appearance on 
the absolute contraband list, Americans involved in the copper industry began pressing 
for it to be removed. As a conciliatory move to the United States, Grey did not place 
cotton on any of the contraband lists as he felt that the United States would almost 
certainly dispute it as contraband. Joseph Fuller and Marion Siney had both claimed that 
Grey's decision to withhold cotton from the lists was based on expediency and had little 
military value anyway. 58 Shortages in cotton had already forced Germany to substitute 
imported Swedish wood pulp for cotton in its munitions industry, therefore leaving 
cotton from the contraband lists was less of an expedient move than a diplomatic move 
S7 Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, pp. 40-41. 
S8 Joseph V. Fuller, 'The Genesis of the Munitions Traffic', The Journal of Modern His/ory vol. VI 
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designed to win U.S. public opinion as well as support within the American 
59 government. 
Copper-producing states pressured Lansing to provide protection for their ability 
to have their product reach markets, claiming that copper production had been cut back 
by about fifty percent due to the war and the restrictions placed on the shipping of 
copper by the British. The copper industry claimed these cutbacks had had an adverse 
affect on approximately 500,000 individuals involved in the copper industry.60 As 
would be expected, Lansing directed Page to address the issue with Grey in order to 
find a solution to the problem, to which Grey, in his usual diplomatic put-off, responded 
that the Foreign Office was studying the issue and would make a decision soon. As he 
had done when dealing with the Panama Tolls issue, the Mexican issue, and with the 
Declaration of London, Grey used his diplomatic skill to hold the United States at bay 
until events unfolded in his favour. 
A large part of the debate over goods rested in the interference of American 
trade with other neutrals. The Royal Navy intercepted all ships travelling in the North 
Atlantic and, in particular, the North Sea. Ifvessels were found to be carrying items on 
either of the contraband lists, or items that Britain deemed could be transferred to 
Germany, they would be escorted to a British port and held over until a Prize Court 
could make a ruling on whether or not the cargo met the criteria of contraband. Lansing 
did not argue this interruption of trade until it began affecting the U.S. market, at which 
point copper, rubber, and cotton were the main items of discussion. In an attempt to 
strengthen his position, Grey ordered the sale of wool produced within the 
Commonwealth be prohibited to the United States. The Foreign Secretary understood 
S9 H.J. Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century: The German Reich and the Federal 
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that United States' industries were dependent on imports from the British Empire just as 
Britain was currently dependent on imports from the United States. By placing a ban on 
the sale of something vital to U.S. industry, ostensibly on the pretence that it would then 
be sold to Germany, Grey had given himself another piece to play in the negotiations 
over contraband with the United States. 
This did not stop the immediate problem of U.S. protests over freedom of the 
seas and the effects of British policy on U.S. industrial output. As Lansing bowed to the 
copper industry'S continued pressure to put an end to the amount of copper being held 
up in British Prize Courts, Grey gathered facts to strengthen his position. Grey gained 
information stating that the United States' copper industry, fearing the war would lower 
demand for their product, had voluntarily reduced its amount produced by fifty percent 
in August 1914, in an attempt to keep its prices high. Additionally, the copper industry 
had a hard enough time keeping up with demand as its New York stockpile of at least 
100,000 tons had been sold.61 Francis Hopwood, then Civil Lord of the Admiralty, put it 
best in a letter to Grey's secretary William Tyrrell when he stated, 'It appears that the 
American copper producers have not suffered from the war, as yet. ,62 So for Lansing to 
continue arguing that British actions were hindering the economic stability of anyone 
section of the United States' economy, much less the economy as a whole appears to be 
a bit absurd. But Grey still had to deal with the complaints from the United States 
Secretary of State's office. Grey continued to hold the line and not allow anything 
through that would help Germany, so when the Royal Navy stopped many vessels 
carrying cargo to neutral countries he claimed that the country had not given assurances 
to not re-export those goods on to Germany, thus stopping the problem of continuous 
voyage. 
61 Admiralty to Francis Hopwood, 13 January 1915, Sir Edward Grey Papers, Pro 187, FO 800/88, 
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The U.S. Secretary of State's office was being inundated with complaints from 
shipping companies about their vessels and cargo being held up in British ports either 
awaiting inspection or awaiting the decision of a British Prize Court. For the shipping 
companies, they were not only losing valuable time due to their ships being impounded 
by the British, but they were also losing money as their cargo sat in the harbour. If the 
cargo was perishable the company stood to lose money because it would simply rot 
while waiting for the Prize Court findings. Lansing beseeched Page to bring these 
matters to Grey's attention. 
Page did speak with the Foreign Secretary on the subject but Grey rebutted his 
complaints by noting that because neutral countries bordering Germany were receiving 
shipments of contraband that exceeded their normal pre-war imports Britain was forced 
to detain these cargos until it was evident that the materials were not destined for 
Germany.63 
Within the Wilson Administration Grey's answer was not satisfactory. The 
Secretary of State's office was still adamant that Britain had no right to detain neutral 
ships carrying material to another neutral country without direct proof that the cargo 
was intended for a belligerent's military. They also argued that Britain was detaining 
ships without full disclosure as to the reason why. The British maintained that because 
they did not have the manpower to search each ship at sea that they had to force these 
ships to port in order to perform a more thorough search. 
In response to U.S. complaints, Grey issued a series of notes concerning each of 
the ships detained in British ports stating that the ships in question and their cargo had 
been put into prize court so that ship owners could prove the neutral destination of their 
cargo. Since 1900 British law had stated that the burden of proof regarding the 
63 Page to Bryan, 13 November 1914, http://digital.library.wisc.edul1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1914Supp, pp. 
345-346. 
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destination of materials rested on the captor. This was reinforced with the Order in 
Council of 20 August. But Grey, whose negotiation with the United States led to the 
rescinding of the 20 August order and the issuing of the Order in Council of29 October, 
had used the opportunity to shift the burden of proof to the owner of the goods. 
In forcing the owners of cargoes detained in British ports to prove the neutral 
nature of the goods, Grey was putting pressure on the United States to do something 
about the contraband items leaving U.S. industry and heading for Germany via a 
circuitous route. Despite U.s. complaints about detained ships and cargo, Grey managed 
to maintain his position, and appeased the United States. His ability to manage both of 
these feats is based on the knowledge that while 773 ships left U.S. ports from the 
beginning of the war to the third of January 1915, only eight had been put into Prize 
Court.64 The numbers show that American commerce had not been overly burdened by 
British search and seizure methods. Additionally, Admiralty records show that while the 
10th Cruisor Squadron intercepted approximately 1,910 U.S., Norwegian, Danish, and 
Swedish ships from 1914 through 1915, only eighty-five were U.S. ships.65 And of 
those nineteen hundred ships intercepted only thirty were sent to port for further 
examination. So while thirty ships from all Scandinavian nations and the United States 
were detained in ports, a mere eight ships were U.S. vessels. Grey had the facts to dispel 
the complaints of the shipping companies, and convince Wilson's administration that 
next to no harm was being done to commerce of the United States. As Lansing and Page 
argued over how to best handle the situation, Spring Rice took the opportunity to squash 
the issue and informed House 'no American exporter had suffered any loss. ,66 
However divided the American public was on the issue of the war, Grey was 
cognizant of the need to appease the vast majority of it in order to achieve his goals. As 
64 Harris to Grey, 5 January 1914, Sir Edward Grey Papers, FO 800/88, Admiralty # 260. 
65 Charts and Graphs, 10th Crusor Squadron, ADM 137/300 Admiralty PRO, Folio #17. 
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complaints that hearings concerning detained cargoes were not progressing quickly 
came to his attention, Grey pushed to have the cases heard without delay. In a letter to 
Attorney General Simon, Grey made it clear that he felt that the postponement of 
hearings could cause 'serious trouble' with the American people and that it was 'most 
important' that cases be 'brought before the Prize Court without delay. ,67 
In his book Walter Hines Page: Ambassador to the Court olSt. James's, Ross 
Gregory states that the mood of the Foreign Office was that there was no real fear of an 
embargo by the United States. 68 Although in his memoirs Grey states that he would 
have ended the blockade if it meant a break in relations with the United States, 
Gregory's conclusion is supported by Grey's actions, which speak much louder than his 
words.69 
Through Ambassador Page, Grey stated that as far as Britain was concerned 
there was more than ample information that copper, among other items, was being 
shipped to neutral nations who then shipped it on to Germany. It was the British 
position that if the United States persisted in supporting 'fraudulent trade' with neutrals 
Britain would then cut off supplies to the United States from Britain and its colonies.7o 
Due to the fact that the United States was rapidly becoming the main supplier of the 
British war effort, Grey had to consider any possibility of a U.S. embargo as retaliation 
for Britain's interference with their trade. Internal Foreign Office memos make it clear 
that these worries were tempered by the fact that Britain not only had the ability to 
completely cut America off from goods necessary for U.S. industry to function, but 
67 Grey to Simon, 18 May 1915, Sir Edward Grey Papers, FO 800/89, Attorney General: 1910, 1914, 
1915. 
68 Ross Gregory, Walter Hines Page: Ambassador to the Court a/St. James's (Lexington, 1970), pp. 78-
9. 
69 Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years_vol. II, p. 37. In his memoirs Winston Churchill, then 
First Lord of the Admiralty, supports this statement in his memoirs The World Crisis. 1911-1918 (New 
York, 1931), p. 423. 
70 Page to Bryan, 6 December 1914. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914 
Supplement, http://digital.library.wisc.edulI711.dIlFRUS.FRUS 1914Supp, pp. 356-8. 
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were actively considering using it if the United States forced them to do SO.71 And in 
fact they had tested this theory when Grey had earlier stopped the sale of wool to the 
United States. The Foreign Office's belief in the strength of this retaliatory measure was 
sufficient enough that other departments within the British government were informed 
of the potential. This threat was delivered to the United States as part of a proposed 
working arrangement and therefore wrapped in a less abrasive packaging. 
What Gregory does not mention is that in addition to the leverage in commerce 
that Britain held over the United States, there had been a conversation between Spring-
Rice and Colonel House earlier that month that allowed Grey to feel secure enough in 
his position to threaten the United States. In this conversation House made it clear that 
while the United States would need to protest British actions, the Administration was 
'sympathetic' to the British cause.72 Again, Grey was able to look at the whole situation 
and manoeuvre Britain into a position of strength over the United States, allowing 
British interests and diplomacy to succeed in a situation that should have not ended in 
their favour. 
Although Grey was in a stronger position than expected with regards to the 
United States, he still had to follow his plan to win direct American assistance - he had 
to win the support of a substantial portion of the American public. Although it was 
clearly not needed in a strictly diplomatic sense, Grey approached the commercial 
interests from two different angles. First he offered to have Britain purchase the cargoes 
of the ships being held over for Prize Court. Maybe more importantly Grey offered to 
purchase the entire American output of copper at a good profitable price - a fact that 
caught Page completely by surprise.73 The mere fact that he had even offered to buy 
71 Internal memorandum drafted by Mr. Sargent, 24 November 1914, Sir Edward Grey Papers, FO 
368/1162. 
72 Spring Rice to Grey, 10 November I? 14. Sir Edward Grey Papers, FO 800/84. 
73 Churchill to Grey, 5 January 1915, SIT Edward Grey Papers, FO 800/88, Admiralty. 
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these commodities from the United States reassured the Wilson administration that 
Britain was not trying to harm U.S. commerce, and quieted, if only for a time, members 
of the American public allowing a sense of good-will to develop. As Alice Morrissey 
has shown in her work using articles from the New York Journal ojCommerce, the 
Wall Street Journal and journals representing mining and trading industries, Britain's 
offer to purchase U.S. goods detained in British ports had the desired impact on 
American opinion - public sympathy was with Britain.74 The fact that Britain did not 
immediately begin purchasing the detained cargoes did not matter; the Foreign Office 
would get around to purchasing the cargoes when it became essential to the war effort. 
Grey's second means of satiating American public opinion was to allow U.S. 
ships being held in port to be released on bail. This action had a two-fold effect. The 
United States had long relied on other countries' merchant fleets to get its products to 
the rest of the world, and the war along with Britain's blockade was causing a major 
disruption in the United States' ability to trade. The disruption was enough that the 
United States Congress was debating the wisdom behind purchasing German 
made/German owned ships that were detained in U.S. ports for American commercial 
use.75 Britain was strongly opposed to this idea, as it would provide Germany with 
much needed funds and put more ships out to sea for the Royal Navy to contend with. 
By allowing U.S. ships to be released, Grey was quelling the cries of the American 
shippers as well as keeping money out of German coffers. Grey corresponded with 
Attorney General Simon and Sir Samuel Evans, President of the British Prize Court, to 
arrange the release on bail of U.S. ships. He then instructed Spring Rice to make it 
74 Alice Morrissey, The American Defence Of Neutral Rights. 1914-1917 (Cambridge, 1939), p. 44. 
7S Grey to Simon, 8 January 1915, Sir Edward Grey Papers, FO 800/89, Attorney General 1910, 1914, 
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known that Britain would work with the shipping companies that offered bail in order to 
increase the amount of shipping tonnage available to the United States. 76 
Conclusion 
The debate over British interference on the high seas was not coming to a close 
in early 1915, but its direction had been shifted from less of a strict legalistic argument 
to one that rested on the perceptions of the American public. The evidence presented 
shows that the skill by which Grey and Spring Rice directed the flow of debate between 
the United States and Britain allowed the British government to implement a blockade 
that, while crucial to their war effort, was illegal under international law and 
subsequently a violation of neutral rights. At the same time, the British Foreign Office 
had allowed the Wilson administration to believe that they were defending the rights of 
their citizens while remaining neutral, a fact that was only true in word. The fact of the 
matter was that the United States had become an accomplice in Britain's throttling of 
the German people, while the vast majority of the American public thought they were 
following their president's tone and maintaining their commercial practices. 
Lansing's attempt to thwart efforts by Grey to win concessions based on 
American public opinion were countered by a lack of evidence of financial harm done 
to U.S. shippers and producers of goods such as copper. Grey's skill at continually 
outmanoeuvring Wilson's diplomats by purchasing detained cargo and by knowing the 
financial status of many U.S. industries, placed pressure on the Wilson administration to 
end contraband trade, and at the same time deflected public complaints about detained 
cargoes from Britain's violations of neutral rights. 
An analysis of the available evidence aimed at understanding why the United 
States did not fonnally and vociferously protest Britain's illegal actions suggests that 
76 Grey to Spring Rice, January 1915, Sir Edward Grey Papers, F0800/89, Attorney General 1910, 1914, 
1915. 
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Wilson and Lansing were placed in a position of protesting the blockade and the 
modification of the Declaration of London on the fickle ground of American opinion. 
As long as they protested many Americans felt they were doing their job against great 
odds. Thus it was not fear of confrontation with Britain, anglophilic leanings, or simply 
poor diplomacy that accounts for the Wilson administration's acquiescence to the 
British blockade. It was the skilful work of the British Foreign Office, led by Grey that 
helped Britain maintain the blockade of Germany and still retain the support of the 
United States. While American trade with Britain was fast becoming its life line, Grey 
knew that he had to maintain pro-British feelings in the United States in order to bring 
them in as a decisive instrument in winning the war. 
This chapter has focused on the role of Sir Edward Grey and the rest of the 
British Foreign Office in order to give a clear representation of the pressure placed on 
the U.S. government to support the British blockade. This chapter substantiates the 
dissertations claim that the diplomatic practices Grey's established prior to August 1914 
continued to be successful in guiding the policies of the United States during the period 
of neutrality. In the next chapter the success of German diplomacy will be analysed to 
determine if its pre-war policies were successful at maintaining U.S. neutrality. Because 
the economic war waged by the two belligerent navies is the portion of the war that 
affected U.S. policy the most, this dissertation will tum its attention to the impact of the 
German submarine war and how Germany's diplomats worked to blunt its effects. 
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Chapter Three 
The Diplomacy of U-boat Warfare 
This chapter will demonstrate how the diplomacy of Bethmann Hollweg and 
Ambassador Bemstorffwas used to predetermine U.S. feelings about submarine 
warfare and frame the debate that followed. The chapter will also reveal that Wilson's 
'strict accountability' policy did not confine the American response, but was instead 
part of the policy of protest German diplomats had expected. To that end, this chapter 
provides evidence that German diplomats successfully blunted the threat of American 
entry into the war provided by controversies surrounding the sinking of merchant ships. 
By November 1914, merely three months into the war it was clear that Germany 
was unable to win simply by pure military might - the military situation had begun to 
dictate diplomacy. In addition to setbacks on land the German military was facing 
setbacks due to British naval policy. It is under these circumstances that the possibility 
of submarine warfare was first broached by Germany's leaders. 
It is an unfortunate reality that the debate about German-American relations 
during the war is generally framed around how the United States reacted to the idea of 
submarine warfare, the sinking of neutral merchant ships, and the deaths of American 
citizens due to submarine attacks on all ships. I What has not been placed under the 
microscope is how the German decision to utilize the submarine drove the diplomatic 
response of the U.S. towards the belligerents and Great Britain's policy towards the 
United States. To that point, Wilson's 'strict accountability' policy is generally 
confused as a threat of war. In 1934 Charles Seymour argued that 'strict accountability' 
meant that if German submarine attacks continued U.S. entry into the war was 
I Robert Carlisle, Sowreignty At Sea: U.S. Merchant Ships and American Entry into World War I 
(Gainesville, 2009); Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare (Stockholm, 1958). 
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unavoidable.2 This line of thought is continued more recently by historians such as 
Robert W. Tucker.3 David Stevenson also continues to support the consensus that 
Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare drove the United States to enter the war 
against Germany but does not account for the almost three full years of submarine 
activity, along with other issues between the United States and Germany before 
President Wilson asked Congress for, and received, a declaration of war against 
Germany.4 Therefore a greater understanding of the 'strict accountability' diplomacy 
will lead to a greater understanding of the German-American diplomacy of the period. 
From that perspective, this chapter analyses the German decision to use the 
submarine and how that decision, and its effects, changed Germany's diplomacy 
towards the United States. It also address how the members of Wilson's administration 
responded to these diplomatic moves, dealing with issues of sunken ships, and the 
deaths of its citizens instead of focusing on mediation and remaining neutral. The first 
section deals directly with Germany's decision to use the submarine and how the 
Foreign Office dealt with the pressures of the new economic warfare strategy. Section 
two examines the Wilson administration's response to the new threat of submarine 
warfare and the impact of the 'strict accountability' policy on German and U.S. 
diplomacy. The final section examines how British and German diplomats battled to 
gain the upper hand in their attempts to sway the Wilson administration. This section 
attempts to clarify the U.S. position of 'strict neutrality' and how American diplomacy 
as well as belligerent diplomacy formed around this policy. It aims to answer the 
question of why the United States remained neutral in the face ofa continuance of 
perceived infractions of international law and morality by the Germans, despite pressure 
to become more involved by the British. 
2 Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy during the World War (Baltimore, 1934), p. 91. 
3 Robert W. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War (Charlottesville, 2007), p. 96 . 
.. David Stevenson, Catac(vsm: The First World War as Political Tragedy (New York, 2004), p. 261. 
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The Chancellor's Challenge 
Analysis of German activity in the United States must be tempered by the 
knowledge that early in the war (August to October 1914) most of Germany's leaders, 
both military and political, were very optimistic that victory would come relatively 
soon.5 Germany's plan of attack, the Schlieffen Plan, called for the war in the west to be 
over in about six weeks. While there was a general understanding amongst German 
military and political leaders that the United States must be kept neutral, the German 
war plan discounted U.S. intervention.6 
To appreciate the decisions made by Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg it is 
important to understand that the German Government was organized so that military 
leaders had direct access to the Kaiser and that during the war they were able to exert 
considerable pressure on the direction foreign policy took. 7 The Kaiser acted as the sole 
conduit through which information passed from the military to the political sector and 
from the political sector to the military. This was supposed to allow the Kaiser to 
understand and pass on information he deemed important, but as Edgar Feuchtwanger 
points out in Imperial Germany 1850-1918 the reality was that it splintered the process 
and allowed a weak Kaiser to be manipulated by one side or the other.8 The military's 
influence over foreign policy was to be an on-going battle during the war. 
According to Roger Chickering, the set-up of the German government created an 
'absence of any institutional form to coordinate strategy and policy,.9 In The Enigmatic 
Chancellor Konrad larausch argues that the lack of coordinated strategy and policy at 
S Bethmann Hollweg to Ballin, 14 October 1914, Teil2, General Affairs, R 17.355, Politisches Archiv, 
Auswiirtiges Amt. 
6 L.L. Farrar, Jr., Divide and Conquer: German Efforts To Conclude A Separate Peace, 19/4-/9/8 (New 
York, 1978), p. 116. 
7 Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare (Stockholm, 1958), p. 8; Isabel V Hull, The 
Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm 11, /888-/918 (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 236-237; Holger AfTerbach, 
'Wilhelm II as supreme warlord in the First World War', in The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm 11's 
Role in Imperial Germany, ed. Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist (Cambridge, 2004), p. 200. 
8 Edgar Feuchtwanger, Imperial Germany 1850-/918 (London, 2001), p. 107. 
9 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, /9/4-/9/8 (Cambridge, 1998), p. 61. 
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the beginning of the war led the Foreign Office to begin doing 'the bidding' of the 
military leaders. 10 But upon viewing Bethmann Hollweg's work under the light of 
continuous diplomatic policy it is clear that the Chancellor was supporting the military 
position in accordance with the Clauswitzian, and Bismarckian philosophies German 
Chancellors were schooled in. 
Bethmann Hollweg did not take his tasks lightly and was very much involved in 
all issues concerning the diplomacy of the war. When making foreign policy decisions 
he worked very closely with Foreign Secretary Gottlieb Jagow and Undersecretary 
Arthur Zimmerman, as well as consulting the Kaiser. Additionally, Bethmann had to 
balance the pressures of dealing with the various political groups in the Reichstag with 
the whims of the Kaiser and the demands of the military. 
At the outbreak of war, Bethmann called for the ambassador to the United 
States, Johann Count Bernstorff, to return to the United States at once with the 
instructions of simply talking to the American public about how peaceful and friendly 
Germany was towards America. I I Writing about the role of Germany's representatives, 
Karl Birnbaum notes that ambassadors were expected to merely carry out orders and 
occasionally, ifbold, make recommendations, but they most certainly did not influence 
Germany's foreign policy. 12 He goes on to point out that Bernstorffwas not limited by 
this policy and is joined by Charles Seymour, and Reinhard Doerries in noting that the 
Ambassador was able to apply 'effective pressure upon Berlin.' 13 Seymour correctly 
contends that Bernstorff was allowed to veer from the norm expected of German 
10 Konrad H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial 
Germany (New Haven, 1973), p. 230. 
11 Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff, My Three Years in America (New York, 1920), p. 36. 
12 Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards 
the United States, April 18, 1916- January 9, 1917 (Stockholm, 1958), p. 9. 
13 Ibid; Charles Seymour, 'The House-BernstorffConversations in Perspective', in Studies in Diplomatic 
History and Historiography in Honour of G.P. Gooch, ed. A. O. Sarkissian (London, 1961), p. 106; 
Reinhard Doerries, 'Imperial Berlin and Washington: New Light on Germany's Foreign Policy and 
America's Entry into World War 1', Central European History II (March, 1978), p. 40. 
97 
diplomats because of the relationship he had created between House and himself. 14 The 
diplomatic importance of this relationship would prove its worth to Germany in the 
years to come. 
Like Britain, Germany understood the impact of positive press on their 
diplomatic aspirations in America. Prior to the war Bernstorff had built relationships 
with members of the American press that he fully intended to utilize upon returning to 
America. ls Upon finding that the propaganda office had been operating out of the 
Embassy during his absence, and in order to maintain a proper and positive working 
relationship with administration officials, Bernstorff promptly shut it down and moved 
it to New York City where it was reopened as the German Information Service. 16 This 
shrewd move on Bernstorff's part displayed his understanding of the importance of the 
ambassador in the United States. If he was perceived to be nothing more than a mere 
propagandist for the German Government then he would have a much harder time 
convincing administration officials that he could be trusted. 
Quite possibly the largest single dilemma faced by Germany in its attempts to 
influence American public opinion and therefore put pressure on the Wilson 
Administration, stems from the initial problem of little communication from Germany. 
On 4 August 1914 the British Navy had all but cut off the German Embassy and all 
German agents in the United States from Berlin, making any direct communication with 
superiors at the Foreign Office virtually impossible without delays of three or four 
weeks. 17 This placed Bernstorff and the German Information Service in the unenviable 
14 Charles Seymour, 'The House-BemstorffConversations in Perspective', in Studies in Diplomatic 
History and Historiography in Honour of G.P. Gooch, ed. A. O. Sarkissian (London, 1961), p. 92. 
15 Reinhard R. Doerries, 'Promoting Kaiser and Reich: Imperial German Propaganda in the United States 
during World War 1', in Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of 
World War 1.1900-1924, ed. Hans-Jiirgen SchrOder (Providence, 1993), p. 136. 
16 Johann Heinrich Count von Bemstorff, My Three Years in America (New York, 1920), pp. 39-42. 
17 On 4 August the Royal Navy cut the German transatlantic cables that connected Berlin to America 
rendering direct communication from Berlin to its representatives in the Americas impossible. From this 
point on Germany's contact with the outside world would have to come via wireless communication, 
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position of not being able to direct the conversation in the American newspapers, only 
being able to respond to the British viewpoint that was being printed first. 
By the time Bemstorff arrived in the United States the British had been filling 
American newspapers with a steady stream of propaganda. In Propaganda For War: 
The Campaign against American Neutrality, 1914-1917 H.C. Peterson points out that 
the British control of the news coming into the United States gave them an advantage in 
shaping the conversation. IS Stewart Halsey Ross adds that the majority of stories printed 
were of a distinctly British view of the war, adding that 'honest, unbiased news simply 
disappeared out of the American papers.' 19 For the rest of the war, the Germans would 
be playing catch up to the British news services and their role in influencing America. 
But it would be the issue of submarines that would cause the greatest problems for the 
German embassy and propaganda machine in the United States. Despite this handicap 
Bemstorff and the German Foreign Office would arduously and successfully maintain 
United States neutrality for 26 months as unrestricted submarine warfare threatened the 
peace between the two countries. 
The Chancellor's Decision 
There are varying explanations of Germany's intended use of submarines 
provided by German naval leaders at war's end. In 'The German Naval Critique of the 
U-Boat Campaign, 1915-1918,' Philip K. Lundeberg claims, and Captain A. Gayer 
concurs, that prior to the war Germany had not even considered attacking Britain's food 
supply lines because it would have violated the Declaration of London, and while not 
ratified by most of the countries that had a hand in creating it, the Declaration was still 
which is open to interception, and the good graces of neutral nations; Letter from Lansing to Mrs. 
Bingley, 1 September 1914, The Papers of Robert Lansing: 1914, Aug. 31-0ct. 2,1911-1928, Container 
4, In 62 Volumes, Library of Congress 1943. 
18 H.C. Peterson, Propaganda For War: The Campaign against American Neutrality, 19/4-1917 
(Norman, 1939), p. 33. 
19 Stewart Halsey Ross, Propaganda/or War: How the United States Was Conditioned to Fight the Great 
War of 19/4-1918 (Jefferson, 1996), p. 29. 
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regarded as a guideline to be followed. 2o However, Lundeberg notes in the same article 
that in May 1914, a full month before the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne was 
assassinated and three months before the Great War was to begin, that a study had been 
developed and presented to the then Secretary of State for the Navy, Admiral Tirpitz, 
calling for the creation of 222 submarines for operations against British shipping.21 
These statements indicate that while the submarine might have been considered a new 
weapon of dubious potential the German Navy understood its possibilities before going 
to war. 
Nevertheless, German naval doctrine initially condemned the submarine to 
obscurity by ensuring that submarines were not to be used on their own, but to be used 
in conjunction with the High Seas Fleet and to defend the approaches to German ports 
against British attack, not because of fear of reprisals, but due to the lack of faith 
German naval commanders had in their ability to assist in offensive measures.22 
Because of German naval policy, submarines had little impact on the outcome of the 
war until late September 1914 when a single German submarine sank three Bri tish 
cruisers off the Dutch coast. 
According to Admiral Milller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet at the time, news of 
this success caused near euphoric enthusiasm for the submarine program at 
Wilhelmstrasse.23 The fact that the cruisers were elderly and did not have anti-
submarine defences was lost on the German command, for at that moment they only 
20 Captain A. Gayer, 'Summary Of German Submarine Operations In The Various Theatres Of War From 
1914-1918', Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, vol. LII (April 1926), p. 625; Philip K. 
Lundeberg, 'The German Naval Critique of the V-Boat Campaign, 1915-1918', Military Affairs; Journal 
of the American Military Institute (1963), p. 105. 
21 Philip K. Lundeberg, 'The German Naval Critique of the V-Boat Campaign, 1915-1918', Military 
A/f::irs; Journal of the American Military Institute (1963), pp. 105-106. 
2 R.H. Gibson and Maurice Prendergast, The German Submarine War, J 9 J 4-J 9 J 8 (Annapolis, 1931), pp. 
1-2. 
23 Walter Gorlitz, The Kaiser and His Court (New York, 1961), p. 34; David Stevenson, Cataclysm: The 
First World War as Political Tragedy (New York, 2004), p. 73. 
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saw the submarine's success.24 In The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 
Ernest May dismissed the Gennan decision to utilize submarines as the 'accidental' 
work ofa few naval officers 'in a fit of absence of mind', who worked unchecked by 
their superiors.25 But this is an over simplification that leads to a misunderstanding 
about what really went on amongst the Gennan leaders and how, even at this early 
stage, they worked to avoid problems with neutrals, particularly the United States. 
The conventional wisdom, to which Ernest May, Daniel M. Smith, David 
Stevenson, and Christopher Clark all ascribe, states that the decision to utiHze the 
submarine solely as a weapon against British shipping was the work of Admiral Alfred 
von Tirpitz and supported by Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg.26 Clarification of the 
Gennan leadership structure is needed at this point to understand who was really in a 
position to make decisions. According to Michael Epkenhans, Kaiser Wilhelm wanted 
to be his own Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet and therefore could not allow 
Tirpitz the power to unify command of the navy; he therefore placed Admiral Pohl in 
the position of Chief of the Naval Staff, making him the chief advisor to the Kaiser on 
naval matters.27 Tirpitz's role as Secretary of State for Naval Affairs was therefore 
reduced to that of an operational advisor.28 Simplified, within naval circles the Kaiser 
was the ultimate decision maker based on advice from Pohl who was to get advice from 
24 Rear Admiral Spindler points out in his article 'The Value of the Submarine in Naval Warfare', 
Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Vol. LII (April 1926), p. 838, that Allied anti-submarine 
measures were weak in 1914. 
25 Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 (Cambridge, 1963), p. 113. 
26 Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914-1920 (New York, 
1965), p. 51; David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, 1988), pp. 72-
74; Christopher Clark, Kaiser Wilhelm II (Harlow, 2000), pp. 230-231. 
21 Michael Epkenhans, Tirpitz: Architect of the German High Seas Fleet (Dulles, 2008), pp. 59- 60; Karl 
Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Waifare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards the United 
States, April 18, 1916-January 9,1917 (Stockholm, 1958), p. 6. 
28 Patrick J. Kelly, Tirpitz and the Imperial Navy (Bloomington, 2011), p. 372. 
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Tirpitz. Still, Bethrnann notes that Pohl and Tirpitz held equal weight when it came to 
advising the Kaiser on naval matters, much to the chagrin of Poh!. 29 
While many historians such as those mentioned above simplify the situation by 
placing the decision for submarine use at the feet of Tirpitz, historians that focus on the 
naval history of the war such as R.H. Gibson, Maurice Prendergast, and Karl E. 
Birnbaum argue that it was Chief of the Admiralty Staff Admiral Hugo von Pohl, not 
Tirpitz, who began to campaign for unrestricted submarine warfare as a means to win 
the war.30 Birnbaum states that it was Pohl who initially rationalized that the British 
declaration of the North Sea as a war zone was yet another illegal move by Britain and, 
buoyed by the perceived success of the submarine flotilla, believed that an immediate 
creation of a blockade by submarine of merchant ships headed for British ports was 
justifiable based on the repeated infractions of international law by the British.3! Philip 
Lundeberg adds that it was again Pohl who argued that the more vigorously the 
blockade was enforced, the quicker Britain would be forced to her knees and the quicker 
the war would end.32 
Tirpitz biographer Michael Epkenhans claims that the Admiral understood the 
political implications of using the submarine in a way that would also be considered 
illegal, and, commenting that the number of operational submarines in the German 
navy's arsenal numbered only about twenty, he questioned the effectiveness of a 
blockade ofthis sort. 33 Bethmann Hollweg and the Foreign Office were also opposed to 
the idea due to the risks posed by offending neutral countries, namely the United States 
29 Letter from Bethmann Hollweg to Jagow, 30 March 1919, Nachlass von Jagow, Packet 4/4 Band 7, 
Doc. 62, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde. 
30 R.H. Gibson and Maurice Prendergast, The German Submarine War, 1914-1918 (Annapolis, 1931), p. 
26; Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards 
the United States April 18, 1916 - January 9, 1917 (Stockholm, 1958), p. 23. 
31 Ibid 
32 Philip K. Lundeberg, 'The German naval Critique of The U-Boat Campaign, 1915-1918', Military 
Af!.airs; Journal of the American Military Institute (1963), p. 109. 
3 Michael Epkenhans, Tirpitz: Architect of the German High Seas Fleet (Dulles, 2008), pp. 64-65. 
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and Italy, before the army had secured the Gennan position on land.34 Pohl adjusted his 
blockade request in December 1914 from an actual blockade of British ports to the 
creation of a war zone around the British Isles only to have Tirpitz again reject the 
proposal based on the potential political ramifications of a submarine campaign. 
Bethmann continued to oppose it on the grounds that it could tum neutrals against 
Gennany.35 
The internal Gennan discussions about the use of the submarine changed 
dramatically on 23 December 1914, when Tirpitz publicly defended Gennany's right to 
utilize the weapon. What has become known as the 'Wiegand interview', named for the 
American journalist who interviewed Tirpitz, is notable because Tirpitz put a very 
public and powerful face on the question of utilizing a submarine blockade by 
explaining that Gennany had enough submarines to 'play the same game' and starve 
England OUt.36 Tirpitz's decision to support submarine raids on British commerce, 
despite any adverse effects a submarine war may cause with America, can be most 
easily found in his memoirs where he discusses his view that the United States had 
already become a partial player in the war due to its massive trade with Great Britain.37 
Generally overlooked in discussions about this interview is the role of Bethmann 
Hollweg. The Chancellor was, as Roger Chickering notes in Imperial Germany and the 
Great War, 1914-1918, the type ofleader who saw only diplomatic risk when 
considering military actions. 38 This is not necessarily a bad characteristic for a diplomat 
to have, and in this instance Bethmann was worried about how the implementation of 
the submarine against British commerce would antagonize the neutrals in general and 
34 Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards 
the United States April 18. 1916 -January 9. 1917 (Stockholm, 1958), p. 23. 
35 Letter from Bethmann Hollweg to Jagow, 30 March 1919, Nachlass von Jagow, Packet 4/4 Band 7, 
Doc. 62, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde. 
36 Charles Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1938), p. 227. 
31 Alfred Peter Friedrich von Tirpitz, My Memoirs (Leipzig, 1919), p. 392. 
38 Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-/918 (Cambridge, 1998), p. 63. 
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the United States in particular. Admiral Georg Alexander von Muller, Chief of the 
German Naval Cabinet during the war, notes in his diary that during a discussion 
between Bethmann and the Kaiser, the Chancellor stated that he had given permission 
for the publication ofTirpitz's interview in the United States because it had previously 
appeared in Dutch newspapers.39 Bethmann knew what Tirpitz was going to say in the 
interview from the Dutch accounts. Needing to feel out the American reaction to 
submarine war, the Chancellor allowed Tirpitz to do the dirty work. 
The possibility of submarine warfare undermining the goodwill Bethmann was 
attempting to maintain between Germany and the United States was common 
knowledge among German leaders, and if Tirpitz was adjusting his view of commercial 
warfare and the use of submarines, it would have been prudent to feel out the Wilson 
administration's attitude towards this new form of blockade before allowing momentum 
to continue to build both within German leadership and the public. While Tirpitz may 
have felt that his interview was a means towards gaining control of the naval program 
during the war, as Bethmann suspected he did, it was quite simply a measure, 
unbeknownst to Tirpitz, for Bethmann to feel out the American position.4o 
Because Bethmann was under pressure from the navy and the public, his 
decision to allow Tirpitz to make his statements directly to the American people 
allowed him to ascertain the U.S. position on submarine warfare while maintaining a 
safe position from which to work to influence the impact of the submarine. At the same 
time, because Tirpitz had gone out on a limb when making this statement, Bethmann 
39 Walter G5riitz, ed., The Kaiser and His Court: The Diaries, Note Books and Letters of Admiral Georg 
Alexander von Mii/ler. Chiefofthe Naval Cabinet. 1914-1918 (New York, 1959), pp. 50-51. 
40 Letter from Bethmann Hollweg to Jagow, 30 March 1919, Nachlass von Jagow, Packet 4/4 Band 7, 
Doc. 62. 
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was able to solidify his position of influence with the Kaiser who was initially opposed 
to submarine warfare and sensibly adverse to provoking the United States.41 
Based on the American reaction to Tirpitz's interview, Bethmann Hollweg 
continued to oppose the use of a submarine blockade on the grounds that, although as a 
response to the British blockade it could be justified, it would cause problems with all 
neutral countries, including Italy and the United States.42 His argument centred on 
America's ability to influence the outcome of the war through economic pressure, and, 
more worrisome, Bethmann believed, its influence on other neutrals, which could easily 
affect the outcome of the war on land.43 But by February 1915, Pohl and Tirpitz had 
successfully lobbied the Kaiser to create a war zone around Britain in an attempt to 
bring an end to the war by cutting off Britain's supplies from the outer regions of her 
empire and, most importantly, from the United States.44 Pohl countered Bethmann's 
argument about neutral shipping by proclaiming that the mere threat of submarine 
warfare would scare neutral shipping from the waters thus allowing Germany to 
strangle Britain without the worry ofa negative reaction.4s 
In a sound diplomatic move to quell the complaints that were sure to come once 
the submarine blockade was declared German officials decided that the official 
proclamation would clearly outline the illegality of Britain's blockade, noting the 
neutrals' inability to, or decision not to, force Britain to end the blockade as having 
compelled Germany to take measures against neutral shipping in and around the 
41 Patrick J. Kelly, Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy (Bloomington, 2011), pp. 403-405. 
42 Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards 
the United States, April 18, 1916 -January 9,1917 (Stockholm, 1958), p. 23. 
43 Konrad H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial 
Germany (New Haven, 1973), p. 272. 
44 It is interesting to note that initially, Kaiser Wilhelm II was not a supporter of the submarine and on the 
day Germany announced the war zone around Great Britain and Ireland he spoke to the officers of the 
submarine wing asking them to save the crews of merchant ships if possible. Tansill, America Goes To 
War, p. 230. 
45 Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards 
the United States April 18, 1916 -January 9,1917 (Stockholm, 1958), p. 25. 
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territorial waters of the British Isles.46 This rationale was based on necessity since as 
early as December 1914 the British blockade and Grey's policy of strangulation was 
beginning to be felt in Gennan homes and it became necessary for Gennany to rely not 
only on diplomacy to end the starvation of its population but also on the submarine to 
bring the war to an end or force the British to end their immoral campaign. In Imperial 
Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918, Roger Chickering points out that prior to 
August 1914 Gennany was reliant on imported food and workers from Eastern Europe, 
both of which were no longer available due to the war, and that loss combined with 
losses due to the British blockade quickly led to a substantial drop in food supplies 
produced inside Gennany.47 
The first attempt to frame the discussion of submarine blockade came on 10 
December 1914, when Ambassador Bemstorffasked Secretary of State Bryan if the 
United States was willing to prevent the British from seizing foodstuffs. 48 Recognizing 
the immorality of starving a civilian population Secretary of State Bryan noted to 
President Wilson 'the bitterness' in the tone of three separate notes he had received 
from the Gennan ambassador regarding the food situation in Gennany and the 
starvation ofnon-combatants.49 These notes would seem to indicate the severity of the 
food situation in Gennany early in the war and, just as important, cast the shadow of 
immorality over Britain. 
46 Memorandum of the German Government concerning retaliation against Great Britain's illegal 
interference with trade between neutral and Germany, United States Department of State/Papers Relating 
to the Foreign Relations o/the United States, 1915, Supplement, The World War. Part II: Neutral Rights, 
ff' 96-97; Doerries, Imperial Challenge, p. 80. 
Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, /914-/9/8 (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 41-44. 
48 The German Embassy to the Secretary of State, 10 December 1914, United States Department of 
State/Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o/the United States, 1914, Supplement, The World War 
(1914),p.362. 
49 The Secretary of State to President Wilson, 15 February 1915, United States Department of 
State/Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o/the United States, The Lansing Papers, /914-/920(in 
two vo!umes),(J914-/920), vol. I, p. 353. 
106 
In attempts to assuage the concerns of Bethmann and the Kaiser, Pohl claimed 
that the fear of being sunk would scare neutral ships away from the war zone, thus 
negating the fear of neutral, more specifically American, retaliation. Additionally, 
Zimmennan claimed that U.S. Ambassador Gerard had assured him that the United 
States' protests would be a mere fonnality.so This, coupled with the fact that the United 
States, along with other neutrals, had up to this point been happy to 'satisfy themselves 
with theoretical protest' indicated to Gennany that they could expect the same 
treatment.SI These arguments along with positive Gennan public opinion towards the 
use of the submarine influenced Bethmann's position; he dropped his opposition, and 
consented to submarine warfare. 
Continuing to lay the diplomatic groundwork for submarine warfare, 
Undersecretary Arthur Zimmerman notified Ambassador Gerard early on 2 February 
1915 that because the British were immorally attempting to starve Gennan civilians, it 
was quite possible the German navy would have to respond by officially blockading the 
British Isles by submarine.52 Importantly, Gerard was also notified that Germany would 
blockade the North and West coasts of France in an attempt to stop the flow of troops 
and ammunition from Britain.53 In making these statements Zimmerman had started to 
frame the debate in moral terms - terms they felt Wilson would respond favourably too. 
Ernest May surmises that Wilson's response to a submarine enforced war zone 
was based on 'moralistic and legalistic sentiments' that the submarine would 'shred' .54 
50 Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards 
the United States April 18, 1916 - January 9, 1917 (Stockholm, 1958), p. 25; Konrad H. Jarausch, The 
Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, 1973), p. 
273. 
51 John W. Coogan, The End of Neutrality: The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899-1915 
(Ithaca, 1981), p. 221. 
52 The Ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the Secretary of State, 2 Feb. 1915, United States Department 
of State/Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement, The World 
War. Part II: Neutral Rights, p. 93. 
53 Ibid 
54 Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, /914-1917 (Cambridge 1963), p. 138. 
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He is joined by other historians including Reinhard Doerries who base their argument 
on the economic warfare aspect of the war zone that was laid out in the German 
proclamation of 7 February 1915, which focuses on British violations of maritime law 
and uses the term 'merchant ships'. 55 What has been dismissed, and in fact rarely 
discussed, is that Germany's initial attempts, as found in the letters from u.s. 
Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State, were to frame the submarine blockade as 
stopping the tools of war from making it to the battlefields. 56 By warning the United 
States and specifying that Germany was most interested in stopping the flow of 
weapons, the notification of which completely followed guidelines set by the Treaty of 
Paris and the Declaration of London, Germany was attempting to place itself in a 
superior moral position to the British, thereby playing to President Wilson's well known 
morality - while the British violated international law by starving Germany civilians. 
Germany, on the other hand, was merely attempting to stop troops and weapons. 
On 7 February 1915, the official German announcement declared the creation of 
a war zone around Great Britain and Ireland, including the English Channel. The 
proclamation made it clear that any vessel in those waters, neutral or not, stood the 
chance of being attacked, and cautioned neutral vessels to take an alternate course 
around Scotland.57 Because the German Foreign Office gave notification to the United 
States prior to the proclamation, and detailed the many British violations of 
55 Ibid; Reinhard R. Doerries, Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count BernstorfJ and German-American 
Relations. 1908-1917 (Chapel Hill, 1989), pp. 80-81; Memorandum of the German Government 
concerning retaliation against Great Britain's illegal interference with trade between neutral and 
Germany, United States Department ofStatelPapers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 1915. Supplement. The World War. Part II: Neutral Rights, pp. 96-97. 
56 The Ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the Secretary of State, 2 Feb. 1915 (Dated 1 Feb. 1915), 
United States Department of Statel Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1915. 
Supplement. The World War. Part II: Neutral Rights, p. 93. 
57 The German Ambassador (Bernstorff) to the Secretary of State, 7 February 1915 (Received 8 
February), United States Department ofStatelPapers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 1915. Supplement. The World War. Part II: Neutral Rights, p. 95; Information to the United States 
regarding safe passage was also relayed via Ambassador Gerard via a note. This can be found at: The 
Ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the Secretary of State, 2 Feb. 1915 (Dated 1 Feb. 1915), United 
States Department ofStatelPapers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1915. 
Supplement. The World War. Part II: Neutral Rights, p. 93. 
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international law, Germany's naval staff fully expected that the American protest would 
follow the pattern set in their dealings with Great Britain as per Zimmerman's 
discussion with Gerard. When the U.S. Ambassador delivered a menacing note of 
protest to the German Foreign Office that threatened that the United States would 'hold 
the Imperial Government to a strict accountability' if American ships or lives were lost 
at sea, they were both surprised and irritated. 58 
It is quite clear that the news of the war zone and the use of the submarine to 
enforce it caught American officials off guard. Secretary of State William Jennings 
Bryan as well as the Counsellor of the Secretary of State's office Robert Lansing are 
both noted as initially being shocked and angered by this development, and while a 
great deal is made about this initial reaction to the news, Daniel Smith's Robert Lansing 
and American Neutrality, 1914-1917, while forty years old, is still one of the few 
accounts to discuss what he called 'belligerent necessity' .59 Smith explains that while 
Lansing was initially appalled at Germany's war zone declaration he voiced his doubts 
to Wilson partially based on the fact that the United States had acquiesced to Britain's 
illegal actions and therefore Germany should get the same consideration. Germany's 
complaint about the British use of neutral flags alleviated Lansing's doubts and gave the 
Councillor the opportunity to appear impartial by sending a note to Britain at the same 
time the 'strict accountability' note was delivered to Germany. 
While there was no real fear in August 1914 of U.S. military action against 
Germany, the Foreign Office fought the submarine issue for months for the sole purpose 
of keeping neutrals, primarily Italy and the United States, out of the war. Now that 
Bethmann had been forced to allow the submarines to be used, he had to work 
58 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Germany (Gerard), 10 Feb. 1915, United States 
Department ofStatelPapers Relating to the Foreign Relations a/the United States. 1915. Supplement. 
The World War. Part II: Neutral Rights, pp. 98-99. 
59 Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality. 1914-1917 (New York, 1972), p. 50. 
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feverishly to apply restrictions that he hoped would prevent a break with the United 
States. As Karl Birnbaum notes, it was from this point forward that Germany's foreign 
policy towards the United States was to prevent them from entering the war.60 
Bethmann Hollweg and the Foreign Office never had any misconceptions about 
the danger submarine warfare posed to Germany by creating a strain on relations with 
the United States. Bethmann, having lost Tirpitz as an ally, turned to the Chief of Staff 
Falkenhayn for assistance in restricting the use of submarines. Upon seeing the U.S. 
note of 10 February, Falkenhayn agreed that the letter was a threat, and as a result 
lobbied the Kaiser to soften the German stance on the use of submarines in order to 
reduce the risk of U.S. entry into the war.61 In Germany, the weeks immediately 
following the United States' 'strict accountability' note were to see arguments among 
the navy, Bethmann Hollweg and the Kaiser as they 'quarrelled about how to answer 
American protests against the declaration of the war-zone and whether there was a way 
to observe maritime law, which would alleviate neutral fears .• 62 
Historians have placed the importance of these challenges on the fact that 
Wilson's reply to Germany was much more stern than the note he sent to Britain.63 But 
what needs to be addressed is how the note of 10 February was received in relation to 
the discussion between Ambassador Gerard and Zimmerman in which Germany was 
informed that the United States would protest simply for the sake of maintaining 
appearances. Once that statement is taken into account the German reaction makes more 
sense. Having decided to allow submarine warfare against shipping around the British 
60 Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards 
the United States April1B. 1916 - January 9. 1917 (Stockholm, 1958), p. 26. 
61 Konrad H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial 
Germany (New Haven, 1973), p. 274. 
62 Michael Epkenhans, Tirpitz. Architect of the German High Seas Fleet (Dulles. 2008), p. 66. 
63 Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation. 1914-1917 (Cambridge, 1963); Ross Gregory, 
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Isles based, in part, upon Zimmerman's assurances that there was nothing to fear from 
the United States, Bethmann was left to decide if Wilson's note declaring that America 
would hold Germany to 'strict accountability' if American lives or property were 
harmed was another mere 'scrap of paper' or ifit needed to be taken more seriously.64 
Now the Foreign Office was faced with deciding which message they must refer to 
when dealing with the United States. Bethmann, for his part, chose to address both. 
As noted, the Chancellor was caught between the navy who wanted unrestricted 
submarine use and the conventional wisdom that their use in this way could cause 
problems with neutral nations. Now, with contradictory information coming from the 
United States (Gerard's comments and Bryan's letter), he was forced to deal with both 
U.S. positions. The American 'strict accountability' note helped him defend his position 
against the navy, while taking his time to reply to the United States, in the same fashion 
that Grey in Britain was doing to hold up American diplomatic actions. David 
Stevenson suggests that the policy Bethmann developed regarding the United States was 
to mirror that of British Foreign Minister Grey's policy, 'to seek the maximum that was 
possible short of a confrontation with Wilson. ,65 
The President's Protest 
The German declaration of a war-zone around the British Isles came at a time 
when President Wilson was preoccupied with Britain's undeclared blockade and 
discussions about lifting the arms embargo to Mexico as he continued to find ways to 
oust Mexican President Huerta. The addition of submarine warfare would simply 
muddy the American neutrality issue, particularly since Britain had been the only 
country to antagonize the United States up to this point. As Wilson was attempting to be 
64 Upon hearing that Britain intended to defend Belgium neutrality and therefore go to war with Germany 
Bethmann Hollweg infamously claimed that Britain was going to war 'just for a scrap of paper', a phrase 
that would be used by the Entente's propaganda machine for the duration of the war. 
6S David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, 1988), p. 72. 
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neutral in deed as well as in thought with the British and their violations of international 
maritime law, the introduction of submarine warfare into the mix was to prove 
troublesome for all parties. In addition, early February 1915 found Secretary of State 
Bryan away from Washington on a speaking tour of the Western United States, leaving 
Councillor Robert Lansing as acting Secretary of State. 
In The United States and the First World War Jennifer Keene states that 
President Wilson 'immediately protested' the German war zone declaration. 66 In a strict 
sense this is true, but it is important to note that the president took the time to listen and 
discuss the issue with his cabinet. According to Robert Lansing's Desk diary he met 
with the president and Secretary Bryan approximately eight times from 5 February to 10 
February on this issue alone.67 
Lansing's initial reaction to the German proclamation led him to write a short 
note to Wilson, advising the president that the German decision to use submarines 
against all shipping in and around Great Britain and Ireland 'presents a most delicate 
situation which [would] have to be handled with extreme care. ,68 Later that same day 
Lansing penned a sharply toned letter to Germany stating that in the event of the 
destruction of U.S. ships or the lives of U.S. citizens, that the United States would view 
the attack as a violation of its rights as a neutral nation. The following day Wilson and 
Lansing met to discuss the difficult situation they now found themselves in - when the 
British declared their military zone in the North Sea in November 1914, 'not a word of 
official protest came from the United States. ,69 It is precisely because they had not 
vigorously protested the British decision to declare the North Sea a military area that 
Wilson and Lansing found themselves having to either accept the German war zone, as 
66 Jennifer D. Keene, The United States and the First World War (Essex, 2000), p. 14. 
67 Robert Lansing Desk Diary and Papers, Library of Congress, Reel 1. 
68 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters: Neutrality 1914-1915, vol. Five (New York, 
1940), p. 247. 
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they had done with the British or, if they took a harder line, place the United States in a 
position distinctly unfriendly to Gennany. 
As noted earlier, Lansing had a change of heart upon reading the Gennan 
memorandum claiming the same necessity to justify the violation of neutral trade as 
Great Britain. Daniel M. Smith and Ray Stannard Baker both point out that Lansing 
recognized the fact that because the United States had done little more than protest 
Britain's violation of neutral rights - illegal actions including its war zone declaration 
and interference with foodstuffs - Gennany was simply requesting the same 
consideration.70 Ross Gregory continues this line of thought, pointing out that Gennany 
was simply demanding the same rights the British had already forced on the world - to 
change the rules of naval warfare to meet the needs of a modem navy.71 
While Lansing had changed his mind on the tone of the letter to Gennany, 
Secretary of State Bryan wanted nothing more than to avoid a diplomatic exchange with 
Gennany that could lead to the possibility of a break in relations with Gennany. Upon 
his return to Washington, the Secretary argued against too strong a response to 
Gennany in light of the fonn responses had taken to the British war zone. Bryan's 
position was that when a belligerent violated international law, or otherwise hanned 
neutral rights a protest should be sent, regardless of which belligerent it was.72 
On 10 February 1915 Ambassador Gerard was directed to pass on a final draft of 
the note to Gennany, which he dutifully delivered to Jagow on 12 February. The note 
reminded Gennany that legally, belligerent rights were limited to visit and search of 
neutral ships unless a blockade was declared and effectively maintained. This was 
followed by statements proclaiming the use of submarines to be 'unprecedented in naval 
70 Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 1914-1917 (New York, 1972), p. 50; Ray 
Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wi/son, Life and Letters; Neutrality, 1914-1915 (New York, 1940), p. 248. 
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72 William Jennings Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan (Philadelphia, 
1925). p. 395. 
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warfare', 'indefensible violation of neutral rights' and that 'the United States 
would ... hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability.'73 Baker 
points out that Wilson and Lansing found it more palatable to send this note to Germany 
in conjunction to a similar note being sent to Britain. This would maintain the 
appearance of impartiality on the part of the United States, and appease Bryan's 
equalitarian desires. It would also appear that the dual notes also appealed to Bryan as 
they went out under his signature.74 
It is no small point that the American response to Germany was coupled with a 
letter to Great Britain. While the note to Germany has received the bulk of the historical 
scrutiny the two notes must be looked at in conjunction. Many histories written about 
this time period mention the dual letters and point out that the British letter was not as 
stem as the one sent to Germany.75 Despite the fact that the note to Germany dismisses 
the British use of neutral flags as merely a suspicion, the letter to Britain, at best a polite 
protest, pointed out the problems to be incurred by the United States and her citizens 
under the official British policy flying neutral, and in particular American, flags to 
avoid detection by German naval forces, and requested that Britain refrain from such 
decisions in order to protect American lives.76 Often not addressed is that in the letter to 
Germany the United States claims that Germany only suspected the use of neutral flags 
by Great Britain, however, in the note to Britain, sent the very same day, they not only 
acknowledge their use but also refer to the British Foreign Office having previously 
defended the policy. 
73 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Germany (Gerard), 10 Feb. 1915, United States 
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It would appear that Zimmerman was correct when he notified Bethmann that 
the United States would limit its reaction to the war zone to paper protests. Germany 
had observed the extent to which Wilson was willing to go not get involved in the war; 
despite repeated violations of American neutrality by the British, America had simply 
protested, leading German officials to believe they too could press the president. 77 In the 
case of the German war zone, Wilson surprised Germany not only by the fact that he 
protested at all, but also by issuing a protest that was more strongly worded than 
anticipated. Nevertheless, it was still only a protest and would be handled as such. 
Wilson also surprised both the German leadership and the British by sending a note to 
Britain directly concerning one of the items pointed out by Germany for the creation of 
a war zone. In doing so Wilson was tacitly admitting that the need to maintain at least 
the appearance of unbiased neutrality required that the United States address aspects of 
British policy. 
Ray Stannard Baker suggests that the German decision to create a submarine 
enforced war zone was not unexpected by Wilson, a theory he based on telegrams from 
Ambassador Gerard in Germany. 78 The Ambassador's telegrams describe the bitterness 
of Germans, leaders and public alike, towards the United States due to what they 
consider un-neutral conduct, explicitly the selling of munitions to the Allies. 79 This 
does not, however, take account of Wilson's or his administrations feelings toward 
Germany at that time. Much of the discussion within Wilson's cabinet brought them to 
the conclusion that the loss of an American life, no matter if it was on aU. S. vessel or a 
77 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York, 1971), p. 54. 
78 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters; Neutrality, 1914-1915 (New York, 1940), p. 
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belligerent vessel, was an affront to U.S. neutrality.8o Still, while the president may have 
already had pro-Allied tendencies he was not vehemently anti-German. It was the idea 
of placing the lives of American citizens and other non-combatants at risk that Wilson 
felt was intolerable. 
The Belligerents' Responses 
Although Wilson seemed to have taken a more stern approach to Britain, he had 
become decidedly more pro-British in his general stance. It was true that Americans had 
become irritated by the British blockade. In fact they were bordering on being incensed 
by it, but the German submarine campaign was so morally despicable in Wilson's eyes 
that he felt he was being forced into the British camp. John Coogan sums up Wilson's 
differing views on the British and German blockades well when he states 'The real 
difference between blockade and submarine in Wilson's view was not that the former 
took property and the latter took lives, but that the former was British and the latter was 
German. ,81 In a discussion with his secretary Joseph Tumulty, Wilson allowed his 
position on the war to show when he stated 'England is fighting our fight [and] ... I shall 
not. .. place obstacles in her way. ,82 Nevertheless, over in the next several months 
British-American relations would be pushed to the limit, and had it not been for German 
gaffes Wilson may have been forced to hold a more firm line against the British. 
Unwittingly, the United States note to Germany had helped strengthen Britain's 
diplomatic position. By making the note to Germany seemingly more hostile, Wilson 
and Lansing sent a subtle message to Grey as to where the United States stood in 
relation to Britain's blockade and Germany's threatened submarine warfare. While 
80 Robert Lansing to Dr. Gallaudet, 2 June 1915, Container 9, Robert Lansing Papers, Library of 
Congress. 
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always careful of potentially alienating the United States, Grey now had more freedom 
to continue pushing his blockade without worrying too much about U.S. reaction. 
Germany's war zone declaration also played directly into Britain's hands. While 
British naval action played havoc on American trade, and raised many complaints from 
American businessmen, Germany's decision to sink ships without warning caused 
moral outrage in America. Spring Rice immediately understood the impact of 
Germany's decision on the American psyche, commenting in a telegram to Grey that the 
mood in the United States was such that if German submarines harmed U.S. ships or 
citizens that a serious situation was sure to follow, and that it was in Britain's best 
interest to do nothing more than avoid inciting incidents that might cause American 
public opinion to swing against Britain. 83 
In response to the American letter of 10 February Grey employed his normal 
delaying tactics, seemingly ignoring the American letter and continuing the use of 
neutral flags. David Stevenson notes that British naval tactics made submarine warfare 
riskier while Ross Gregory takes the matter a step further in declaring that Grey viewed 
submarine warfare as a 'stroke of good fortune. ,84 By delaying, Grey was giving 
German submarines the opportunity to make a mistake that could ensure the Allies of 
America's full support and possibly its entry into the war. Grey was certain that his 
defiance of American demands would payoff in the end, but he always maintained that 
if he had miscalculated and the United States threatened retaliation, he would drop the 
naval action against neutral shipping.85 But until that time, the Royal Navy would 
continue stopping neutral ships and Grey would continue slowly expanding the list of 
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contraband items. Grey finally responded to the United States' request to stop the use of 
neutral flags on 19 February, defending the use of neutral flags as a ruse de guerre and 
as necessary due to the German use of submarines. 
Just as Grey had delayed the British response to the United States, so did 
Bethmann. Responding on 16 February, three days before Britain, Germany complained 
bitterly that the United States was not acting in a truly neutral manner. To the German 
mind, Wilson was allowing the British to continue to use an illegal blockade based on 
dubious argument while threatening 'strict accountability' of the Germans due to their 
submarines. The German reply pointed out that not only was the United States acting in 
a non-neutral manner by allowing England to restrict U.S. trade with Germany and mine 
the North Sea without protest, but that, at the same time, they were selling munitions to 
Britain.86 Germany added that if the U.S. could convince Britain to allow foodstuffs and 
raw materials for civilian use through the blockade they would be willing to suspend 
submarine activity.87 This statement allowed a brief moment of hope to filter through 
the smoke of the war. 
On February 20, based on the mention of Britain's mining of the North Sea, 
Lansing, after long discussions and thorough editing by and with Bryan and Wilson, 
sent identical notes to both Britain and Germany encouraging them to restrict their use 
of all tactics that would be considered immoral, including mines, submarines, and 
neutral flags. 88 The notes also called for American direction of foodstuffs delivered to 
Germany. 
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Unbeknownst to Gennany, their tactics played directly into the hands of British 
diplomacy. The motives of Gennany's diplomacy remained to try and create a situation 
by which it could break the stalemate on the battlefield and win the war; now, however, 
in regards to the United States, Gennan diplomacy had the added task of attempting to 
keep them out of the war long enough for the military to achieve a decisive victory. 
First Contact: The Impact of U-8oat Warfare 
The first casualty of the submarine enforced war zone was recorded on 28 
March 1915 when the Gennan submarine U-28 sank the British ship Falaba off the 
Irish coast with the loss of 104 crewmembers and passengers including one American. 
This was followed by an aerial attack on the U.S. ship Cushing on 29 April, and then on 
1 May the American steamer Gulflight was torpedoed. All three of these attacks were 
overshadowed in a matter of days with the sinking of the Lusitania off the coast of 
Ireland on 7 May 1915. Then, with a brief period of respite, the British steamer Arabic 
was sunk on 19 August, bringing about a pledge from the Kaiser himself that no ocean 
liners should be sunk without full warning. Often viewed as individual incidents by 
historians, what is truly needed to understand the work done by the diplomats to ease 
tensions is a look at the initial submarine crisis as a whole and within the framework of 
the U.S. threat of strict accountability. 
In The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War, Ross Gregory 
expresses the common theory concerning the meaning of 'strict accountability' when he 
states that it most likely meant the United States would go to war if U.S. ships were 
attacked.89 Holger Herwig supports the theory by stating that the United States would 
'defend [its] right with force'.9O But the note to Gennany never uses the words force or 
war, and on 29 April 1915 Lansing wrote that too strong ofa policy would 'close the 
89 Ross Gregory, The Origins 0/ American Intervention in the First World War (New York, 1971), p. 54. 
90 Holger Herwig, Politics o/Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning. 1889-1941 
(Boston, 1976), p. 117. 
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door to all compromise', and that is precisely what Wilson wanted to accomplish - a 
compromise peace.91 In a letter to Bryan on 5 May 1915, Lansing clearly states that 
'Strict Accountability can only mean that the German Government must make full 
reparation for the act of their naval force and must also repudiate the act, apologize for 
it, and give ample assurance that it will not be repeated. ,92 This does not mean that 
Lansing did not see the pitfalls of strong language, for he often writes to Wilson and 
Bryan that it is possible that too strong a protest could lead to a break in diplomatic 
relations and possibly war.93 But to represent Lansing's position of 'strict 
accountability' as being directly related to the use of force is a slight misrepresentation 
of the facts. 
Diplomats watched with great interest as submarines began sinking ships and the 
initial American diplomatic moves seemed to bear-out Zimmerman's assertion that the 
United States would limit itself to a paper protest of the use of the submarine. For days 
after the sinking of the Fa/aha the Wilson administration's debated about the proper 
response to the sinking. As the facts of the case were not clean cut - the citizenship of 
the dead American and whether or not the ship had attempted to evade capture were in 
question - there was much consternation over the direction the U.S. protest should take. 
In his book The Will to Believe Ross Kennedy argues that Wilson took weeks to 
draft a protest to Germany and then, under pressure from Bryan and Lansing about the 
potential German reaction, he changed his mind and didn't send it.94 According to 
91 Memo, 29 April 1917, The Robert Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, Private Memoranda (Typed Copy), DM 
15347, Ree11 (Lansing Diary Blue Box 2: Confidential Memoranda and Notes from 15 April1915 - 30 
December 1918, Inclusive), Library of Congress. 
92 Letter from The Counsellor for the Department of State (Lansing) to the Secretary of State, 5 May 
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Kennedy, Wilson's fear of a strong Gennan reaction coupled with the fear that 
intervention would hann his desired position of mediator were part of the calculation to 
maintain America's moral position in the world leading to his decision against 
protesting the initial sinking by submarines.95 Kennedy's assertion simplifies the 
complex situation that was in play at this time. By arguing that Wilson was not truly 
beholden to the strict accountability statement, he admirably bucks the trend of most 
historians of this time period, but in doing so he does not do the diplomacy that had 
been taking place the justice it deserves. 
Like others, Kennedy assumes that the strict accountability letter of 10 February 
1915 set the tone for all future conversations dealing with submarine warfare, but this is 
not the case. In fact, it was upon being notified that an American citizen had died due to 
the actions of Gennan submarines that Wilson's advisors, in particular Lansing and 
Bryan, began fonnulating an outline for future u.s. policy - the groundwork for any 
and all future incidents involving the deaths of U.S. citizens by submarine warfare. 
Wilson's policy toward submarine warfare did indeed begin with the strict 
accountability phrase but this was neither an outline nor a plan of action. As Ernest May 
and John Milton Cooper assert, Wilson had yet to define 'strict neutrality'. 96 The 
cabinet discussions surrounding the Falaba, gave his administration the opportunity to 
do just that. 
In a letter to Bryan, Counsellor Lansing outlined the case against Gennany in 
regards to the F alaba noting that if a merchant ship did not abide by the rules of naval 
9S Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson. World War I. and America's Strategy for 
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warfare, America would have no legal standing to protest the loss of life.97 At the time 
Lansing wrote this letter, he admitted that he was lacking information about the sinking, 
but he understood the need for the United States to clarify what it meant by strict 
b·l· 98 accounta t tty. 
What Kennedy sees as fear by Wilson is really good, cautious, diplomacy on the 
administration's part. Wilson, Bryan, and Lansing were in constant contact as they 
worked to clarify America's position regarding the war at sea.99 Although President 
Wilson recognized the potential for more problems to arise between Germany and the 
United States due to the death of this lone American citizen it was not Wilson's intent, 
as John Milton Cooper suggests, to take a harder line against Germany for its infractions 
on U.S. trade than he had against Britain. IOO In a letter to Bryan dated 3 April 1915, 
Wilson again expressed his desire to clearly define the U.S. position, asking that 
Lansing formulate a new and more 'mature' letter towards that end. IOI The President 
and his Secretary of State continued to discuss the situation and wait, impatiently, for 
further information to help clarify the situation. \02 
On 5 April 1915, Lansing sent a draft response to Bryan for the President's 
approval accompanied with a note clearly outlining the issues facing the United States 
with respect to its response to the sinking of the Fa/aba. The Counsellor pointed out 
that if the letter to Germany were too soft there would be no reason for Germany to 
heed America's warning and drop their submarine tactics, while at the same time 
97 Letter from The Counsellor for the Department of State (Lansing) to the Secretary of State, 2 April 
1915, The United States Department of State/ Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
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acknowledging that if the letter was too harsh it could be seen as American support for 
Germany's enemies, leading to German hostility and possibly war. I03 
True to Wilson's personal style he mulled over his options for several weeks 
before he landed on what he felt was the best approach. On 22 April he directed Lansing 
to draft a new note that was less harsh, but still firm. 104 The key to this new note was, 
much like Lansing's original draft, focusing on the rights of neutrals, the violations of 
international law, and pushing Germany to adhere to the laws of visit and search. lOS If 
Germany had done as asked there would have been no further issues; they would be 
acting in the same manner as the British in regards to neutral merchant shipping, and the 
Wilson administration recognized that if the belligerents acted in the same manner, 
America could treat them the same. 
Before the United States had a chance to send this letter, reports arrived that on 
29 April a German Plane had bombed the American steamship Cushing with no loss of 
life. And then on 1 May, the Gulflight became the second U.S. flagged ship to be 
attacked by German forces. While these events caused a stir amongst some members of 
Wilson's cabinet, the Cushing incident did not involve the loss of life, and in the case of 
the Guljlight, the ship had failed to sink and was travelling with British trawlers making 
it hard to protest. Regardless of the fact that an American flagged ships had been 
103 Letter from The Counsellor for the Department of State (Lansing) to the Secretary of State, 5 April 
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attacked, the lack of injuries forced Wilson and his advisors to virtually ignore this 
. ·d ~ \06 
mCI ent as a case lor protest. 
While still debating the specifics of the protest letter, and whether or not the 
incidents of the Cushing and Gulflight should be included or dealt with separately, news 
arrived that the British luxury liner Lusitania had been sunk with the loss of 1,198 lives, 
128 of which were American. U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain Walter Page and 
presidential advisor Edward House believed that the incident would usher the United 
States into the war, and, accordingly, both Page and House - whom the president had 
sent to Europe for a third time to attempt to bring the warring sides to some type of 
peace agreement - sent notes to the President declaring that if the United States wanted 
to maintain the respect of the world it would have to declare war; if Wilson were to 
refrain from acting, he would have 'no voice or influence in settling the war nor in what 
follows for a long time to come. 107 Page's comment was designed to strike a chord with 
the president. He knew how desperately Wilson wanted be the deciding voice in 
bringing the war to an end and the crafting of a lasting peace. 
House's role in the stance the United States was to take in this matter draws 
deeply on the timing and work of Sir Edward Grey. As noted earlier, House was in 
London at the time of the German declaration of a war zone and during the sinking of 
the Falaba, Cushing, Gulflight, and Lusitania. Immediately upon his arrival in London 
in January 1915, House met with Grey and spent the next three and a half hours 
discussing everything about the war from the challenges of the Allies with the European 
neutrals, to Russia's transportations problems, to the expectations and demands of all 
106 Letter from The Counsellor for the Department of State (Lansing) to the Secretary of State, 1 May 
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the allied nations. They even exchanged gifts, House giving Grey a book that Wilson 
had written, and Grey returning the favour with a book he authored on angling. Grey 
continued the course he had begun during his previous meetings with House - he 
listened carefully, and spoke with House as if they were old friends simply catching up 
on things. As had happened before, House was deeply impressed with Grey, later 
commenting on Grey's 'frankness' and lack of reservation during the discussion, even 
going so far as to compare it to the type of conversation he had with Wilson. Grey 
reinforced House's perception of him by stating that while he was a government official 
of a nation at war he had been 'talking .. .like a neutral.' 108 
Wilson was now placed in a situation where he would have to reconcile his 
desire to maintain U.S. neutrality with his desire to mediate an end to the war. It is at 
this point that the outline created by Wilson and Lansing on what the 10 February letter 
and its 'strict accountability' phrase meant becomes crucial in understanding the 
American diplomatic reaction to the German submarine war and the British blockade. 
Despite the outrage expressed by Page and House; despite the outrage expressed 
by the American east coast press; and despite the outrage expressed by the British press, 
the outline created, but not sent, due to the Falaba case was the driving force behind 
Wilson's reaction to the sinking of the Lusitania. Leaders in the United States as well as 
among the belligerent nations misinterpreted the time it took Wilson to determine the 
proper response to the sinking of the Falaba. Ross Gregory indicates in Walter Hines 
Page: Ambassador to the Court of St. James's, that American representatives abroad 
were being reminded that 'Wilson had not protested the Fa/aba and Gu/flight.'109 Ross 
A Kennedy notes that on the home front Wilson was being attacked by former president 
108 Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston: 1926-28),4 volumes, vol. I, pp. 
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Teddy Roosevelt and Senator Elihu Root for 'failing to respond to Gennany's initial 
attacks' and for issuing 'ultimatums that fail to ultimate.' 110 
The impact of the Lusitania was a mix of intense emotions fanned by the eastern 
press and British propagandists. Ross Gregory observes that 'the reaction to the sinking 
of the Lusitania was so intense that [Wilson] had no choice but to do something' .111 
Reinhard Doerries remarks that 'America's entry into the war on the side of the Entente 
had become a serious possibility.' 112 These two historians base their prognosis of 
potential American belligerency on the writings from the eastern press, and media 
outlets controlled by the British propaganda machine of the time. And although 
members of Wilson's cabinet, in particular Walter Page and Edward House, expressed 
outrage, the President had effectively secluded himself from the emotion while he 
continued to focus on the outline begun after the sinking of the Falaba. 113 Additionally, 
it must be noted that the majority of Americans outside of the east coast cared little for 
news about the Lusitania or of its importance; with the Cleveland Press going so far as 
to downplay the incident as early as 10 May 1915.114 Furthennore, the San Francisco 
Chronicle described the sinking as Gennany's 'largest individual triumph in the war on 
B .. he ,115 ntIs ommerce. 
Prior to the sinking of the Lusitania, and in an attempt to ease the possibility of a 
conflict with the United States, Ambassador Bernstorff had taken the unusual step of 
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publishing a notice in major American newspapers warning American citizens about the 
risk involved in travelling on British and allied ships in the war zone. Reinhard Doerries 
describes this attempt by Germany to avoid conflict with the United States as 
inconsequential due to the lack of attention paid by the Wilson administration up to that 
point. I 16 But the notification is significant in that it is directly related to the German 
mission in the United States; to clarify the German position and maintain American 
neutrality in the war. Bernstorff substantiates this in his memoirs when he notes that the 
warning was motivated by both policy and humanity, two ideas that were sure to grab 
. fP 'd W'l 117 the attentIOn 0 res} ent } son. 
In the wake of the sinking of the Lusitania, the German government quickly 
moved to placate the U.S. government. On 9 May, Bethmann sought and received 
assurances from the Kaiser that neutral shipping would be spared in the submarine war 
on Britain's commerce. I IS Later that same day, U.S. ambassador Gerard was handed a 
circular that Bethmann had sent to all neutral governments, calling the attack a regretful 
mistake and contrary to the instructions repeatedly given to German submarines; 
furthermore, the circular stated that upon investigation of the facts, Germany would 
compensate those harmed. I 19 The next day Ambassador Bernstorff also made a point of 
calling on the State Department to express his 'deep regret...to the loss of the so many 
. l' ,120 Amencan Ives. 
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The idea that the note of 10 February hindered the president's ability to 
manoeuvre diplomatically, as proposed by Ross Kennedy, does not take into account 
the meaning of the 'strict accountability' phrase. 121 As noted earlier, while most people 
outside of Wilson' s cabinet misunderstood this phrase to mean 'war' as the only option, 
inside the cabinet the definition had become more clear. At the time of the Lusitania's 
sinking, Wilson and his advisors had been working for almost three months to create a 
clarifying outline on this point. Events had simply outpaced their ability to put their 
thoughts into a cohesive, understandable policy. 
What did hinder the president's abilities was the British propaganda. From very 
early in the war the British had been inundating Americans with messages designed to 
tum public opinion firmly against Germany by demonizing Germans as uncivilized, 
brutal Huns, and the sinking of the Lusitania benefited all areas of British 
propaganda. 122 It is true that most Germans supported the sinking of ships coming from 
the United States to Britain and France because it was well known that munitions were 
being shipped from America, but, as Ross Gregory notes, while Bethmann understood 
the popularity of the sinking, he was deft enough to understand the potential 
ramifications associated with provoking the United States. 123 Karl Birnbaum, in support 
of this point, argues that in May 1915, Germany's greatest fear concerning the United 
States was not its military, but that a declaration of war by the world's most powerful 
neutral would lead to other neutrals joining the Entente as well. 124 
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True to fonn, and with his closest advisor in London, Wilson secluded himself 
from the outside world for three days as he contemplated his response. 125 When Wilson 
finally emerged from his self-induced sabbatical on 11 May, he shared a draft of a 
diplomatic note he had written with his cabinet. Wilson's note was finn in its recounting 
of the earlier note of 10 February, and events between the two countries at sea including 
the attacks on the Falaba, Cushing, Gulflight, as well as the Lusitania, and called for 
Gennany to pay reparations, as well as taking steps to ensure that future incidents of 
tho k· d d·d 126 IS same minot occur. 
When the final letter was delivered to Gennan Foreign Minister Jagow on 13 
May, it was the culmination of months of thought and policy work by Wilson and his 
advisors. In the letter, Wilson reiterated his point that the United States simply did not 
accept Germany's claim that British measures forced them to bypass the visit and search 
procedures, internationally recognized as legitimate rules of naval warfare, and as a 
result they would be expected to disavow the actions of the submarine commanders at 
fault.127 The note continued along the exact phrasing used by Wilson in his draft, calling 
for the payment of reparations and for the Gennan government to take the actions 
necessary to ensure that there would be no further incidents of this type. 128 
Despite the internal bickering that occurred between Lansing and Bryan, and 
despite the disagreement over the tone of the letter, the Wilson administration had 
finally and clearly outlined the policy by which the United States would wage its 
neutrality against the pressures of submarine warfare - that the submarine issue was a 
diplomatic question, and not a military matter. 
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Bethmann did not immediately respond to Wilson's note of 13 May, employing 
instead the well-used diplomatic tactic of dragging out the discussions and the 
wrangling over the sinking of the ship, payments of reparations, and disavowing the 
actions that would last well into the summer. Through frequent meetings with 
representatives of the German Foreign Office, particularly Jagow and Zimmerman, U.S. 
Ambassador Gerard kept the Wilson administration abreast of the thoughts and 
discussions of the German leadership and the German people with reports detailing the 
German position. 129 Again, Bethmann was using the tactic of discussion and friendship 
in an attempt to convey the German position to Wilson and his advisors to draw out the 
debate without making an official statement. Reassurance was given to Bethmann about 
the sternness of the note when Zimmerman passed on information that U.S. Secretary of 
State Bryan had said that the note was for public consumption only. 130 The fact that 
Bryan later denied the conversation is inconsequential to the German diplomatic 
position.13 1 Bethmann had the reassurance he needed via a non-official conversation 
which he knew Americans put more faith in. 
When the British steamer Arabic was sunk on 19 August 1915, the German 
Foreign Office and the U.S. Secretary of State's office were still in negotiations over the 
sinking of the Lusitania. The sinking of the Arabic threw a kink in the negotiations in 
large part because the ship was heading to the United States and therefore could not 
have been carrying contraband or supplies for Britain. But the question for leaders on 
both sides of the Atlantic would be if - despite earlier German assurances that neutral 
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shipping would be spared from submarine attacks - the United States would continue 
with paper protests only. Almost immediately, Bemstorff issued a request to Bryan for 
the U.S. government to hold off on any decisions until all information was available. 132 
This would allow Germany to gauge the mood of the American leaders and public as 
they moved forward with their plans for submarine war. 
According to the diaries of Admiral MUller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet as 
compiled by Walter Gorlitz, there was 'great anxiety' over American actions, so much 
so, that after a meeting between the Kaiser, Bethmann, and Tirpitz, the decision was 
made to send a mollifying note to the United States. 133 While the Foreign Office was 
busy crafting its note to the United States it also continued its work on the personal 
level. In a series of meetings between Gerard and Jagow, the Foreign Minister reiterated 
that if the attack had occurred as reported it was contrary to instructions issued by the 
Kaiser. 134 Ambassador Gerard was also made privy to the behind-the-scenes fight 
between Tirpitz and Bethmann over the direction the submarine war would take. The 
leaking of this internal battle, done by Jagow, assisted in the Foreign Offices attempts to 
draw out negotiations over the use of the submarine. As Gerard passed this information 
on to Bryan, Lansing, and the rest of the presidential advisors, he was unintentionally 
buying time for Bethmann's diplomacy to work. On 30 August 1915, two days before 
Germany issued its official statement regarding the sinking of the Arabic. Gerard was 
notified that Germany was preparing to express regret and offer reparations. 135 As was 
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then expected in the White House, on 1 September 1915, German Ambassador 
Bernstorff delivered the official German note that would become known as the 'Arabic 
Pledge'. The note simply restated the instructions given to submarine commanders after 
the Lusitania was sunk; that liners would not be sunk without warning and without 
safety being provided for non-combatants provided the liners do not attempt to escape 
or resist. 136 Ross Gregory sees this episode as a diplomatic victory for President Wilson 
on the evidence that Germany backed away from unrestricted submarine warfare. 137 But 
taken in the context of the overall diplomatic and military situation, the victory clearly 
belongs to Bethmann. Germany would still be using submarines to blockade the British 
coast; they could still sink liners carrying contraband, and they could still sink liners 
that resisted search and seizure visits by submarines. Add to the equation that by 
February 1915 German submarine commanders had found that they had more success 
sinking ships while 'operating under international prize rules' and the concessions made 
by Germany in the 'Arabic Pledge' prove to be no concessions at a11. 138 
This is not to say that the fear of a break with the United States due to 
submarine warfare had disappeared from Bethmann's mind. In early March the 
Chancellor was still standing firm on the subject despite pressure from Falkenhayn, 
Holtzendorff, and Tirpitz. 139 Within the ranks of German leadership the fight over how 
the submarine was to be used would continue into late 1916, claiming Admiral Tirpitz 
and Bethmann Hollweg as casualties along the way. 140 
136 The Gennan Ambassador (Bemstorfi) to the Secretary of State, 1 September 1915, United States 
Department ofStatelPapers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1915. Supplement. 
The World War. Part II: Neutral Rights, pp. 530-531. 
137 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York, 1971), p. 69. 
138 Karl Lautenschlager, 'The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001', International Security. Vol. II, 
No.3 (Winter, 1986-1987), p. Ill. 
139 Bethmann Hollweg to Jagow, 5 March 1916, Theobald v. Bethmann Hollweg - N. 1549 (Nr. 342-1), 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
140 Bethmann Hollweg to Jagow, 5 March 1916, Theobald v. Bethmann Hollweg - N. 1549 (Nr. 342-1), 
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When the French steamer Sussex was sunk in the English Channel on 25 March 
1916, it appeared that submarine activity would once again be the catalyst for a break in 
relations between Germany and the United States. The so called crisis that followed the 
sinking of the Sussex revolved around the fact that the ship had been sunk without 
warning and its passengers had not been provided for, leading many in the Allied and 
neutral camps to the conclusion that the German's had violated their earlier 'Arabic 
pledge' .141 
The diplomatic exchange that followed resembled earlier exchanges in that the 
United States protested on 18 April 1916 by decreeing that unless Germany agreed to 
the 'abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare' the U.S. would break 
relations. 142 The ultimatum and the subsequent German decision to again restrict 
submarine warfare, has been seen by historians such as Arthur S. Link and John Milton 
Cooper as another diplomatic victory by Wilson.143 
On 4 May 1916, Germany responded to Wilson's letter essentially reaffirming 
the 'Arabic pledge' and on 8 May 1916 a second letter was sent apologizing for the 
attack on the Sussex. 144 Despite the apparent back-sliding by Germany on its use of 
submarines, Bethmann Hollweg had once again been able to mitigate the potential 
damage to German-American relations and maintain the navy's use of the submarine 
simply by following the rules initially laid down by Wilson in his note of 10 February 
1915 - repudiation of the sinking and reparations. 
141 Armin Rappaport, The British Press and Wilsonian Neutrality (Stanford, 1951), p. 85. 
142 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Germany (Gerard), 18 April 1916, United States 
Department ofState/Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o/the United States, 1916, Supplement, 
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Supplement, The World War, pp. 265-266. 
133 
Although the submarine issue would continue to be a sticking point in the 
relations between Germany and the United States during the war, with other incidents 
causing friction from time to time, German diplomacy had achieved a measure of 
success. Submarine warfare would continue, albeit with restrictions, but it would 
continue nonetheless to attack the lifeline of the British war effort. 
Conclusion 
Though the Arabic and Sussex pledges far from settled the issue of submarine 
warfare between the United States and Germany, the two nations now had a policy on 
which to base their future diplomacy. Having placed Tirpitz as the public face of the 
pro-submarine officials, Bethmann could deflect diplomatic criticism from the United 
States while at the same time appeasing his fellow countrymen who wanted to put the 
weapon to use. Using Tirpitz to sound out the United States on the issue allowed 
Bethmann the best chance to direct the policies the submarines would operate under, 
and therefore mitigate the diplomatic damage that could occur. 
The German Foreign Office's campaign to frame the use of the submarine on 
moral grounds, before the proclamation was officially made, effectively stunted the U. 
S. response, as evidenced in Lansing's acknowledgment of the 'belligerent necessity' as 
well as the strategy developed by the Wilson administration towards submarine warfare. 
While fault could be found in the length of time Wilson took to respond to the 
initial sinking of passenger liners, the importance of his action lies in the 
misunderstanding of the 'strict accountability' phrase. Yes, the note of 10 February 
1915 took a more firm line against Germany than had previously been taken towards 
Great Britain, and yes, the first Lusitania note was also firm as were the Arabic and 
Sussex notes, but the message was clear - the United States would defend the right of 
freedom of the seas from all violations. But both notes fell well short of a direct threat 
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of war. Lansing, at most, called for the breaking of diplomatic ties with Germany and 
Wilson threatened it in his Sussex letter of 18 April 1916, but as Wilson was to prove in 
1917 this was by no means an automatic invitation to declare war. Until the sinking of 
the Lusitania no one outside of Wilson's cabinet had any idea what the phrase really 
meant, but as the negotiations with Germany proved, the phrase meant only repudiation 
and reparation. 
Due to military concerns Bethmann was right to continue to worry about 
provoking the United States, but the time between American deaths on the seas and the 
American entry into the war indicates that Gerard's initial reaction to Zimmerman 
concerning the U.S. response to submarine warfare was spot on. The United States 
would indeed protest each incident at sea, but diplomatically there was very little in the 
way of direct treats of war until well after diplomatic relations were broken. 
To this point, this dissertation has established the diplomatic tactics that both 
Britain and Germany used with the United States. It has also revealed that Britain used 
its diplomacy to secure American acquiescence to their blockade of Germany. This 
chapter has analysed a variety of sources concerning German diplomatic tactics as they 
gained American diplomatic acquiescence for their use of the submarine. This chapter 
has established that Bethmann's role in maintaining American neutrality was greater 
than had been previously recognized by historians such as Roger Chickering. The 
evidence supplied in this chapter reveals that the Chancellor was able to gain an 
understanding for America's feelings on submarine warfare, and in doing so, prepare 
the Foreign Office to calm U.S. concerns. 
By using U.S. and German archives this dissertation has established that 
Bethmann was successful and dulling American outrage by framing the submarine issue 
before any attacks on American shipping occurred. What has also been clarified was the 
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intention of the American notes protesting the sinking of the Lusitania, Sussex, and 
Arabic. Emotions may have been running high among Wilson and his advisors but, as 
this chapter has demonstrated, Bethmann was able to ensure that the American reaction 
would consist primarily of protests and verbosity mainly for public consumption. 
The following chapter will take what appears to be a step back to discuss the 
animosity between the United States and Mexico, but in doing so it will establish the 
basis for German diplomatic discourse with Mexico and in particular the decision to 
offer an alliance between the two countries. 
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Chapter Four 
Diplomatic Acquisition via Mexico 
Mexico is rarely viewed as having a role to play in First World War diplomacy, 
this chapter seeks to change that attitude. The role Mexican-American relations played 
in creating an atmosphere of distrust and therefore a place that Gennany could use her 
diplomacy to influence the wars outcome cannot be over-estimated. In chapter one this 
dissertation established that Gennan diplomacy was based on the Bismarckian tradition 
of exploiting opponents' weakness in order to gain the advantage. This chapter focuses 
on the diplomatic tensions between the United States and Mexico to reveal the 
reasoning behind the Gennan decision to offer an alliance to Mexico. 
The history of Mexican-American relations is long and violent. The secession of 
Texas in 1836 had left enough bad feelings between the two nations that they went to 
war in 1846. That Mexican-American conflict led to the United States gaining the 
present day territories of New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, California, and parts of 
Colorado, nearly one-third of Mexico's territory, as the spoils of war. Disorder along 
the U.S.-Mexican border in the late 1870s/early 1880s led many American leaders to 
call for intervention, followed by more than twenty instances of American troops 
pursuing Mexican bandits into Mexican territory.) U. S. concerns over the stability of its 
southern neighbour eventually led it to assist in the overthrow of French installed 
dictator Maximilian and the instillation of the dictator Portirio Diaz.2 
During the thirty years Diaz led Mexico, relations between the two countries 
became comparatively good, thanks in large part to Diaz's policy of encouraging 
foreign investment in order to bring Mexico into the world economy.3 It was in this 
I Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History o/the American People (New York, 1964), p. 392. 
2 Robert D. Schulzinger, U.s. Diplomacy Since J 900 (New York, 2002), p. 51. 
3 Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M House (New Haven, 
2006), p. 86. 
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period that the United States was joined by the British, Germans and other European 
nations in investing in Mexico, particularly in railroads and oil. 
When Francisco Madero overthrew Diaz in 1910 he continued his predecessor's 
policies of bringing in foreign investors, while attempting to end the disparity between 
rich and poor created by these same policies.4 Even though Madero attempted to undo 
the systems of injustice in Mexico he was not able to quell the indignations of the 
Mexican people and was himself overthrown and eventually murdered in early 1913. 
The man that led this bloody coup was Madero's trusted General, Victoriano Huerta. 
The murder of Madero occurred three weeks before Woodrow Wilson took 
office. Wilson was so disgusted by the unsavoury circumstances of Huerta's rise to 
power that he refused to recognize the legitimacy of the regime.s The battle between 
Wilson and Huerta over the Mexican presidency hinged not only on Wilson's outrage 
over Madero's murder, but also on American fears of European interference in Mexican 
affairs, particularly from the British and Germans.6 
Wilson's decision to force Huerta out led to rising anti-Americanism in Mexico, 
and to deepening fears of European intrigue by Wilson and his advisors. America's fear 
of European influence in Mexico was justified, and in the run up to American entry into 
the First World War Germany, in particular, was attempting to exploit the fault lines in 
Mexican-American relations in order to solidify their position militarily as they 
attempted to bring the war to a successful conclusion. The German decision, led by 
Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann, to offer an alliance to Mexico was based on 
4 Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M House (New Haven, 
2006), p. 86; Robert D. Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900 (New York, 2002), p. 52. 
S Secretary of State to the American Ambassador to Brazil, 31 May 1913, United States Department of 
State/Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of the president to 
Congress, 2 December 1913, p.806. 
6 Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution. 1910-1914 (Cambridge, 1968), p. 19; Godfrey Hodgson, 
Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand (New Haven, 2006), pp. 86-88. 
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standard European diplomatic practice of alliances based on need, honour, and a 
perception that countries desired additional territory. 
With the exception of Rodney Carlisle's Sovereignty At Sea: u.s. Merchant 
Ships and American Entry Into World War I, there is almost universal agreement among 
historians that the Zimmermann telegram was a determining factor in Wilson's decision 
to break relations with Germany and eventually ask for a declaration ofwar.7 An 
excellent and in depth look at how Britain, Germany and the United States were 
involved in the decision and issues concerning the Mexican revolution is The Secret 
War in Mexico: Europe, The United States and the Mexican Revolution by Friedrich 
Katz, and while it does come the closest to covering the issues that brought about 
Zimmermann's decision to create an alliance with Mexico, it does not go into great 
detail about how this diplomacy affected the entry of the United States into the First 
World War.s 
The intent of this chapter is to clarify the role Wilson's policies towards Mexico 
played in inducing Germany into offering the prospect of a secret alliance if the United 
States broke neutrality and entered the war. This will be done by comparing the issues 
created by Wilson's Mexican policy and German diplomatic objectives in relation to the 
United States. The German perception of how Mexico was responding to American 
interference in their internal matters is crucial to understanding Zimmerman's decision 
to send his famous telegram and his equally famed decision to not deny responsibility 
for it when it became public. 
7 Rodney Carlisle, Sovereignty At Sea: U.S. Merchant Ships and American Entry Into World War I 
(Gainesville, 2009); Some examples of historians that view the Zimmerman telegram as the determining 
factor include, Ernest R. May, The World War and American Iso/ation, 1914-1917(Cambridge, 1963); 
Barbara W. Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York, 1958); John A. Thompson, Woodrow 
Wilson: Profiles in Power (London, 2002); John Milton Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, A Biography (New 
York, 2009). 
8 Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, The United States and the Mexican Revolution 
(Chicago, 1981). 
139 
To effectively accomplish this, it is necessary to examine Wilson's policy on the 
issue of the Mexican presidency, the fiasco at Veracruz, and the decision to send U.S. 
troops into Mexican territory. Once the background events are established this chapter 
will discuss the diplomatic reaction by Germany to these events and how it led to the 
proposal of an alliance between Mexico and Germany. In doing so this chapter will 
specifically cover the German diplomacy concerning support of the presidency of 
Victoriano Huerta, and American reactions to this; the German reactions and diplomacy 
concerning Pershing's punitive expedition into Mexico to capture Pancho Villa; and 
finally, how this culminated in German Foreign Minister Zimmermann's decision to 
send his telegram offering an alliance to Mexico in case of war with the United States 
over submarine attacks. 
Entering the Fray 
As Laura Garces has noted, despite the fact that Mexican leaders may have seen 
the investment by European nations in their country as a means of bringing the country 
on par with the great nations of the world, the Wilson administration saw it as a 
violation of the Monroe Doctrine.9 Garces argues that Wilson's cabinet felt that Mexico 
was doing the bidding of European nations who were fostering anti-American feelings 
for economic gain. Because Wilson believed that the United States had a duty and a 
right to warn off the European agitators by invoking the Monroe Doctrine, he fashioned 
a diplomatic memo on 24 October 1913 that enumerated the right of the United States to 
ensure that Mexico 'maintained ... independence of foreign financial power.' 10 
By positioning himself as a guardian of the Monroe Doctrine, Wilson hoped to 
involve the United States in the internal matters of Mexico without alienating the 
9 Laura Garces 'The German Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine in Mexico, 1917', in Confrontation and 
Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I. 1900-1924. ed. Hans-Jilrgen 
SchrOder (Providence, 1993), pp. 284-285. 
10 Woodrow Wilson draft diplomatic note, 24 October 1913, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur 
S. Link et ai, 69vols. Princeton University, 1966-1994. 
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majority of Americans who were generally apathetic to the whole episode. Wilson 
eventually decided against sending this diplomatic note, but its theme underlines 
Wilson's and his administration's belief that the problems in Mexico were the 
machinations of European powers and therefore a threat to American hegemony in the 
Western Hemisphere. 
In 1913 the European country that Wilson and his advisors felt was most 
threatening to the predominance of the Monroe Doctrine was Great Britain. II According 
to Mark Gilderhus, Wilson viewed the extent of Britain's connection with Mexican 
President Huerta as making him 'a creature of British imperialism.' 12 With controversy 
between the United States and Great Britain over the Panama Tolls issue, and now with 
Britain's decision to recognize Huerta, Wilson assumed British economic interests had 
trumped their moral indignation concerning the circumstances of Huerta's rise to power. 
Sir Edward Grey pitted Wilson's desire to see Huerta removed from power with 
congress' desire to charge Britain a higher toll when using the newly completed Panama 
Canal. This did not do much to dampen the idea that European powers still had designs 
on Mexico. Just as importantly it did nothing to change the effect Wilson's policy was 
to have on decisions made in Berlin regarding Mexico. 
To an extent, Germany, along with Britain, did have designs on Mexico dating 
since the tum of the century. Warren Schiff notes that the German Minister Edmund 
Freiherr von Heyking was sent to Mexico with direct instructions from the Kaiser to 
strengthen Diaz, and shortly thereafter the Germany military began assisting in the 
II Laura Garces 'The Gennan Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine in Mexico, 1917' in, Confrontation and 
Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era o/World War I. 1900-1924. ed. Hans-Jilrgen 
SchrOder (Providence, 1993), pp. 284-285; Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed 
Inten'ention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent State University Press, 1986), p. 42. 
12 Mark T. Gilderhus, 'Revolution, War, and Expansion: Woodrow Wilson in Latin America', in 
Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson, ed. John Milton Cooper Jr. (Washington D.C., 2008), p. 171. 
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modernization of the Mexican military's weapons and tactics. 13 Germany, it seemed, 
saw the economic impact Mexico could have on the German armaments industry and 
they were prepared to take full advantage. Even as Wilson was in negotiations with 
Britain to withdraw their recognition of Huerta he was presented with a series of choices 
that would lead Germany to believe that Mexico would make a reasonable counter-
weight if the United States were ever to pose a threat. 
On 9 April 1914 a small group of American sailors were arrested in the Mexican 
port city of Tampico, creating the opportunity for a diplomatic fire storm. Wilson seized 
upon the arrests to place pressure on Huerta despite the quick decision of the Mexican 
commander to release the Americans and apologize. But, as Frederick Calhoun 
explains, it was not so much the arrest of U.S. sailors that touched off events as it was 
Admiral Henry T. Mayo's (the senior officer at Tampico) perception of the arrest as a 
national insult worthy of a twenty-one gun salute. 14 The Admiral dutifully notified the 
Secretary of State's office of his demands and gained the full support of both Secretary 
Bryan and President Wilson. IS Wilson's support, according to Mark Benbow, came 
down to the president being mentally spent by the death of his wife and simply 'looking 
for a fight.' 16 Following the form that he would use in the coming years, Wilson sent 
diplomatic letter after letter, and threatened armed intervention in an attempt to 
convince Huerta to give the salute. Receiving no satisfactory response (insult as Huerta 
agreed to give the salute only if the United States did that same for the Mexican flag), 
13 Warren Schiff, 'Gennan Military Penetration into Mexico During the Late Diaz Period', llispanic 
American Historical Review 39 (1959), pp. 568-569. 
14 Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent 
State, 1986), p. 45; Admiral Mayo to General Zaragoza, 9 April 1914, United States Department of 
StatelPapers relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of the President to 
Congress, 8 December 1914, pp. 448-449. 
IS The Secretary of State to Charge O'Shaughnessy, 11 April 1914, United States Department of 
StatelPapers relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of the President to 
Congress, 8 December 1914, p. 452. 
16 Mark Benbow, Leading Them to the Promised Land: Woodrow Wilson, Covenant Theology, and the 
Mexican Revolution, 1913-1915 (Kent, 2010), p. 62. 
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on 20 April 1914 President Wilson informed both houses of Congress about the 
situation in Mexico asking for their approval to use the U.S. military 'in such ways and 
to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta ... the fullest 
recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States.' 17 Congress granted Wilson 
the power to 'force a showdown.' 18 
World events developed further while Wilson and Huerta argued over the 
demand ofa salute. In particular, a shipment of weapons that Huerta had ordered in 
early 1914 moved ever closer to the port of Veracruz during the incident at Tampico. 19 
The weapons were being carried on the Ypiranga, a ship owned by the German shipping 
firm the Hamburg-America-Lines. Wilson and his advisors were certain that Mexico 
was falling prey to European powers, and although Britain was Wilson's initial worry in 
Mexico, Germany had a recent history of interfering in which the the U.S. was 
involved: Samoa, Philippines, and Cuba. With weapons arriving on a German ship from 
a German port, it seemed that Germany was involving itself once again in American 
affairs by shipping weapons to a Mexican leader whom the United States wanted to 
oust. 
Late in the evening of 20 April 1914, after Wilson had been granted the 
authority to utilize U.S. forces as he saw fit, American Consul Canada relayed a 
message to Secretary of State Bryan about the Ypiranga, its cargo, and its imminent 
17 Address of the President delivered at a joint session of the two Houses of Congress, 20 April 1914, on 
'The Situation in our dealings with General Victoriano Huerta at Mexico City', United States Department 
ofStateiPapers relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address ofthe President to 
Congress, 8 December 1914, pp. 474-476. 
18 Mark T. Gilderhus, 'Revolution, War, and Expansion: Woodrow Wilson in Latin America', in 
Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace, ed. John Milton 
Cooper Jr. (Washington, D.C., 2008), p. 172. 
19 Thomas Baecker, 'The Arms of the Ypiranga: The German Side', The Americas 30 (1973), p. 2. 
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arrival at Veracruz.20 Orders went out for U.S. troops to seize the customs house in 
Veracruz in an attempt to keep the weapons from reaching Huerta.21 
The Wilson administration confused the name of the ship with the seller of arms, 
which led to further misunderstandings in future years. Wilson's decision to seize the 
Veracruz customs house came at a very high toll, not only in lives lost but in the 
nationalistic backlash the action created.22 
The overwhelming condemnation by Mexicans of Wilson's intervention and 
attack on Veracruz included Huerta, his enemies, and peasants, adding weight to the 
view emerging in Germany of Mexican hostility towards the United States .. 23 This 
would be the first in a series of events that would eventually give German leaders cause 
to see Mexico as a potential ally should war with the United States become unavoidable. 
The occupation of Veracruz also led to concern in Britain where the Foreign Office 
deemed Wilson's policy in Mexico as being 'quite careless' and lacking in 
'responsibility or humanity. ,24 
On 15 July 1914 Huerta's opponents forced him to resign and go into exile in 
Spain. Venustiano Carranza, the leader of the Constitutionalists (responsible for 
Huerta's downfall) assumed the presidency which, for the time being, gave Wilson a 
20 Consul Canada to the Secretary of State, 20 April 1914, United States Department of State/Papers 
relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of the President to Congress, 8 
December 1914, p. 477. 
21 The Secretary of State to Consul Canada, 21 April 1914, United States Department of State/Papers 
relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of the President to Congress, 8 
December 1914, p. 477. 
22 Accounts put the number of Mexican dead somewhere between 152 and 175 dead and upwards of 250 
wounded, and American losses of 17 dead and 61 wounded. John Milton Cooper Jr., Woodrow Wilson. A 
Biography (New York, 2009), p. 243. 
23John Milton Cooper Jr., 'Making a Case for Wilson', in Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson. ed. John 
Milton Cooper Jr. (Washington D.C., 2008), pp. 13-14; Mark T. Gilderhus, 'Revolution, War, and 
Expansion: Woodrow Wilson in Latin America', in Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson. ed. John Milton 
Cooper Jr. (Washington D.C., 2008), p. 172. 
24Letter to Wickham Steed from Arthur Willert, 11 May 1914, The Arthur Willert Papers, 
Correspondence, General Correspondence, Steed-Wrench; Incomplete; Illegible; Microfiche, Group No. 
720, Series No.1, Box No.5, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 
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small sense of victory.15 Unfortunately for Wilson that victory would be short lived as 
Carranza proved to be no more accommodating than Huerta. The Mexican revolution 
and indeed several revolutionary leaders refused to accept Carranza's rule well into 
1920. 26 
Punitive Measures 
As the dispute between Wilson and Carranza continued the United States 
became ever more involved in Mexican affairs. The details of the dispute do not need to 
be covered here in much depth as a general understanding is all that is required to 
appreciate how the United States' involvement/interference in Mexico played out in the 
diplomacy between Gennany and the United States.27 
Friedrich Katz argues that Wilson never really had any intention of allowing 
Carranza to maintain the Mexican presidency because the decision on who ruled 
Mexico was too 'momentous [a] choice' to leave to the Mexicans.28 To that end, Wilson 
convened a Pan-American conference made up of the so called ABC nations of 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile - along with other Latin American nations - to appoint a 
new government for Mexico.29 According to a telegram from British Ambassador 
Spring Rice to Grey, Wilson's advisor Edward House had infonned him that the plan 
was a means to 'pacify [Mexico] without using force.'3o Carranza refused to accept the 
conference as legitimate and refused to hold elections, placing the United States in in 
25 Roben E. Quirk, An Affair Of Honour: Woodrow Wi/son and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York, 
1962), p. 157. 
26 John A. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson: Profiles in Power (London, 2002), p. 85. 
27 For a more in-depth analysis of Wilson's continued problems in Mexico see, Friedrich Katz, The Secret 
War in Mexico: Europe. the United Slates and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago, 1981), pp. 298-326, and 
Lloyd C. Gardner, Safe for Dt'mocracy: The Anglo-American Response To Revolution. 1913-1923 (New 
York, 1984). pp. 45-69. 
28 Friedrich Katz. The Secret IFar in Mexico: Europe. the United States and the Mexican Revolution 
(Chicago, 1981). pp. 299-300. 
29 Note, 6 July 1915 and 7 July .1915. United States Dep~ment of StatelPapers relating to the foreign 
relations of the United States with the address of the PreSIdent to Congress, 8 December 1914, p. 722. 
30 Telegram, Spring Rice to Grey, 3 August 1915, PRO 170, FO 800/85 Microfilm, UK National 
Archives. 
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the position of utilizing a secondary means of pacifying Mexico. 31 The secondary means 
turned out to be the two other revolutionaries and former Constitutionalists, Francisco 
'Pancho' Villa and Emiliano Zapata, who, while not supporting each other also refused 
to support Carranza, with Villa in particular going so far as to curry favour with the 
Americans who he believed would help him gain power.32 
The Wilson administration's paranoia about European interference in Mexican 
affairs had not ceased during this time; it had increased. And while the Wilson 
administration saw the end of British influence in the end of the Huerta regime, they 
also feared that it was being replaced by German influence in the form of Carranza. 33 
As early as 11 July 1915, Robert Lansing noted that he believed German agents 
had been to blame for America's problems in Mexico, and that in order to frustrate 
German plans it would be important to remain on friendly terms with Mexico even if 
that meant recognizing Carranza as President. 34 Recognizing Carranza could possibly 
have interfered with German plans but Wilson did not deem it as an acceptable course 
of action due to the way he deposed Madero and his belief that because Villa was 
seemingly more 'amenable to American influence' he was the right man for the job. 35 
Reports reached the White House confirming Villa's attitude towards the United States 
31 The Confidential Agent of the Constitutionalist Government of Mexico to the Secretary of State, 10 
August 1915, United States Department ofStatelPapers relating to the foreign relations of the United 
States with the address of the President to Congress, 8 December 1914, pp. 734-735. 
32 General Villa to Messrs. L10rent and BoniIIia, 5 August 1915, United States Department of 
StatelPapers relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of the President to 
Congress, 8 December 1914, p. 733. 
33 Laura Garces, 'The German Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine in Mexico, 1917', in Con/rontation and 
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and increasing Wilson's desire to support him, despite information that Villa was a 
'flatterer' and 'unreformable' .36 
Additionally, February 1915 saw the reappearance of Huerta as a player in the 
Mexican revolution.37 George J. Rausch correctly argues in 'The Exile and Death of 
Victoriano Huerta' that the fear of U.S. entry into the European war precipitated the 
German decision to take a heightened interest in Mexican-American affairs in order to 
divert U.S. attention.38 Regardless of German attempts to keep their moves in Mexico 
quiet none of Wilson's advisers had any doubt that the move to re-establish Huerta in 
Mexico was backed by Germany.39 According to Michael C. Meyer, Germany was also 
developing a relationship with Pancho Villa in the event that their gamble on returning 
Huerta to power proved fruitless.4o This assumption is supported by the comments of 
the Mexican Minister to Great Britain, Covarrubias, who, in a conversation with U.S. 
Ambassador Page pointedly noted that there was a German among Villa's advisors.41 
By 1915 Germany was in some way involved with three of the four contenders 
for the Mexican presidency - Huerta, Villa, and Carranza. This would not only indicate 
that Wilson and his advisors were correct to worry about German influence in Mexico 
but that Germany understood the importance of the role Mexico played in U.S. policy 
and how American preoccupation with their southern neighbour could influence U.S. 
policies toward the war in Europe. 
It became apparent that Wilson, in supporting Villa, had backed the wrong man. 
Pancho Villa may have seen the U.S. as the support needed to defeat Carranza's forces 
36 Unsigned Memo, Mexico: Political Situation, 1914, Clifford N. Carver Papers, Box 7, Seeley G. Mudd 
Manuscript Library, Princeton University Library. 
37 10 October 1915, Lansing Notes I, 1915-1916, Lansing Private Memoranda, Container 63, U.S. Library 
of Congress. 
38 George J. Rausch, Jr., 'The Exile and Death ofVictoriano Huerta', Hispanic-American llistorical 
Review 42 (1962), p. 134. 
39 Michael C. Meyer, 'The Mexican-German Conspiracy of 1915', The Americas 23 (1976), p. 85. 
40 Michael C. Meyer, 'The Mexican-German Conspimcy of 1915', The Americas 23 (1976), p. 88. 
41 Unsigned Memo, Mexico: Political Situation, 1914, Clifford N. Carver Papers, Box 7, Seeley G. Mudd 
Manuscript Library, Princeton University Library. 
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but by late 1915 Carranza's forces had unmistakably triumphed over Villa's army 
leaving him capable of no more than guerrilla raiding and with 'little chance of 
overpowering Carranza's forces.'42 To add to the administration's fear over Mexican 
affairs were the increasing reports of German involvement in MexicoY Most 
worrisome at the time were the confidential letters coming from Italian Ambassador 
CoHere to Lansing. While the content essentially amounted to hearsay it fuelled the 
worries of German influence in Mexico. The ambassador stated that the Italian 
representative in Mexico had been told that Carranza had made plans with Germany to 
recognize his government and have German citizens in Mexico fight alongside Mexican 
forces in the event of intervention by the United States.44 
This information, along with Villa's poor military performances led Wilson to 
pre-empt formal German recognition of the Mexican President by extending de facto 
recognition to Carranza on 19 October 1915 in an attempt to settle the situation.4s The 
timing of the this settlement is important because at the time the United States was also 
heavily involved in negotiating with Germany over the sinking of the Arabic by a 
German submarine. With tensions between Germany and the United States high at the 
time, Wilson saw the need to assure himself the freedom to manoeuvre. Because Wilson 
saw the European war as needing his attention more than the troubles in Mexico it was 
an easier decision to push Mexico off by the de facto recognition of Carranza and thus 
the easing oftensions with Mexico. The administration's fear of German involvement in 
42 John A. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson: Profiles in Power (London, 2002), p. 85; Mark Benbow, 
Leading Them to the Promised Land: Woodrow Wilson, Covenant Theology, and the Mexican Revolution, 
1913-1915 (Kent, 2010), p. 109. 
43 8 October 1915, Edward Mandell House Papers, 1885-1938, HM 236-2, Vol. 3-4, p. 251, Yale 
University Library. 
44 Letter from Lansing to Wilson, 10 September 1915, Microfilm - M 743-1 Roll, Personal and 
Confidential Letters, From Secretary of State Lansing to President Wilson, 1915-1918, U.S. National 
Archives, Washington D.C. 
45 The Presidents Message transmitting to the ~enate a Repo~ of the Secretary of State, 17 February 1916, 
United States Department ofStatelPapers relatmg to the foreIgn relations of the United States with the 
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Mexico continued to pervade their thoughts as Robert Lansing noted that he believed 
Gennany would try to involve the United States in military activity in Mexico in order 
to distract the United States from the war in Europe.46 
Villa's reaction to Wilson's recognition of Carranza was measured and swift. lie 
began placing high taxes on American citizens and property in the area under his control 
and even murdered several American citizens in Mexico. Yet Villa had not given up 
hope of utilizing the United States as a means of gaining power. According to Frederick 
Calhoun, the means by which Villa hoped to utilize the United States was by inciting 
war between the United States and Mexico.47 On 9 March 1916 Villa crossed the U.S.-
Mexican border and attacked Columbus, New Mexico, killing several Americans. 
Wilson's cognisance of the distraction Mexico could provide to his desired work of 
mediating an end to the European conflict was a factor that Villa could not have 
foreseen. 48 That being said, the attack on Columbus could hardly have been a total 
surprise to the Wilson administration due to the fact that for over a year they had an 
agent travelling with Villa.49 In addition, for three days prior to his cross-border attack 
they had keep constant tabs on Villa and his forces, knowing that he was crossing the 
border with ease and regularity. 50 
Upon learning of Villa's attack on Columbus, Carranza immediately began 
laying the ground work to mitigate the damage and ensure the integrity of his 
government and Mexico. The Carranzista General in charge of the Chihuahua district 
46 10 October 1915, Lansing Notes I, 1915-1916, Lansing Private Memoranda, Container 63, U.S. Library 
of Congress. 
47 Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent 
State, 1986), p. 52. 
48 Letter to Wilson, 15 Mareh 1916, Box 47, Folder 13, Joseph P. Tumulty Papers, Library of Congress. 
49 The Secretary of State to Special Agent Crothers, 12 January 1915, United States Department of 
StatelPapers relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of the President to 
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State, 8 March 1916, United States Department ofState/Papers relating to the foreign relations of the 
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infonned the American Consul of the attack and requested that he infonn the U.S. 
Government that they had sent substantial forces to intercept Villa, even expressing a 
'willingness to cooperate' with the United States to capture Villa.51 That same day 
another Carranzista General stated that he did not resent the fact that U.S. troops had 
crossed into Mexico in pursuit of Villa but if they remained too long his view would 
change.52 The frankness with which the General spoke about his feelings towards 
American troops on Mexican soil was an early and clear warning to Wilson as to how 
the Mexican people felt about American intervention. 
Wilson received a second warning about sending troops into Mexico on 10 
March 1916 when Secretary of State Lansing was notified that Carranza was rushing 
troops to the area and that he would 'resent American troops entering Mexico. ,53 
Because Gennany was attempting to create closer ties with Carranza as well as Villa 
they were privy to the fears, resentments, and hatred created by American interference 
with Mexican affairs. This would add to their belief that the United States could be tied 
down in a war with Mexico if necessary. 
While Wilson did eventually decide to intervene in Mexican affairs in order to 
punish Villa, it was his ability not to allow the situation to get out of hand that thwarted 
not only Villa's plans but Gennany's as well. It was with incredible bravery that Wilson 
decided to publicly announce that the U.S. would 'get Villa' once congressional 
backing had been obtained, despite the very real possibility that resistance by the 
Mexican government would dramatically change the situation in Mexico and therefore 
51 Consul Fletcher to the Secretary of State, 9 March 1916. 3 p.m. and 6 p.m., United States Department 
of State/Papers relates to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of the President to 
Congress, 5 December 1916, pp. 481-482. 
52 Consul Edwards to the Secretary of State, 9 March 1916, United States Department of State/Papers 
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December 1916, p. 484. 
150 
impact U.S. influence on the European war. American prestige was on the line in 
Mexico and Latin America, Wilson did not want to be diverted from his goal of 
influencing the outcome of the war in Europe. 
Calhoun points out that the military believed that intervention in Mexico meant 
_ a full scale war - but Wilson was adamant that intervention was a political question 
not a military one.54 This decision should be no surprise to Wilson scholars because it 
follows the same pattern as his decision on submarine warfare. Many members of the 
eastern elite, as well as Wilson's own advisors and the British, had hoped to use 
German submarine warfare to bring about the United States' entry into the war, but 
Wilson had refused to allow it. He steadfastly stuck to his decision to protest American 
deaths because he believed the issue to be political, not military. 
For her part, Britain understood the potential consequences of the United States 
becoming deeply involved in a war with Mexico for quite some time and had continued 
its work on guiding the United States towards the Allied camp. A particular worry for 
the British military was that if the U.S. were to intervene in Mexico it would mean an 
end to their supply of munitions from America.55 From the British point of view it had 
to ensure the America did not get side-tracked by Mexican affairs. Grey was worried 
enough about this prospect that he instructed Spring Rice to impress upon Colonel 
House the seriousness of the situation as it pertained to British interests. 56 The British 
Ambassador dutifully pressed the chief presidential advisor for assurances of a 
continued supply of arms and no intervention in Mexico.57 
According to Spring Rice, House stated that they were well aware the Germany 
was attempting to 'trap them into invasion of Mexico' and that they were working to 
54 Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent 
State, 1986), pp. 54-55. 
55 Sir Edward Grey to Spring Rice, 4 June 1915, PRO 170, FO 800/85 Microfilm, UK National Archives. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Spring Rice to Grey, 4 June 1915, PRO, 170, FO 800/85 Microfilm, UK National Archives. 
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'avoid armed intervention, except within [the] narrowest limits possible.'s8 By 
qualifying his statement to the 'narrowest limits possible' House was giving the United 
States the latitude to intervene but not to the extent that it harmed their support of the 
British war effort. Wilson understood the need to appease the American public and 
while New Englanders may have been clamouring for war, the American Mid-West was 
59 
not. 
On 16 March 1916 the United States sent a military force into Mexico with the 
express purpose of capturing Pancho Villa. Because Wilson viewed intervention from 
the viewpoint of policy and not from a military point of view he felt that he could limit 
intervention to meet his policy goals by ordering U.S. troops to avoid Carranzista 
soldiers and if avoidance was not possible they were to extend every courtesy 
possible.60 Wilson clearly did not want war. Nevertheless this action would increase the 
possibility of outright war between the two countries and, just as important to the 
leaders in Berlin, it encouraged the German belief that it was possible to distract the 
United States from the war in Europe. 
Among the conflicting views on why U.S. troops were a1lowed into Mexican 
territory, the one unifying thread is that Carranza did not wholly oppose the action even 
ifhe did not sanction it. According to John A. Thompson Carranza had refused 
pennission for U.S. forces to cross the border between the two countries and Kendrick 
A. Clements adds that Carranza 'denounced the incursion. ,61 But Friedrich Katz notes, 
importantly, that Carranza neither agreed to nor denied the request, instead urging the 
revival of an anti-Apache agreement that allowed U.S. and Mexican forces to pursue 
58 Ibid, 12 August 1915. 
59 Ibid. 
60The Acting Secretary of State to Special Representative Rodgers, 20 March 1916, United States 
Department ofStatelPapers relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of the 
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61 John A. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson: Profiles in Power (London, 2002), p. 85; Kendrick A. Clements 
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bandits across the border.62 Katz goes on to contend that Carranza had intended the 
agreement to apply to any future attacks and when U.S. troops entered Mexico he 
hesitated to protest, but as days turned into weeks and the number of U.S. troops 
increased with the amount of territory they were covering he was forced to act. 63 Katz' s 
conclusion that Carranza viewed the anti-Apache agreement as applying towards future 
attacks is supported by a letter suggesting the reinstatement of the agreement sent to 
Lansing on 10 March 1915 in which Carranza is crystal clear that the agreement applied 
if the raid 'should unfortunately be repeated. ,64 The explicitness of the letter denudes 
the idea that Wilson could have misinterpreted it to believe that it applied to the 9 
March raid. This would seem to indicate that Wilson was taking a huge gamble on the 
belief that he could control the situation. 
In letter after letter Carranza issued warnings about the possibility of war 
between the two countries if U.S. forces entered Mexico, reminding Wilson that it was 
the enemies of the two countries that were seeking U.S. intervention.65 This statement 
can be viewed to have several different meanings, the first applying to Villa as an 
enemy of Carranza and recently abandoned by Wilson, and the second applying to 
Germany. This idea is reinforced by the fact that the United States had been receiving 
reports that Villa was being encouraged by Germany to attack the United States in order 
to force intervention.66 It is possible that some of those reports came from British agents 
in the United States who noted the fear that intervention could provoke an all-out war 
62 Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, The United States, and the Mexican Revolution 
(Chicago, 1981), p. 310. 
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between the two nations, and cautioned that it was the Germans who were behind the 
anti-American mood in Mexico.61 
If this were the case, Wilson was playing into the hands of the Germans by 
sending troops into Mexico. The Italian Embassy continued to stoke the fires of anti-
German fear in Wilson's administration when it notified Lansing that Germany intended 
to establish a submarine base in the Gulf of Mexico, most likely at Vera CruZ.68 While 
this may not have played into Wilson's decision to send troops into Mexico, it certainly 
gave credence to his long held beliefthat Germany had designs on Mexico. 
Nevertheless, American forces continued to stream across the Rio Grande and into 
Mexico. 
Carranza's predictions turned out to be correct to a point. As the American 
expedition pushed deeper into Mexico in search of Villa the Mexican people became so 
irritated with the presence of U.S. troops that Villa's ranks began to swell, applying 
massive pressure to Carranza to end the incursion. On 19 March 1916 Carranza 
condemned the entry of U.S. forces, and the occupation of Mexican towns along the 
border, calling for the withdrawal of the American expedition, but his requests 
seemingly fell on deaf ears.69 It was not very long after U.S. troops started their 
expedition to find Villa that they began to run into issues with the Mexican popUlation 
as well as with some direct confrontations with Carranzista soldiers - war looked to be 
imminent. 
67 Letter to Hohler from Willert, 14 March 1916, Arthur Willert Papers, Correspondence, General 
Correspondence, Drummond - Myers, Group No. 720, Series No. I, Box No.3, Manuscripts and 
Archives, Yale University Library. 
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Wilson's actions towards Mexico from 1913 to 1917 gave Germany hope, albeit 
unintentionally, that the United States could be distracted from the war in Europe long 
enough for them to win, or at the very least force the Entente to agree to a plan for peace 
that the German leadership felt was worthy. 
Zimmerman's Gamble 
On 16 January 1917, German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman sent a 
telegram via American diplomatic cables to Mexican President Carranza offering an 
alliance against the United States if America did not remain neutral in the current war.70 
Most historians tend to focus on the arrogance of Zimmerman, the use of American 
diplomatic lines to send the message, and the interception of the message by the 
British.71 In many cases this is understandable as these historians are focused on other 
aspects of the war, but diplomatic histories of the war such as Reinhard Doerries' 
Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count Bernstorff and German-American Relations, 
1908-1917 dismiss the entire affair as 'absurd' and 'unusual.,n Just as dismissive is 
Justus D. Doenecke who calls the proposal 'absolutely ludicrous'. 73 David Stevenson 
notes in Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy that ties between 
German and Mexico had been growing, but here again the origins of the proposed 
alliance are dismissed while still marvelling at Zimmerman's arrogance not only in 
70 Zimmerman to Bemstorff, 13 January 1917, Politisches Archiv, Nr. 16 secr., IA Mexico, R 16919-1, 
Bd. 1, Auswlirtiges Amt. 
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making the offer, hut then admitting it when he could have just as easily attempted to 
dismiss it as a hoax.74 
Apart from dismissing the plan's origins these historians offer no answers as 
they continue to question Zimmerman's reasoning for sending a message that the 
United States was bound to find blatantly offensive. An understanding of Gennan 
diplomatic history, Mexican-American history, and more to the point, the early 
twentieth century history between Mexico and the United states should help clarify 
Zimmerman's reasoning that Carranza would find an alliance bctwccn Gcnnany and 
Mexico appealing and is certainly not based on a flawed, and 'blundering' German 
policy as Niall Ferguson claims in The Pity o/War. 75 
Friedrich Katz and Michael C. Meyer have already pointed out that the 
combination of American forces occupying Veracruz in 1914, the Pershing expcdition 
in 1916 that had U.S. forces penetrating deep into Mexico, and the vchcment complaints 
of Mexican leaders, added weight to the various Mexican groups that had been pitching 
German-Mexican alliance to German leadership for years, led to Zimmennan's 
confidence in the successful conclusion of this plan.76 So while it appears that the idea 
may have originated in Mexico itself, Katz and Reinhard Doerries point out that despite 
the lack of archival evidence regarding specific discussions among Gennan leaders, the 
final proposal originated from within the German Foreign Office with the support of the 
K · 77 alser. 
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Zimmerman's decision to offer an alliance with Mexico in the event that the 
United States entered the war, can be seen as being based on Bismarckian diplomacy 
that dictated the use of counterweights to potential enemies, a fact that is supported by 
Zimmermann's defence of the offer which he defined as a 'defensive measure' when 
asked if the telegram was truly sent by him.78 Rodney Carlisle addresses this point when 
he notes that Zimmerman saw the acquisition of allies as a 'natural' concept in the 
course ofwar.79 Additionally, Karl Birnbaum points out that by January 1917 the goal 
of German diplomatic actions toward the United States was 'to prevent war with 
America as a consequence of the impending ruthless U-boat campaign.'Ho Birnbaum's 
position is supported by a letter from Bethmann Hollweg to Gottlieb von Jagow in 
which the German Chancellor notes that in a discussion with General Falkenhayn in 
March 1916 that the role of Germany's diplomacy regarding submarine warfare was to 
h . ,81 'resolve t e terram. 
The reality of Zimmerman's proposed alliance against the United States, if they 
were to join the war, was that of diplomatic necessity. The near seventy years of 
animosity between Mexico and the United States coupled with Mexican proposals for a 
war against America to regain lost territories led the German Foreign Office to believe 
that Carranza's support was a safe bet.82 Add to the decision making process that once 
the decision to wage unrestricted submarine warfare had been made and the dute for its 
commencement set, Zimmerman was tasked with finding a way to prevent war with 
America. In theory, if Mexican forces had attacked the United States, Wilson would 
78 German Official Explanation, p. 7, HW 3/180, UK National Archives. 
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have been forced to resolve that issue, pulling men, money, and arms from the allies in 
order to defend America from a direct attack from Mexico, giving the German 
submarines time to starve England into submission and German armies time to wear 
down allied troops to the point that they sue for peace.83 An alliance with Mexico as a 
means of keeping the United States from sending troops to Europe fit Bismarckian 
diplomacy and seemingly met the needs of the German military. 
Once the decision was made Zimmerman had to decide the best means of 
communicating the proposed alliance with Carranza. The initial act of the war by the 
British government was to cut the communication cables between Germany and the 
Western Hemisphere. This left Germany with only wireless communication and the use 
of the American diplomatic cables as a means of communicating with its representatives 
in the Western Hemisphere.84 It is also necessary to understand that British Naval 
Intelligence had broken both the German military and diplomatic codes as early as 13 
October 1914, allowing the British to read German telegrams almost before the 
ambassador himself had a chance to read it. 85 While the general story about the telegram 
is well known, the diplomatic tactics that were employed by all sides stayed true to the 
patterns established years before. 
With the interception of the message on 19 January 1917, Britain did not 
immediately pass the information on to the United States. The reasoning behind this 
was quite solid: The British wanted to protect the fact that they could break German 
code, and in the battle to acquire America it would not do for the United States to find 
out that Britain had been, as Robert Carlisle puts it 'tapping their own [America's] 
83 Letter from Professor Max Weber to Friedrich v. Payer, N 1020, Politisches Nr. 10, Bundesarchiv 
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private diplomatic line. ,86 More to the point, Britain needed to hold the information 
until they knew it would force American's into action. 
Despite Germany's announcement on 31 January 1916 of its intention to renew 
unrestricted submarine warfare, the United States did not enter the war. Wilson merely 
handed Bemstorff his papers and sent him packing. Frustrated with Wilson allowing yet 
another opportunity pass without joining the war the British turned to Zimmerman's 
telegram as a means of applying pressure on Wilson.87 Britain finally released the 
message to Page for delivery to Wilson on 24 February 1917 and while it led to 
increased anti-German feelings throughout most of the United States, Wilson still did 
not ask Congress for a declaration of war against Germany. 
When Zimmermann's note was first made public many Americans thought that 
it was a forgery or some form of British propaganda, but when Zimmermann assumed 
full responsibility for the note a tide of indignation among the American public rose 
dangerously high. Carranza, maintaining his innocence, denied any knowledge of the 
offer both publicly and in private discussions with the British Ambassador. 88 
Conclusion 
In scholarship on First World War diplomacy such as Doenecke's Nothing Less 
Than War and both of David Stevenson's works, Cataclysm and The First World War 
and International Politics, the prominence of Mexico as a key figure in the drama of the 
First World War is either entirely overlooked or more often viewed as a sideshow to the 
great powers clashing over Europe.89 But its importance to the diplomatic conflict 
between Britain and Germany as they vied for American support should not be 
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minimized. From almost the moment Woodrow Wilson took office, his interest in 
Mexico was almost obsessive. His hatred of Mexican President Huerta, fear of growing 
European influence in the region, and use of American military forces to stop German 
ships from delivering weapons to the country clearly preceded the start of the First 
World War, but they sowed the seeds of future German-American discord over Mexico. 
Wilson's constant meddling in Mexican affairs, particularly his use of force in 
Veracruz and later Pershing's punitive expedition, led to a palpable rise in Mexican 
hostility to the United States. The seizing of Veracruz was met with such strong 
repudiation from all comers of Mexican society that it surprised the Wilson 
administration and gave notice to the world that Mexico was not an American stooge. 
Despite Wilson's attempts to limit U.S. excursions into Mexico his decisions fed the 
German belief that if the United States were to break neutrality entirely, Mexican anger 
towards its northern neighbour would make it a valuable ally tying up American men, 
material, and money long enough for Germany to win the war outright or, at the very 
least, force the Entente to sue for peace on Germany's terms. 
The growing German belief that the submarine was the only weapon that could 
challenge British supremacy on the sea and guarantee victory led its leaders to gamble 
that anti-American feelings in Mexico could be translated into a counter-weight and 
therefore the creation of an alliance based on Germany's long held beliefs in diplomacy. 
Zimmermann's calculation that Mexico could distract the United States long enough for 
victory was not an absurd idea, but instead a well thought out, diplomatic manoeuver. 
German arrogance about their ability to communicate freely would be what ultimately 
doomed Zimmermann's planned alliance with Mexico, but this too can hardly be 
considered the crucial failure of German diplomacy during the war. 
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The events in Mexico lead inexorably to the fact that American actions in 
dealing with Mexico clearly led to the German belief that Mexican hostility made the 
country a perfect counter-weight should the United States enter the war on the side of 
the Entente. As damaging as it was to German-American relations, the disclosure of 
Germany's proposed alliance with Mexico was not seen by Zimmerman and Germany's 
leadership as an embarrassment. A view vindicated by the fact that it was not the straw 
that broke the camel's back. 
The impact Mexico had on German-American diplomatic relations cannot be 
underestimated. The turbulent relationship between the two countries combined with the 
troubles Wilson had with Mexico led German leaders to see the Central American 
nation as a potential ally in their bid to keep the United States neutral. This chapter has 
shown that Zimmerman's fateful telegram of 1917 was not reckless and arrogant as has 
been stated by historians such as Reinhard Doerries, but instead, it was a diplomatic 
tactic that had a long record of being successful in European diplomacy. Germany had 
not gambled with the offer of alliance to Mexico, instead they had looked at the 
relations United States actions had created with Mexico and judged that there was an 
opportunity to tie American money, supplies, and forces down in Mexico. 
This chapter has demonstrated that German diplomacy followed the established 
trend of exploiting others troubles, in this case American disputes with its southern 
neighbour, in an attempt to create a favourable position for Germany. By attempting to 
lure Mexico with the promise of lost lands German diplomats saw Mexico as a means to 
break the stalemate and bring the war to a swift and successful end. This chapter reveals 
that Zimmerman and the German Foreign Office made a calculated decision based on 
diplomatic tradition, poor American policy, and a need to maintain American neutrality. 
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In the previous chapter this dissertation revealed the intense diplomatic and 
political battle surrounding the use of submarines to break the deadlock, and the 
resulting diplomacy needed to maintain American acquiescence. This chapter 
concentrated on how German diplomacy expanded from attempting to hold the 
American government at bay concerning submarine warfare, to utilizing outside 
pressure on the Wilson administration, in the form of Mexico, in maintain American 
neutrality. Chapter five will engage the question of peace and how the belligerent 
nations were attempting to use the prospect of peace to influence American support for 
their cause. 
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Chapter 5 
The Peace Option 
To this point this dissertation has focused primarily on how belligerent nations 
used diplomacy to guide U.S. policies to favour them. In each case the intent was to 
gain U.S. support for their position, either through maintaining American neutrality or 
in bringing the country closer to joining the war on the side of the Allies. In each case 
the diplomats built their policies to appeal directly to Wilson's desires. The evidence 
provided in this chapter will reveal that the discussions of peace held between Britain, 
Germany, and the United States were once again, diplomatic ploys to gain an advantage. 
President Wilson declared that the United States would remain neutral in the 
European war onl8 August 1914. But before he established American neutrality, he had 
extended an offer to the belligerent nations to help bring either an immediate end to the 
conflict or to mediate 'at any other time that might be thought more suitable.' I Though 
none of the warring nations chose to accept his offer, leaders in Berlin and London 
quickly came to understand the importance Wilson placed on mediating an end to the 
war in large part because Colonel House spent the balance of 1914 attempting to coax 
them into mediation.2 
Despite having had his offer refused Wilson would hold on to the possibility of 
American led mediation for the next three years. Having already attempted to prevent a 
general European war by sending House to Europe in the months preceding the 
assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne, the president was not entirely naIve to 
the difficulties of bringing nations to the negotiating table. Throughout the war there 
1 On 4 August and 5 August 1914 the United States extended this offer to all the belligerent governments, 
Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Austria-Hungary, 4 August 1914, Papers relating to the foreign 
relations of the United States, 1914. Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), 
http://digital.library.wisc.edulI711.dllFRUS.FRUSI914Supp, p. 42. 
2 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal internationalism during 
World War I (Wilmington, 1991), p. 36. 
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would be on-going discussions about bringing peace to Europe all seemingly falling 
upon deaf ears as one or the other belligerent government backed away from the 
mediation efforts of the United States. Despite the repeated attempts of the United 
States to end the war and despite the repeated troubles between the belligerents and the 
United States - including blockade issues by Britain and submarine issues with 
Germany - Wilson and his cabinet continued to talk about peace with whoever would 
listen. 
Historians in general, and diplomatic historians specifically, have not viewed 
mediation and peace offers as a diplomatic tool. Instead they discuss the peace offers as 
a means of exploring the personalities of those involved or as part of a larger, separate 
issue. For instance, Fritz Fischer is one of the earlier historians to examine the German 
motive for peace in his ground-breaking and controversial book Germany's Aims in the 
First World War. 3 But Fischer was describing what Germany wanted to gain when the 
war had ended, not what they would gain from the offer itself. Malcolm D. Magee 
addresses American attempts at peace in his book, What the World Should Be: 
Woodrow Wilson and the Crafting of a Faith-Based Foreign Policy but here again, 
discussions are not so much about the diplomatic tactics involved as they are about how 
Wilson's peace initiatives were wrapped up in his religious ideology.4 Magee's focus on 
Wilson's individual beliefs is nothing new to this genre of writing as seen in Godfrey 
Hodgson's biography of Colonel Edward M. House, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand 
which follows the same pattern as Magee by discussing First World War American 
diplomacy through the lens of House's personality.s 
3 Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967). 
4 Malcolm D. Magee, What the World Should Be: Woodrow Wilson and the Crafting 0/ a Faith-Based 
Foreign Policy (Waco, 2008). 
S Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life o/Colonel Edward M House (New Haven, 
2006). 
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Some historians, such as John Coogan, have charged that Wilson's inability to 
bring about mediation is, in part, a result of his ineptitude as a leader at communicating 
his ideas to those responsible for the foreign relations of the United States in a way that 
clarified his decisions, and in some cases 'deliberately misleading' them.6 Others claim 
that it was the belligerents' stance and war aims, or lack thereof that did not allow room 
for negotiations that scuttled peace plans before they could even come to fruition, as 
Ross A. Kennedy does in The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and 
America's Strategy for Peace and Security.7 Ernest R. May does examine the overall 
peace initiative from the perspective of Germany, Britain, and the United States, 
claiming that Germany 'made no effort' to use American mediation efforts to their 
advantage, and that while Grey 'handled ... the Americans,' Colonel House worked more 
to preserve Anglo-American relations than he worked to negotiate peace.8 But in his 
final analysis, May misses the point behind German diplomatic tactics regarding peace. 
And while one must note that May makes glancing remarks about Grey's ability to 
manoeuvre American diplomats to his line of thought, he does not draw a connection 
between the policy of delay and peace within Grey's diplomacy. In the cases of Coogan, 
Kennedy, and May, the use of a peace offer by the belligerent nations to gain a strategic 
position has not been examined in any real detail. 
Key to understanding why a peace settlement through American mediation was 
not reached until 1918 is Wilson's desire to lead a charge for peace. His speeches 
proclaiming that' America must be the example, not merely of peace because it will not 
fight, but because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world' and of 
'Peace without victory' are but two examples he gave to the world that he believed the 
6 John Coogan, 'Wilsonian diplomacy in war and peace', in American Foreign Relations Reconsidered. 
1890-1993. ed. Gordon Martel (London, 1994), pp. 72-73. 
7 Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson. World War I. and America's Strategy for 
Peace and Security (Kent, 2009), p. 79. 
8 Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation. 1914-1917 (Cambridge 1963), pp. 72-73, 90. 
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United States must remain above the pettiness of war and bloodshed in order to provide 
the world with a beacon oflight.9 His offers of the good offices of the United States to 
help stop the war were not mere lip service but were followed up with letter upon letter 
and visits of his most trusted advisor not only with the ambassadors from belligerent 
nations but to the warring Capitals as well. Often this played straight into the delaying 
tactics of the Foreign Offices in London and Berlin. 
Historians such as Ernest R. May have clearly understood that Wilson saw the 
ideal role for himself and America regarding the war in Europe as that of mediator - a 
sort of messiah who would bring about a lasting peace not only to Europe but to the 
world. 10 Others such as Arthur S. Link agree, stating that 'Wilson's supreme 
objective ... was peace through his own mediation.,11 Thomas J. Knock writes that the 
desire to mediate an end to the war was a 'critical factor in Wilson's foreign policy,' 
and Joyce Grigsby Williams notes that from August 1914 'Wilson's major activity in 
foreign policy had been to promote peace.' 12 Kendrick A. Clements adds to this line of 
thought by stating that early in war Wilson declared mediation and the need for a lasting 
peace 'the goal of his diplomacy.' 13 Lloyd C. Gardner adds that the idea of mediation as 
the aim of U.S. foreign policy was as much a product of Wilson's most trusted advisor 
Colonel House as it was Wilson's, because it was House that helped develop the policy 
that Wilson's role in the war should be that of directing the peace-making process and 
not one of direct involvement. 14 
9 President's speech, 10 May 1915, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 33, pp. 147-49, Princeton 
University; Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers 0/ Woodrow Wilson vol. 
II (New York, 1925),President's speech, 22 January 1917, pp. 407-414. 
10 Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation. 1914-1917 (Cambridge, 1963), p. 347. 
II Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore, 1957), p. 58. 
12 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest/or a New World Order 
(Princeton, 1992), p. 34; Joyce Grigsby Williams, Colonel /louse and Sir Edward Grey: A Study in 
Anglo-American Diplomacy (Lanham, 1984), p. 53. 
13 Kendrick A. Clements, Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman (Chicago, 1999), p. 152. 
14 Lloyd C Gardner, 'The United States, the German Peril and a Revolutionary World: The 
Inconsistencies of World Order and National Self-Determination', in Confrontation and Cooperation: 
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Wilson scholar John Milton Cooper places more emphasis on the president's 
aspiration to keep the United States out of the war without placing too much weight on 
the president's wish to playa major role in mediating a peace deal. ls This is somewhat 
countered by Ross Kennedy who argues in The Will to Believe that Wilson's desire to 
keep the United States out of the war and his desire to mediate are in fact one policy 
aimed at bringing about peace. 16 Yet while it has been determined that Wilson wanted 
to avoid U.S. involvement in the war, and that he wanted to lead the movement for 
peace, the various peace offers from the belligerent governments are not examined as 
part of a larger diplomatic strategy of the belligerents to drive America into the position 
required by the belligerents. 
The idea of peace in the context of diplomacy, such as the House-Grey 
Memorandum, have been discussed in conjunction with the general peace movement as 
Thomas J. Knock does in his book To End All Wars, or as an agreement born out of 
misconceptions and obfuscation among diplomats attempting to out-manoeuvre each 
other as Joyce Grigsby Williams claims in Colonel House and Sir Edward Grey. 17 The 
various peace parlays attributed to Germany in conjunction to the work of Ambassador 
Bemstorff have been examined by Reinhard Doerries in Imperial Challenge and Z.A.B. 
Zeman in The Gentlemen Negotiators. IS Once again none of these discussions analyse 
the efforts at peace within the broader context of diplomatic manoeuvring. 
Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I. 1900-1924. ed. Hans-Jilrgen SchrOder 
(Oxford, 1993), p. 268. 
15 John Milton Cooper, Woodrow Wilson. A Biography (New York, 2009). 
16 Ross A Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson. World War I. and America's Strategy for 
Peace and Security (Kent, 2009), p. 90. 
17 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest/or a New World Order 
(Princeton, 1992); Joyce Grigsby Williams, Colonel House and Sir Edward Grey: A Study in Anglo-
American Diplomacy (Lanham, 1984). 
18 Reinhard R. Doerries, Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count Bernstorff and German-American 
Relations. 1908-1917 (Chapel Hill, 1989); Z.A.B. Zeman, The Gentlemen Negotiators: A Diplomatic 
History o/World War I (New York, 1971). 
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The British position on American peace initiatives was based on the diplomacy 
of delay, conciliation, and vagueness. It was the distinct desire of the Foreign Office to 
keep peace plans at bay long enough for the United States to lose patience with 
Germany and go to war. Grey's fear of Germany led to his desire and the desire of 
almost all of Britain's leaders to 'above all ... defeat Germany.'19 With that intent, Grey 
could not sincerely entertain the possibility of peace before Germany no longer posed a 
threat to British interests. 
German diplomacy regarding American peace initiatives was not much different 
from that of Great Britain. The peace moves that came out of the German Foreign 
Office were vague, conciliatory, and employed delaying tactics as a means of stalling 
U.S. entry into the war in the belief that German military prowess could force a peace 
thoroughly on Germany's terms. In his ground-breaking book, Peace Moves and U-
Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards the United States, April 
18, 1916 - January 9, 1917, Karl Birnbaum writes that 'the principal object of 
Germany's policy towards the United States was to prevent America from joining the 
Entente ... :20 This being the case, Bethmann would entertain the possibility of peace if 
that were sufficient to keep them out of the war. Despite hardships imposed by the 
British Blockade and fighting a multi-front war, Germany's leaders held fast to the 
belief that the German Army could still emerge victorious. By policy design, both 
Britain and Germany held out the hope of peace as a means to draw out negotiations 
with the United States in order to exact a favourable military decision that would force 
the other to sue for peace on the victor's terms. 
19 John Charmley, 'Splendid Isolation to Finest Hour: Britain as a Global Power, 1900-1950', in The 
Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, ed. Gaynor Johnson (London and New 
York, 2005), p. 135; V.H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-1918 (London, 1971), 
ff' 2-3. 
Karl Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards the 
united States, April 18, 1916 -January 9, 1917 (Stockholm, 1958), p. 26. 
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Focusing on three specific instances, this chapter examines the belligerents' use 
of peace as a diplomatic strategy, beginning, in the first section, with the initial peace 
discussions that stretched from September 1914 into June 1915, which created the 
framework for all future peace offers. The second section analyses the motivation 
behind the distinctly one sided peace initiative between the United States and Great 
Britain in the House-Grey Memorandum. The final section examines the reasoning for 
Bethmann's peace initiative of 12 December 1916 that pre-empted President Wilson's 
long awaited call for peace. 
Posturing for Peace: 1914-1915 
Having turned Wilson's initial offer of the good offices of the United States 
down, both Britain and Germany continued to discuss various peace options with the 
U.S. throughout the war, each one ending with no concrete offer acceptable to the 
opposing side. Yet Foreign Secretary Grey worked with Colonel House and 
Ambassador Page on several occasions to create possible peace options that were 
clearly not going to be accepted by the Germans. Equally, Ambassador Bernstorff, and 
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg worked with House, Lansing, and Ambassador Gerard 
to create peace offers that would just as clearly not be acceptable to the Allied nations or 
the United States but nevertheless kept Wilson's attention. One theme developed in the 
peace discussions from both camps: Whatever form peace took, it had to be an enduring 
peace that would prevent another war. 
Although Wilson offered the good offices of the United States, the first 
diplomatic exchange regarding peace - often overlooked when discussing the First 
World War-was initiated by Germany in September 1914 and lasted well into 1915.21 
According to Armin Rappaport both sides had a litany of excuses to rebuff the 
21 Reinhard R. Doerries, Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count BernstorfJ and German-American 
Relations, 1908-1917 (Chapel Hill, 1989), p. 91. 
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president's early offers to mediate, with Britain going so far as to express 'no interest' 
at all in peace talks.22 According to Robert J. Young, the French appeared to be no 
closer to accepting a peace offer as Ambassador Jusserand found the idea to be 
'inconceivable,.23 Yet on 5 September 1914 the British were notified by U.S. Secretary 
of State Bryan and Counsellor Lansing that Germany was open to peace talks.24 Bryan's 
and Lansing's knowledge is based on comments made by the German Ambassador 
during a dinner he attended on 5 September 1914.25 That American officials jumped on 
this possibility to bring peace is in itself uninteresting; more germane to the point is that 
Grey was alerted to the possibility of a German peace demarche by anglophilic 
members of the American government, giving him time to formulate a response that 
would, in theory, not place Britain in a negative position for rejecting the German peace 
overture. 
In a flurry of notes between Spring Rice and Grey on this subject, the Foreign 
Minister noted that the U.S. Ambassador Walter Page had voiced his concern over the 
potential for Germany to request mediation. Page pointed out that the recent declaration 
by the Allies that they would carry on the war in common in conjunction with a German 
request for mediation would give the impression in the United States that Germany 
wanted peace while Britain and her allies wanted to continue the war.26 Page's worries 
were a precursor to the effect the diplomatic game involving peace would have for the 
duration of the war. 
22 Annin Rappaport, The British Press and Wilsonian Neutrality (Stanford, 1951), p. 103. 
23 Robert J. Young, An American By Degrees: The Extraordinary Lives of French Ambassador Jules 
Jusserand (Montreal, 2009), p. 79. 
24 Telegram Spring Rice to Grey, 5 September 1914, FO 371/2223, Political, America General (war) files 
39619-53594,1914, National Archives. 
25 Annin Rappaport, The British Press and Wilsonian Neutrality (Stanford, 1951), p. 103. 
26 Letter, Sir Edward Grey to Spring Rice, 9 September 1914, , FO 371/2223, Political, America General 
(war) files 39619-53594,1914, National Archives. 
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Although Grey dismissed Page's worry with tact and common sense - noting 
that the agreement with France and Russia was an obvious one since they were all three 
fighting the same enemy - the point remained that if either Germany or Britain were to 
reject a peace out of hand they could alienate the United States.27 Page clearly attempted 
to convey the seriousness of potential diplomatic manoeuvres regarding the question of 
peace and America when he told Grey that he considered the German peace offer as 'a 
. th ,28 move In e game. 
Despite a conversation already in full swing regarding a possible German peace 
offer, Bernstorff surprised House by taking the initial step for peace by asking for a 
conference with House on 18 September 1914 and then agreeing to meet with Spring 
Rice to discuss peace.29 Regardless of the fact that Page viewed the German peace offer 
as a move in the diplomatic game, House saw an opportunity to have the United States 
playa leading role in ending the war quickly.30 Therefore the Colonel's next step was to 
attempt to use his influence to begin confidential talks between the ambassadors of 
Germany and Great Britain. 
Meeting with Spring Rice, House was surprised for a second time when the 
ambassador refused to meet with Bernstorff on the grounds that the Germans were 
'unreliable' and 'unmoral' and that any negotiations would have to include all the 
Allies.31 Contrary to Charles Seymour's conclusion that 'the diplomatists [were] taking 
orders from the quietly persuasive Colonel,' the timeline of events suggests that the 
British were following the same pattern of dealing with the Wilson Administration 
27 Ibid. 
28 Letter, Sir Edward Grey to Spring Rice, 9 September 1914, , FO 371/2223, Political, America General 
(war) files 39619-53594, 1914, National Archives. 
29 Reinhard R. Doerries, Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count Bernstorff and German-American 
Relations. 1908-1 917 (Chapel Hill, 1989), p. 90; Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel 
House vol. I (Boston, 1926), p. 326. 
30 5 September 1914, House Diary, Edward Mandell House Papers, Vol. I, p. 152, Manuscripts and 
Archives, Yale University Library. 
31 Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of C%nelHouse vol. I (Boston, 1926), p. 327. 
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established by Grey during his first meetings with House. Having already discussed the 
potential for a German peace note two weeks earlier, Spring Rice took to using the 
guise of discussion to direct the conversation from why he would not meet with his 
German counterpart to suggesting what was the 'best thing' Wilson could do regarding 
the 'situation. ,32 Based on House's version of events and his perception of Spring Rice 
during this conversation as being 'frank and honest, and ... a high-minded scholarly 
gentleman' one could only conclude that the Foreign Office's tactics were continuing to 
dictate the direction of American policy. In essence, this rejection was a clear headed 
decision to avoid discussing peace based on Britain's plan to wear the German people 
and military down while not alienating America. 
Prior to Spring Rice's meeting with House, the Ambassador had exchanged 
many telegrams with Grey discussing the rumoured German peace offer. In doing so, he 
clarified their position based, in part, on news that the German Kaiser had told Wilson 
that Germany only wanted peace if it would be a lasting peace, but he would not agree 
to a cession of territory or compensation to Belgium or France.33 German leadership 
was unified in the feeling that Germany was forced to fight for her life and that their 
campaign had, to date, been wildly successful. 34 Additionally, Bernstorff had informed 
House that Germany would not go into detail about her terms for mediation without first 
knowing the terms the Allies were seeking.35 
Although it could be argued that Germany remained in a militarily strong 
position, having occupied most of Belgium and Eastern France, historians such as Paul 
Sweet, Karl Birnbaum, and Roger Chickering agree that leaders on both sides 
32 Ibid., pp. 326-328. 
33 Spring Rice to FO, Telegram No. 360, 18 September 1914, FO 37112223, Political, America General 
(war) files 39619-53594,1914. 
34 Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967), pp. 98-99. 
35 Spring Rice to FO, Telegram No 371,19 September 1914, FO 371/2223, Political, America General 
(war) files 39619-53594,1914. 
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recognized the problems inherent in the German position only a month into the war.36 
The fact of the matter was that Germany's armies had been turned back at the battle of 
the Marne on 9 September and intimates on both sides of the war realized that the 
strength of Germany's position had been significantly compromised. Combining the 
Germany military's situation with the British plan to wear the German's down via her 
naval power, and the desire for a conclusive victory over Germany, Grey could afford to 
brush off German peace feelers that did not meet British demands. Justus Doenecke, 
C.J. Lowe, and M.L. Dockrill conclude that it was this reasoning that allowed Grey to 
determine that House's peace efforts were not needed.37 
Conversely, German leaders were increasingly worried that their worst fears 
were being realized. Without a quick victory in the West, they were facing a war on 
multiple fronts that had been their pre-war goal to avoid. With this new twist, Germany 
was forced into a war of attrition with the Allied nations which would bring on new 
problems and the chance of alienating neutral nations. Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase points 
out that it was at this point that German diplomacy towards America determined that 
keeping Britain and American apart would facilitate maintaining U.S. neutrality and 
was therefore necessary.38 Correspondingly, German leaders recognized the importance 
of American goodwill towards Germany and were discussing the importance of working 
36 Paul R. Sweet, 'Leaders and Policies: Germany in the Winter of 1914-1915', Journal a/Central 
European Affairs. Vol. XVI, No 3 (October 1956), p. 29; Karl Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat 
Warfare (Stockholm, 1958), pp. 11-12; Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War. 1914-
1918 (Cambridge, 1998), p. 52. 
37 Justus D Doenecke, Nothing Less Than War: A New History 0/ America's Entry Into World War I 
(Kentucky, 2011), p. 96; C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, The Mirage o/Power: Volume 2. British Foreign 
Policy. /914-1922 (London, 1972), p. 237. 
38 Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, 'The United States and Germany I the World Arena, 1900-1917', in 
Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era o/World War I. 1900-1924. 
ed. Hans-Jilrgen SchrOder (Oxford, 1993), p. 56. 
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with the United States and specifically with Secretary of State Bryan's arbitration pacts 
as a means of demonstrating German willingness to work towards world peace.39 
What is clear is that only a month into the war the belligerents had an 
understanding as to the role the President of the United States wanted to play, and they 
were beginning to employ diplomatic strategies using the peace initiative to garner 
support from the President. According to Edward Buehrig it was not until the end of 
1914 that House finally realized the ambassadors were giving him the run-around and 
he convinced the president to allow him to journey to Europe in order to bring about 
peace.40 But it was towards the end of September 1914 that House, discussing his 
frustration with the constant excuses each of the belligerents had for not making peace, 
mentioned to Wilson that the German Ambassador had suggested that House's presence 
in Europe could encourage the belligerents to come to the peace table.41 Bernstorffmay 
have initiated the peace conversation and been the first to encourage House to go to 
Europe to broker a peace deal, but, as Lowe and Dockrill point out in The Mirage of 
Power, the British Officials felt that it was in their best interest if House visited London 
and Berlin.42 According to Reinhard Doerries and supported by House's notes, the 
president's initial response was to counsel his friend to continue to apply pressure to 
Grey on the basis of their long standing fear of Russian dominance in Europe.43 
Despite House's attempt to apply pressure to Grey, by mid-January he and 
Wilson decided that his going to Europe gave them the best chance to bring about 
39 Ballin to Bethmann Hollweg, 14 October 1914, Allgemeine Angelegenheiten, Teil2, USA and 
Deutschland, R.17355, Politisches Archiv des Auswlirtiges Amt. 
40 Edward H Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power (Bloomington, 1955), p 193. 
41 28 September 1914, House to Wilson, Edward Mandell House Papers, Vol. 1, p. 147, Manuscript and 
Archives, Yale University Library. 
42 C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power: Volume 2. British Foreign Policy. 1914-1922 
(London, 1972),pp.237-238. 
43 Reinhard R Doerries, Imperial Challenge: Ambassador Count BernstorfJ and German-American 
Relations. 1908-1917 (Chapel Hill, 1989), p. 91; 28 September 1914, House Diary, Edward Mandell 
House Papers, Vo!' 1, p. 147, Manuscript and Archives, Yale University Library. 
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peace.44 On 30 January 1915, House began yet another long journey to Europe in the 
hopes of negotiating peace. He left with the knowledge that getting all the belligerent 
nations to agree to mediation would be a long and difficult task but it was his goal, and 
Wilson's fervent desire, that the United States be the driving force in ending the current 
slaughter, and possibly, ending war entirely. The amateur diplomat's first stop was 
London. 
By December 1914 the war had clearly stagnated and the hopes of a quick 
conclusion to the war faded on both sides. Militarily the stalemate was a virtual death 
blow to the Germans. Stalemate did, however, play directly into the hands of the 
British. Britain's established war plan revolved around the Royal Navy and its ability to 
blockade Germany, while Lord Kitchener's battle plan was to allow the blockade and 
attrition to wear down the superior German forces before the bulk of the British army 
was committed to the field. Stalemate also suited President Wilson as he was quite 
candid about his desire for there to be no clear winner in the war in order to guarantee 
that another war of revenge would not occur.45 
As has already been stated, Britain turned down Wilson's initial offer to mediate 
an end to the war in 1914, but the pressure to come to the peace table by America 
allowed Foreign Secretary Grey to utilize American desires to meet British ends. From 
Grey's point of view, Britain had to utilize its greatest weapon, the Royal Navy, while 
at the same time not alienating the United States. One means of doing this was to 
seemingly pursue the same positions America espoused. 
44 12 January 1915, Edward Mandell House Papers 1885-1938, HM 236-2, Vol. 3-4, Yale University 
Library. 
4S H. B. Brougham, 'Memorandum ofInterview with the President,' 14 December 1914, in WWI 
Document Archive, 1914 Documents, 
http://wwLlib.byu.edu/index.php/Brougham%27s Memorandum of Interview w 
ith President Wilson (7 January, 2012). 
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House biographer Godfrey Hodgson states that House travelled to Europe in 
such 'great secrecy' that not even his closest of friends knew of his mission.46 It is of 
course possible that many people did not know what House's exact plans were for this 
trip, but to claim that it was utterly unknown is a stretch. It is more likely that Joyce 
Grigsby Williams was closer to the actual facts when she wrote that the trip was taken 
with the 'air of secrecy', as this clearly suited House's vision ofhimself.47 Undoubtedly, 
each of the governments he intended on visiting had been alerted to his plans.48 Charles 
Seymour noted in The Intimate Papers o/Colonel House that the Colonel had received 
letters from old friends, who though professing their lack of knowledge as to his 
mission, wished him luck,49 House also notes in his diary that he met with several 
people immediately before leaving who knew 'something of [his] mission. ,50 
Additionally, upon arrival in Britain, House notes that he was met by Page and 
'representatives of nearly every New York paper. ,51 House's agenda may not have been 
public knowledge but with Wilson's desire for peace widely known it is hardly a leap of 
faith to think that the press had an idea as to the purpose of the presidential envoy's 
visit. 
Ernest May and Joyce Grigsby Williams point out that the importance of 
convincing House about the British desire for peace while at the same time not giving 
up positions important to the overall war effort was not lost on Grey.52 British officials 
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50 25 January 1915, House Diary, Edward Mandell House Papers, Manuscript and Archives, Yale 
University Library. 
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set upon House with the same tactics they had used the previous summer. Grey changed 
his schedule so that he could meet with the Colonel almost immediately after he set foot 
on British soil, and inviting him to lunch with Englishmen of note, including an hour 
with the King himself. 53 As before, this wooing of House was designed to inflate the 
ego of a man who longed to be an international power-broker, and it worked to 
perfection. House may have felt that many of the individuals he met were not receptive 
to his message of peace, but he was nonetheless impressed. 
As for the reason for House's visit - to bring the warring sides together for 
peace talks - Grey continued to play the same game with House that Spring Rice had 
worked with such skill in America. As before, Grey allowed the conversation to cover a 
wide range of topics and spoke with House as if they were old friends simply chatting 
over lunch. 54 When the topic of peace was finally brought into the discussion, Grey 
stated that Britain would only bargain if Gennany withdrew from Belgium, agreed to 
pay an indemnity, and there was a guarantee of a lasting peace - the status quo ante 
would no longer be acceptable. 55 On the off chance that Gennany did agree to those 
demands, Grey deftly shifted responsibility for any additional possibility of problems in 
coming to a peace squarely at the feet of his allies, Russia and France. Grey pointed out 
that France and Russia both had territorial demands that would need to be met. Due to 
previous conversations between House and Spring Rice, Grey was already aware that 
the United States did not relish the idea of Russian domination of Europe. 56 He was also 
aware that the vast majority of Americans still had a very favourable view of France.57 
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Charles Seymour characterised the inclusion of Allied territorial demands as an 
embarrassing moment for Grey, indicating that Grey and Britain tried to seem above 
mere territorial pettiness.58 By placing France, and Russia's territorial demands squarely 
into the peace equation Grey was setting up his allies to take the brunt of American 
anger if Allied war aims were to cause the peace process to break down. This strategy 
seems to have been a successful one because House later writes Wilson that at that 
moment France was the major obstacle to peace. 59 
Knowing that House was in Europe to broker a peace deal that Britain was not 
going to agree to, Grey's strategy was simple: allow the conversation concerning peace 
to happen on his terms. Grey's terms were safely wrapped in the cloak of desiring peace 
but insisting on the peace being a lasting one. In order for peace to be a lasting peace it 
required the end of German militancy and American support in the form of a treaty 
involving the availability of U.S. forces to enforce the peace. Grey knew that traditional 
American political practice considered any military or political treaty as an unwanted 
entanglement and would therefore be a fairly safe bet as an on-going obstacle against an 
'unfavourable' (to the British) actual negotiated peace settlement. 
Just as he had done when Spring Rice broached this subject in Washington D.C., 
House refused to guarantee U.S. involvement on the grounds that American tradition 
made it impossible for Wilson, or any administration, to entangle the United States with 
foreign govemments.60 During the entirety of House's visit to London Grey kept 
pushing for a 'league of peace' that the United States would be a part of as key to any 
peace discussions. Although he permitted the conversation to take different avenues, 
allowing House to feel as if he were getting his points across, Grey was safe in the 
58 Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers o/Colonel House Vol. I (Cambridge, 1926), pp. 364-5. 
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knowledge that as long as he conveyed that Britain was only interested in a lasting 
peace he would be able to maintain U.S. peace hopes while not conceding any of his 
own goals. 
House was to spend considerable time with members of the Foreign Office 
during his month long stay in London. During his conversations, British officials 
continued to perpetuate the idea that Germany's peace overtures were insincere. As part 
of their strategy, Grey and the other Foreign Office officials noted that France also 
believed that Germany would not be serious about peace until they were in a better 
military position to force their version of peace upon the Allies. As Joyce Grigsby 
Williams notes at this point, House was receiving far more diplomatic direction from 
Grey than he was from Wilson.61 Facing this pressure from Grey, Tyrrell, and other 
diplomats from the allied nations, House continued to be surprisingly up-beat about the 
sincerity of Germany's desire for peace. According to C.J. Lowe and M. L. Dockrill, 
members of the Foreign Office and the ambassadors from the Allied nations found 
House's view to be 'very naIve. ,62 Yet, despite his naivety or perhaps because of it, 
House continued to follow Grey's direction and postponed his trip to Berlin until the 
Foreign Minister deemed the time right for travel to Germany.63 
House started out for Berlin on 11 March 1915, making a short stop in Paris 
first. Godfrey Hodgson's examination of House's time in Paris is sorely lacking as he 
claims that 'the French were too preoccupied by the war and too confident of victory to 
think ofpeace.'64 But Hodgson neglects to understand the French position on the war at 
this time. He disregards the French requirements for reclamation of Alsace-Lorraine that 
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he noted a few pages earlier with their resistance to peace parlays. Hodgson also 
neglects to note that as early as 10 November 1914 French Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Theophile Delcasse had declared that the Entente would not accept U.S. mediation in 
any form. 65 Delcasse reiterates this position when he informed Grey that House would 
be welcomed in Paris but he would not discuss U.S. intervention or mediation because 
the French people were not inclined to accept it. 66 What Hodgson missed was that the 
French were simply sticking to the policy they had set at the outset of the war -
territorial acquisition, no status quo peace, and no U.S. interference in the peace 
process. The plan for House's trip had been to spend the bulk of his energy working 
with officials in London and Berlin anyway; therefore the lack of time spent in Paris 
during this trip should not be confused with French intransigence as much as it should 
be noted for the inexperience House showed by not giving credence to French peace 
demands. House had apparently felt that the Allies would follow Britain's lead. 
According to Ernest May, by the time House had arrived in Berlin Germany's 
leaders could not even pretend to be in favour ofpeace.67 This is a statement that May 
repeatedly makes based primarily on public statements made by Chancellor Bethmann 
Hollweg and meant to calm the annexationist fringes of the German public. In this 
instance May misses the larger picture of diplomacy. In The Quest for Peace through 
Diplomacy, Stephen D. Kertesz explains that because historically successful diplomacy 
depended on knowledge of the enemy's domestic politics, 'highly emotional patriotism' 
was the internal countermeasure used to ensure internal unity.68 Kertesz goes on to say 
that during the First World War aspects of diplomacy were likewise kept secret in order 
65 10 November 1914, Bertie to Grey, FO 800/181, UK National Archives. 
66 12 March 1915, Bertie to Grey, FO 8001181, UK National Archives. 
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to guarantee domestic harmony.69 This basic understanding of diplomacy clarifies 
Germany's persistent pursuit of peace terms they would likely never agree to. 
Some historical approaches place the emphasis on the question of public 
pressure on German foreign policy. Hans-Ulrich Wehler points out that an aggressive 
foreign policy had long been the means of placating the German public.70 Following 
this line of thought allows the two ideas to be tied together. Bethmann's hard-line 
utterances, ostensibly made for public consumption, were part of his diplomacy as he 
needed to placate the German public while he privately negotiated a peace deal. The 
importance here is that he was not looking for a true peace settlement as much as he was 
attempting to maintain American neutrality and separate Britain. 
Upon House's arrival in Berlin on 19 March 1915 he met almost immediately 
with German Undersecretary of State, Arthur Zimmerman. As Germany had done 
during the summer of 1914, House met with a multitude of German officials that came 
to the American Embassy. After Zimmerman came meetings with Foreign Minister 
Jagow, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, and a host of other Germans of high reputation 
and position.7) All of which reflected the importance Germany placed on House as the 
confidant of President Wilson and Bethmann's knowledge of the importance House 
placed on himself. 
In his meetings with Bethmann, Jagow, and Zimmerman House heard a virtual 
repeat of what he had been told in London - any settlement must guarantee a permanent 
peace.72 House indicated that he believed that Germany was 'sympathetic' towards u.S. 
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ideas and that his discussions had 'accomplished much ofvalue,.73 As House left Berlin 
for a return trip to London he was' optimistic' about the chances for peace. 74 But 
according to Lloyd Ambrosius, House's experience in Berlin had led him to believe that 
'Germany desired peace only on the basis of victory. ,75 How was House optimistic 
about peace while at the same time believing that Germany was the one nation that did 
not desire it? It was evident that both Grey and Bethmann were open to a lasting peace. 
It was also evident that both Grey and Bethmann were not willing to discuss a peace 
conference until they had won a decisive military victory in the field. And according to 
Ambrosius, although Grey professed a desire for peace, he favoured an Allied victory 
over American mediation.76 As for Bethmann, he stated in separate letters to Foreign 
Minister Jagow and Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold that they could not 
reject American offers out of hand and would instead find a way to give the impression 
77 that Germany was open to peace. 
The primary factors in creating House's view that only Germany was opposed to 
peace were Grey's insistence that if mediation was to work it would only work because 
the United States pushed it, his belief in collective security as professed to House during 
their discussions, and the information he passed on to House that recent speeches given 
by the Kaiser and Bethmann were unfavourable towards peace.78 In the end it was 
Grey's diplomatic tact that fed House's known Anglophilic tendencies combined with a 
lack of German support for a reduction in weapons and the militancy of its population 
towards the United States that led House to believe that peace would be difficult to 
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achieve. To add to matters, on 7 May 1915 the British steamer Lusitania was sunk by a 
German submarine resulting in the death of 1,200 passengers including 124 American 
citizens. The sinking of the Lusitania as well as continued issues with the British 
blockade along with the intransigence of both Britain and Germany sent U.S. attempts 
at peace negotiations temporarily to the back burner while the Wilson administration 
spent the summer of 1915 wrestling with its citizen's rights to travel the high seas as 
citizens of a neutral nation. 
The House-Grey Memorandum 
Peace negotiations may have no longer been at the forefront of American foreign 
policy as Wilson, House, and Lansing wrestled with the multitude of issues the war had 
brought to their doorstep, but peace continued to be a topic in letters that House and 
Grey continued to exchange. The design of the House-Grey Memorandum has its 
origins in the trip House had completed in June 1915. During that visit, House and Grey 
had laid the foundations for a post war League for the Preservation ofPeace.79 But Grey 
began influencing Wilson and House before the Colonel was sent to Europe in February 
1915. Although some historians claim that House only discovered Grey's desire for a 
league of nations to guarantee peace in February 1915, Grey's management of this 
episode of American foreign policy started months earlier when he sounded out the 
Wilson administration about the possibility of America joining an agreement to preserve 
future peace as indicated in a letter to Ambassador Spring Rice on 2 January 1915, 
where Grey clearly discusses the Colonel's reluctance to agree to the U.S. becoming a 
80 party to guarantee peace. 
In attempting to establish Wilson's reasoning for joining in negotiations with 
Britain to create a league of nations, Arthur S. Link inadvertently outlines Grey's 
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reasoning for pushing a league of nations. 81 In Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look At His 
Major Foreign Policies, Link points out that Wilson's early writings demonstrate his 
desire for what he called a 'parliament ofman,.82 In addition, Wilson and House had as 
early as December 1914 proposed the creation ofa Pan-American treaty that would 
essentially create a league of American nations. By May 1915 the President had spent 
five months negotiating with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the so called ABC countries, 
and he was hosting a meeting with eighteen American states to strengthen commercial 
ties en route to creating a Pan American league. It is hardly a surprise that Grey would 
seize upon Wilson's ideas for a league of nations and attempt to use that to his 
advantage. It is with this information in hand that Grey's tactic of pushing for a League 
of Nations begins to make sense. Adding to the knowledge base that Grey was working 
from, Wilson had conversations dealing with a 'community of nations' with 'British 
radicals' as Thomas Knock points out in To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the 
Quest/or a New World Order.83 
The common belief involving the development of the House-Grey 
Memorandum, as aptly expressed by a number of historians, revolves around House as 
the driving force in the development of the idea and his work to convince the British to 
support a U.S. led end to the war and a post war league of nations. 84 Ernest May 
concludes that House and Wilson were attempting to lure Britain into accepting 
American mediation with the promise of armed intervention, while Armin Rappaport 
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claims that House had been 'laying the foundation for the secret House-Grey 
agreement' since his return to the United States in the spring of 1915.8s 
These historians have taken the view that Grey was following the U.S. lead and 
that House and Wilson, because of the need for American financial and industrial 
support, were able to cow the British Foreign Minister into following their lead. Indeed, 
to House it surely seemed that he was directing the diplomacy between the countries as 
it was he who would travel to London, Paris, and Berlin in an attempt to fashion 
together a bargain. And it was he who would put forth what he considered the initial 
ideas for a pact to mediate and for a league to enforce peace after the war. But it was the 
work done by Grey and the British Foreign Office that placed the seeds of these ideas, 
and, as Lloyd Ambrosius points out, effectively 'fostered' and 'nurtured House's 
. ,86 
conceptIOn. 
Grey accomplished this by persistence and patience. During House's discussions 
with Spring Rice after the outbreak of war, the Ambassador had made it clear to the 
Colonel that Britain needed a guarantee of peace once the war had reached its 
conclusion before they could make any decisions regarding mediation.87 Sir Edward 
Grey notes in his memoirs that during House's trip to London during the Spring of 1915 
he had prodded the envoy about the likelihood of American entry into the war, only to 
be told that any attempt would be 'premature and unsuccessful. ,88 This, as Arthur S. 
Link points out, was Grey initiating the idea of a post-war league of nations and for the 
idea of U.S. intervention by pushing House on how far the United States would be 
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willing to go in order to mediate an end to the war and guarantee a lasting peace.89 In a 
letter to House on 22 September 1915, Grey asked if the United States would be 
prepared to bind itself to a league ofnations.9o Robert Tucker points out that Grey had 
'found a willing listener' in the President who, accordingly, jumped at the chance to 
guarantee peace sending House to Europe on a second peace mission.91 
Despite House's best intentions it was clear that the war was going to continue 
until one side or the other achieved a military breakthrough. According to Joyce 
Grigsby Williams and Godfrey Hodgson, Gennany's submarine campaign coupled with 
their animosity towards the United States for its lack of genuine neutrality furthered 
House's thoughts that the world would benefit from a Gennan defeat; contending that 
the submarine war, and the sinking of the Lusitania in particular, had radically changed 
House's view on the war, leading him to believe that the United States must take an 
. l.th 92 actIve ro e In e war. 
It is perhaps unfortunate that House did not understand where the Allies stood 
regarding peace proposals at the time of his arrival in Europe in January 1916. Since 
November 1914 France had made it clear on multiple occasions that they did not want 
to encourage the United States to mediate the war.93 For its part, Britain seems to have 
demurred, with Grey notifying House that mediation would be discussed among the 
Allies if Gennany made a promising overture.94 From March 1915 to January 1916 little 
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had occurred that would change Allied minds. Yet Grey continued to manoeuvre the 
United States closer to the Allies by his encouragement of House's propositions. 
Shortly after arriving back in the United States in June 1915, House began 
developing a plan of action that would, as Joyce Grigsby Williams describes it, 
'either ... compel a peace settlement or bring the United States into the war on the Allied 
·d ,95 SI e. 
The key to understanding House's desire to create what would become the 
House-Grey Memorandum is his belief that in order for his plan to work the United 
States would have to remain neutral. House expressed his belief during a meeting with 
Grey and Arthur Balfour that was held in 6 June 1916, but the idea was plainly a base 
from which the Colonel was working during his time at home in America; House 
explained that in his view the United States gained more flexibility of action by 
maintaining neutrality with Germany than they would otherwise have, thus allowing the 
U.S. to manoeuvre into a position to go to war over something besides the use of the 
submarine.96 House believed that he was placing the United States in a win-win 
situation. If his manoeuvre worked and Germany agreed to come to the peace table, 
Wilson would be hailed for ending the war. If Germany refused to come to the table, the 
United States would be able to join the Allies and crush Germany militarism once and 
for all, with Wilson having a seat at the peace settlement at the end of hostilities. 
It is this idea - that House was looking to set-up the United States to bring all 
the warring nations to the peace table or go to war with Germany - that is of 
importance. His plan did not count on British intransigence, only German because, 
unbeknownst to House, Grey's diplomacy was working. Grey had noted on several 
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occasions that he believed that mediation was only possible with American guidance, 
going so far at one point out that peace negotiations would have begun in February 1915 
if proposals had been ready to make.97 On 22 September 1915 Grey's diplomacy, in the 
form of a letter to House, brought the United States ever closer to joining the Allied war 
effort in total. 98 
Grey's letter was the equivalent of throwing a gauntlet down at House's feet. 
How far was the President of the United States really willing to go in order to eliminate 
navalism and militarism? How far was the President willing to go to bring an end to this 
war, to bring about a league of nations? Though the letter was in response to House's 
question about timing for peace proposals, Grey's tact was impeccable. It implied first 
and foremost that Britain was willing to make huge changes to its centuries old axiom 
about having the strongest navy in the world (a problem faced by Americans since the 
early 1800s), but clearly required the United States to break its life-long national policy 
of not becoming entangled in European military affairs. 
With Wilson's support, House responded with a letter on 17 October 1915 that 
laid bare the Colonel's support for Britain and his willingness to go to war with 
Germany. When it comes to this letter most historians focus on the word 'probably' that 
Wilson inserted into House's original letter in the sentence 'If the Central Powers were 
still obdurate, it would [probably] be necessary for us to join the Allies and force the 
issue .... ' The importance given to 'probably' by historians is fair in that the word 
changes the entire meaning of the sentence, thus giving rise to the idea that while 
Wilson supported the general theory that House was working on, he was still, at heart, 
committed to remain neutral. 
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To the diplomacy being practiced at the moment the importance of the insertion 
of 'probably' is much less relevant because it did not change Grey's position. The 
Foreign Minister continued his insistence that the United States essentially put-up or 
shut-up. Grey told House that without knowing precisely where the United States stood 
he could not in good faith council him to return to Europe and begin peace 
negotiations.99 According to House's diary, the President and House were in agreement 
_ the Colonel would have to return to Europe to hammer out the plan for peace. 100 This 
was much like the fly coming into the spider's parlour. 
While there has never been any question that House had been hoping for a 
German defeat for some time (on 16 June 1915 he told the President that if the United 
States helped the Allies they could 'turn the world into the right paths. '), there is equally 
no question that he had supported Britain from the beginning. 101 Nevertheless, during 
House's previous visits to Britain he had actually become more like minded with Grey 
when it came to taking a strong line of against Germany. Each time he returned to the 
United States he seemed to revert to a more neutral stance. Grey recognized this in great 
part because House's tone changed from the time he was in Britain to the letters he sent 
to Grey from America. The Colonel's return to Britain would allow Grey to guide him 
back into a 'British' state of mind. 
While in London House approached Grey with the outline that would come to be 
known as the House-Grey Memorandum. Almost all discussion leading up to the 
creation of the Memorandum were initiated by House and initially, Grey and other 
British leaders pressed him about the President's determination and desire to actually 
break neutrality and enter the war if Germany were to refuse peace terms. House had 
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planned to spend only a few days in London before traveling to the continent again, 
much as he had the previous spring. 
Here again, Grey played a skilful diplomatic hand as he encouraged House to 
visit Germany, knowing full well that because of events on the field of battle Germany 
would not accept peace mediation. With House's plan firmly in mind - that if Germany 
did not accede to mediation the United States would enter the war on the side of the 
British - this was a plan with which Grey could hardly lose. If Germany happened to 
agree to mediation, House's plan called for everything the Allied nations wanted short 
of a complete Germany defeat. 
House's visit to Germany, a grand total of four days, was extremely short for 
such an important meeting. Although the Colonel had ostensibly gone to Berlin in order 
to feel out the German attitude towards peace, he seemed to have arrived with his mind 
already made up. It could easily have been that discussions with British officials before 
House headed for Germany had swayed him. It could also have been his experience on 
the way to Berlin when he travelled, and stayed with British soldiers as they moved to 
and from the front lines. House's diary entry from 26 January 1916 is blunt about the 
Colonel's view that everyone he met on that day, from the Dutch Minister to his old 
friend Count von Moltke, he found to be unreasonable and anti-British. 102 
House refused to meet with anyone unless the meeting was held at the embassy, 
ostensibly because he wanted to control with whom he would meet. After unsatisfactory 
conversations with Bethmann Hollweg, von Jagow, and Zimmerman, House did not feel 
that much had been accomplished, yet according to House's diary the conversations had 
not involved navalism, militarism, a league of nations, or peace. 103 It seems that House 
travelled to Germany for the simple tactic of keeping up appearances of neutrality. He 
102 House Diary, 26 January 1916, Edward Mandell House Papers, vol. II, Yale University Library. 
103 Ibid., 28 January 1916. 
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mentions in his diary that he wanted to avoid meeting with Tirpitz if at all possible and 
he declined to meet with the Kaiser to discuss items, stating that he felt the German 
Emperor was 'heartless' and possibly 'crazy.' 104 Thus House left for his return trip to 
London feeling that no one in Germany was reasonable enough to make peace 
negotiations a possibility. In fact, House left Germany with such animosity that he was 
convinced Germany wanted a war with the United States. 
Upon leaving Germany House travelled to Paris where he met with French 
Prime Minister Aristide Briand and Foreign Minister Jules Cambon. House spent 
several days discussing plans with the French who communicated the bulk of their 
conversations with House to Grey before the American envoy was back in London. lOS 
Through the French and messages House sent to Wilson that British Naval Intelligence 
intercepted, Grey knew how House felt about his time on the continent and his state of 
mind even before they met to continue their discussions regarding U.S. intervention and 
106 
a peace settlement. 
Almost from the moment House arrived back in London British leaders began 
calling on him. Lord Reading was first on the scene inviting him to meet with Lloyd 
George. This meeting was quickly expanded to include Grey, Arthur Balfour, and Prime 
Minister Asquith. Although the meetings were spent discussing the benefits of House's 
plan and the possible repercussions, Grey was safe in the knowledge that the United 
States was firmly in the Allies' comer. From his correspondence with the French he 
knew that none of the Allies were willing to agree to peace terms with Germany, and he 
was safe in the knowledge that the President of the United States and his principal 
104 House Diary, 27 January 1916, Edward Mandell House Papers, vol. II, Yale University Library. 
lOS Secret Memorandum, Cambon to Bertie, 7 February 1916, FO 800/181, UK National Archives. 
106 David M. Esposito, 'Imagined Power: The Secret Life of Colonel House', lIistorian (Summer, 1998), 
vol. 60, Issue 4, p. 745. 
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advisor were pro-Ally and willing to go to war with Germany if they turned down the 
mediation proposal. 
Much of the historical discussion surrounding the House-Grey Memorandum 
focuses on the President's second insertion of the word 'probably' in a document House 
prepared for the British Government. Wilson's insertion of this one word again changed 
the meaning of the entire document. Instead of the document reading 'the United States 
would enter the war against Germany in the event it refused to negotiate', it now stated 
that it was possible that the United States would enter the war against Germany. 
The emphasis here should be placed on the fact that even with Wilson's caveat 
of 'probably' Grey had obtained from the United States approval for the Allies to 
attempt to destroy Germany militarily and if they failed, to invite American assistance 
in the process. According to the agreement American assistance would only come at 
the Allies' request. From the American point of view, things were set. Peace was 
possible and on request of the Allies the United States would request peace terms from 
the belligerents. If Germany refused negotiations the possibility of American entry to 
the war against the Central Powers was likely; ifby chance Germany agreed to take part 
in a peace conference there would be no need for America to join the war, Wilson 
would become the man who ended the slaughter on the European fields, and all would 
be well. 
Grey's understanding of the situation is laid bare in a letter to British 
Ambassador to France Lord Bertie shortly after the House-Grey Memorandum was 
created. In this letter Grey notes that as long as the Allies believed they could achieve a 
military victory without U.S. military assistance there was no harm in the American 
proposal, but if the war were to begin to develop into a stalemate then American 
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assistance would be required in order to gain a favourable peace. 107 From Grey's point 
of view then, the United States was falling into line where he could be assured that they 
would not break relations with Britain over the blockade. It seemed that the 
acquiescence of the United States to Britain's desired destruction of Germany was on 
course. 
The German Peace Offer of 1916 
On 12 December 1916 Bethmann Hollweg proposed that immediate peace 
negotiations with the Allied powers begin. 108 Here again, peace was not offered for the 
sake of peace alone, but as a means to an end. Bethmann' s attempt at peace was 
designed to create an opportunity for Germany to win the war, but the essential question 
that seems to be lost amongst the bevy of issues in late 1916 is what Bethmann expect 
to gain by not waiting for Wilson's expected mediation. 
Often Bethmann's peace proposal is seen as his attempt to assuage the military 
leaders about the necessity of unrestricted submarine warfare. 109 Indeed, in the months 
preceding the peace offer Germany's military leaders had been pressing for greater 
freedom for the submarines in order for the war to be winnable for the army, in part 
because they were no longer sure Germany could continue fighting another winter. 
When Bethmann pushed back citing a possible break with the United States, as well as 
the possibility of breaks with Holland and Denmark as only a few reasons why 
unrestricted submarine warfare should be avoided, he was forced to defend his case in a 
meeting with the Kaiser. This meeting took place on 4 March 1916, and upon hearing 
the arguments for and against unleashing the submarines the Kaiser agreed that 
\07 Grey to Bertie, 5 March 1916, FO 800/181, UK National Archives. 
\08 The Charge in Germany (Grew) to the Secretary of State, 12 December 1916, Papers relating to the 
foreign relations of the United States, 1916. Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), 
http://digital.library.wisc.edulI711.dllFRUS.FRUSI914Supp, pp. 87-89. 
109 Z.A.B. Zeman, The Gentlemen Negotiators: A Diplomatic History of World War I. (New York, 1971), 
p. 114. 
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unrestricted submarine warfare was not a viable option at that time. I 10 He did. however. 
issue instructions to Bethmann to begin laying the diplomatic ground work in neutral 
countries, and in the United States particularly. for the Kaiser agreed with Bethmann 
that it would be 'stupidity to provoke a war with America.' III 
Despite the Kaiser's decision not to provoke a war with the United States, 
Bethmann was still under considerable pressure to clear the way for unrestricted 
submarine warfare. The year 1916 saw several changes in the war that forced Germany 
to adapt her approach. The military assault on Verdun had not forced France's collapse 
and the battle of the Somme had come to pass, both battles taking a tremendous toll on 
the number of soldiers lost by both sides. In the east Romania had been defeated and the 
Brusilov offensive had petered out leaving both the Russian and Austro-Hungarian 
armies wrecked and discontented, and in spite of the Austro-Hungarian position, there 
was some room for positive thought on the part of Germany's leadership. Nevertheless, 
by mid-1916 Germany was feeling the pressure of the British Blockade and knew that 
they would need to create an opportunity for the military to put Germany in a more 
favourable position for peace. 112 Because it was the feeling amongst Germany's military 
leadership that restricted submarine warfare limited the success of the submarine it was 
decided that the diplomats should clear the way for unrestricted submarine warfare. I 13 
If Bethmann agreed with the assessment that Germany's position was becoming 
more precarious by the day, and most historians agree that he did, then it becomes easy 
to understand why he would give up his attempts to keep the U.S. out of the war and 
110 10 March 1916, Zimmermann to Bethmann Hollweg, Recording/Chronicle, Theobald v. Bcthmann 
Hollweg, Nachlass 1549, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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look towards the possibility of peace, presented as an opportunity to occupy America's 
interest while the military forced a decision in the war. I 14 It is with this in mind that 
Bethmann's diplomatic initiatives toward the United States in 1916 inadvertently took 
the same lines as House's agreement with Grey - if peace terms were met, great, ifnot 
Germany would hope to create an environment that would make it difficult for the U.S. 
break neutrality by means of appearing to have wanted peace only for the British to 
. d h d . 115 shun the opportumty to en t e estructlOn. 
On 25 September 1916 Jagow notified Wilson that Germany would accept 
general terms of peace immediately if the President would only make the offer. I 16 The 
offer never came but the promise to make a peace offer after President Wilson had won 
re-election. 117 Germany's leadership was growing tired of Wilson's lack of action 
towards peace, and because Bethmann had been charged with clearing a path for the 
unrestricted use of submarines, it was apparent that Germany would have to make an 
appeal for peace. Jagow was also consistent in his discussions with Ambassador Gerard 
regarding Germany's willingness to welcome Wilson as a mediator in peace efforts. 
Following a more traditional view of First World War history, Z.A.B Zeman writes that 
Bethmann was working on the hope of peace being near in order to stave off 
unrestricted submarine warfare. I 18 Viewed through the idea that there was a continued 
battle between the civilian and military forces in Germany this is a valid conclusion. But 
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viewing the German discussions with the United States as part of a larger diplomatic 
and military strategy - that was to clear the way for this type of submarine warfare, 
meaning that the United States would remain neutral because Wilson would have 
assumed that Germany had made a sincere attempt at peace only to have it rejected - it 
becomes clear that the German Foreign Office was working to placate the United States 
as the military worked to bring an end to the war on German terms. 
Bethmann's peace proposal of 12 December 1916 has often been deemed a 
diplomatic blunder because it upstaged President Wilson's own plan that was delivered 
on 26 December 1916, demanding an end to hostilities and for all belligerents to come 
to the peace table. It is, however, important to note that it followed a clear pattern of 
using peace to maintain American neutrality and, according to Ragnhild Fiebig-von 
Hase, Germany's peace offer was a 'highly opportunistic diplomatic move initiated to 
either secure peace ... or to create a politically favourable situation for the return to 
d· . lb' ~,119 uncon ItlOna su manne warlare. 
In the days following the German peace offer, the Entente expectantly rejected 
the offer, and Wilson presented an offer of his own. This new offer was, in essence, 
rejected by all sides, but it is Germany's response that is so often misunderstood. All 
Allied governments had rejected both the German peace initiative and the American 
initiative and, from Germany's point of view, the United States had to recognize the fact 
that Germany had made an attempt at peace and that the Allies had shown their true 
intentions to destroy Germany, leaving Germany with no other choice but to utilize 
unrestricted submarine warfare. 120 Nevertheless, Zimmerman's response to Wilson's 
proposal clearly states Germany's willingness to meet with the Allied powers to discuss 
119 Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, 'The United States and Germany in the World Arena, 190-1917', in 
Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I, 1900-1924. 
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the cessation of hostilities, going so far as to point out that Germany had already offered 
peace on 12 December and therefore was serious about bringing about an end to the 
war.I21 
Because Bethmann was not looking to simply create peace but to create an 
opportunity for the force of arms to create conditions beneficial to a German dictated 
peace it must be pointed out that Germany placed restrictions on how a peace 
conference would come about because Germany's leadership still believed that if the 
United States remained neutral they could win the war. The Allied camp made no bones 
about its desire to destroy Germany. In a letter to Lansing the American Ambassador to 
France William Sharp notes that the Allies believed they had the men and ammunition 
needed to drive Germany back across the Rhine and force them to 'yield or give better 
terms.'122 
The idea that maintaining American neutrality ended with the decision to utilize 
unrestricted submarine warfare is an overly simplistic view of First World War history. 
Bernstorff continued to work to maintain the Wilson administration's hope for peace 
and therefore American neutrality up to and after the point that he was sent home by 
Wilson and diplomatic ties were broken with Germany. The infamous Zimmerman 
letter to Mexico is another attempt at maintaining U.S. neutrality, as is indicated by the 
line in the letter stating that Germany would work to keep America neutral. 
Conclusion 
Talk of peace during the years 1914-1916 had become a means to an end, not the 
end in itself. In their attempts to position themselves to win the war, the belligerents did 
121 The Ambassador in Germany (Gerard) to the Secretary of State, 26 December 1916, Papers relating to 
the foreign relations of the United States, 1916, Supplement: the World War (Washington, 1928), 
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not hesitate to use the promise of peace in order to give their troops the time needed to 
win decisively. Influencing the United States to remain neutral was as important to 
Germany as American belligerency was to Britain. The tactical use of peace was 
extremely effective in influencing Wilson and his advisors. 
From Grey's perspective, American intervention was only as needed as the 
military claimed it was. Because the U.S. provided a large portion of the war material 
used by Britain, the maintenance of American sympathy was of equal importance to the 
overall desire to bring the war to a successful conclusion. Due to Grey's seeming desire 
to have peace, and a lasting peace at that, Britain was able to maintain American 
affection. Wilson's well known desire for peace in this case actually prolonged the war, 
as the British were able to continue to drag out the need for American mediation based 
on events at the front and the intransigence of France and Russia. As it became more 
apparent that the war could not be won without American intervention, Grey used the 
issues of peace to guide Wilson firmly into the British corner. 
Despite the anti-German feelings of so many members of the Wilson 
Administration, Bethmann Hollweg, Bernstorff, and the German Foreign Office were 
able to continually use the idea of peace to diffuse American angst. Germany's initial 
calls for peace led President Wilson and Colonel House to believe that there was at least 
a chance that they could end the war before being drawn in. Even when House was 
determined that Germany was being ruled by the militarists and navalists, Bethmann's 
appeal for peace stunted a potential break in relations between the two countries. 
Bethmann's 1916 peace proposal allowed Germany the time to manoeuvre in hopes of 
ending the war through military means before the United States was able to make a 
decisive impact. Despite precipitating Wilson's own peace initiative, the German peace 
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proposal should still be considered a success in that it bought Gennany time to end the 
war on her tenns. 
The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that Britain and Gennany 
were both attempting to use the idea of peace as a means of directing U.S. policy. Grey 
had established that Britain could not make peace with Gennany while Gennany still 
posed a threat to her interests. In Gennany, Bethmann had been tasked with keeping 
America out of the war long enough for the military to finally win a decisive victory. 
This chapter has revealed that Britain and Gennany spoke with the United States about 
peace only when they believe peace suited their purposes. If either country found itself 
in a position to dictate an end to the war they were willing to put forth a plan for peace 
that suited them. Peace would not be discussed by Britain if it had recently suffered a 
military setback, nor would Gennany discuss peace if it felt the situation at the front 
placed it in a weaker position. Peace was only an option to either country if it were 
perceived to be in a position of strength and could dictate the tenns. By the same 
principle, peace was not an option if dictated too. Peace, it turned out, was simply 
another weapon of war. 
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Conclusion 
This analysis of British and Gennan diplomacy during the American period of 
neutrality has demonstrated that both countries had similar approaches towards the 
United States. This dissertation has shown that the policy of British and Gennan 
diplomats was one of delay, vagueness, and conciliation that had been established 
decades before the first shots were fired in August 1914. Both Britain and Gennany 
strove to maintain friendly relations with the United States, but only as long as it did not 
interfere with their efforts to win a decisive military victory. 
Using documents from British, Gennan, and American archives this critique of 
Great Power diplomacy has interpreted First World War diplomacy as an extension of 
long established British and Gennan diplomatic policies towards the United States. In 
doing so it has shown that continuity of diplomacy played a detennining role in 
American entry into the war. 
This essay has demonstrated that the decision made by British Foreign Minister 
Lansdowne in 1896 to chart a course building friendly relations with the United States, 
relations between the two countries had begun to see positive results. The friendship 
between the two countries grew after Sir Edward Grey took over the Foreign Office in 
1905 as he was detennined to maintain this policy and at the same time secure British 
interests. Using telegrams between Grey and Spring Rice found in the records of the 
Foreign Office at the British National Archives, and the Colonel Edward M. House 
Papers at Yale University, this critique has shown that Grey's success was based on his 
use of his Ambassador's and other agents of the British government to provide him with 
insight about the United States and its leaders. 
In support of the thesis, this dissertation focused on the clash over the Panama 
Tolls controversy and the issue of the Mexican presidency as evidence of Grey's early 
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seduction of President Woodrow Wilson and his administration. The evidence provided 
created a clear picture of how Grey pressed the Wilson administration to meet its 
obligations under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, and at the same time adroitly tied the 
issue to who Britain would support in for the Mexican presidency. The evidence shows 
that in doing so, Grey and his ambassadors worked closely with the American 
Ambassador as well as with Edward M. House to foster a sense of camaraderie and 
understanding. The groundwork laid by Grey during this period gave him insight into 
how the Wilson Administration worked, and it allowed him to influence members of the 
administration during the period of American neutrality. 
This dissertation also argues that German diplomatic policy followed the same 
path as the British policy, although with a decidedly less favourable outcome. Evidence 
primarily from the Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States has 
shown that much of the animosity between Germany and the United States is due to 
misunderstandings over how diplomacy works. Germany's attempt to expand from a 
strictly European power to a colonial power coupled with American attempts to become 
a colonial power led the two countries on a collision course. What this essay has made 
clear is that how the two countries dealt with these events laid the groundwork for how 
they would deal with each other during the period of American neutrality. 
Using the Samoan affair and the German interference in the Spanish-American 
War this critique has demonstrated how German diplomatic policy attempted to 
establish a feeling of cooperation and friendliness towards the United States. The 
evidence provided has shown that German diplomacy was never quite successful at 
bringing about a detente with the United States. It does, however, demonstrate that 
through careful nurturing of administration officials, the careful handling of events, and 
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the use of likable personalities, such as Stemburg and Bemstorff as ambassadors, 
Germany was able to decrease tension between the two countries. 
The United States, on the other hand, haphazardly approached each diplomatic 
event separately as if they occurred in a vacuum. This dissertation demonstrates that 
America's distaste for diplomacy led to U.S. diplomacy being directed by the 
domestically adept and foreign policy inept Colonel Edward M. House. When 
comparing evidence from the British National Archives, the Library of Congress, Yale 
University, and the German Foreign Ministry (Auswartiges Amt) it has shown that the 
professional foreign offices headed by Sir Edward Grey in Britain and Theobald von 
Bethmann Hollweg in Germany - and their respective array of long-standing 
ambassadors and Foreign Service officers - the United States found itself at a 
disadvantage when negotiating diplomatic policies to defend Wilson's policy of 
neutrality. 
This essay has focused on a number of specific instances in which British and 
German diplomats out-manoeuvred the United States: Sir Edward Grey's decisions to 
work with the United States over the issues surrounding Britain's blockade of Germany; 
Bethmann Hollweg's attempt to allow the German submarine force to do as much 
damage to British shipping as it could without forcing a break with the United States; 
Germany's attempt to use Wilson's Mexican policy to create a distraction to events in 
Europe; and the use of the promise of peace to gain Wilson's support. The instances, it 
has been argued here, illustrate the diplomatic success of both Britain and Germany in 
their respective attempts to gain the maximum advantage in acquiring American 
assistance. 
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The United States and Britain's Blockade Diplomacy 
This dissertation has applied the view that a continuing diplomatic policy 
allowed Grey to delay responses to American complaints about the effects of the 
blockade illustrating Grey's ability. It supports the claim that Grey was intent in 
maintaining friendly relations with the United States, and indeed it has gone to great 
lengths to show that it was this long-standing policy that the Foreign Minister sought to 
maintain throughout the period preceding American entry to the war. 
In doing so it has shown that Grey was successful in blunting American 
concerns over the British blockade of Germany by purchasing confiscated American 
cargo. Evidence found in the Sir Edward Grey Papers at the British National Archives 
has also demonstrated that through the deft use of delay, Grey was able to temporarily 
confuse U.S. diplomats, and therefore gave British blockade policy the time needed to 
affect the war. By slowly adding articles to the list of items considered contraband and 
therefore illegal to ship to Germany, Grey had successfully forced the United States into 
accepting the British blockade. By promising to purchase U.S. cargo, and moving items 
on and off of the contraband list, he was able to change the American argument against 
Britain's distant blockade from one oflegality to being a debate on U.S. public 
perception. The diplomacy surrounding this event gives a clear picture of how the 
diplomatic experience of the British Foreign Office was able to out-manoeuvre the 
inexperienced American diplomats. 
Regardless of the event in question Grey would work to gain the most possible 
from the situation for Great Britain without alienating the United States. The British 
Foreign Office's work was clearly helped by the large number ofanglophiles in 
Wilson's administration. It is to Grey's credit that he did not squander the good 
relations, not only maintaining but creating closer British-American relations. This 
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critique has demonstrated, however, that despite the advantage of anglophiles running 
the White House, Grey was not initially successful at creating a perceptible move 
towards war in the United States, and as this was the case at least some credit should be 
given to the German diplomats working just as tirelessly as their British counterparts. 
The Diplomacy of U-boat warfare 
Utilizing documents in Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, Staatsbibliothek 
Berlin, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, and the Politischen Archiv des Auswartigen Amts, this 
dissertation has shown that Bethmann's delay in response to American complaints about 
the establishment of a war zone around the British Isles, and ships lost to sinking by 
German submarines allowed more ships to be sunk while the United States waited for a 
reply. It has also argued that Germany successfully used its diplomatic corps in the 
United States to blunt the legalistic approach the American Secretary of State's office-
initially used to decry the use of the submarine - by couching the need for the weapon 
in moralistic terms that President Wilson would understand and therefore dulling the 
effect of calls for war from the American press. While the immorality of lost lives 
eventually worked against the Germans in the court of public opinion, this essay has 
proven that they had succeeded in blunting the Wilson administration's legalistic 
attempts to stop the use of the submarine. 
Just as important in understanding the diplomacy during Americas period of 
neutrality is an examination of Wilson's 'strict accountability' statement -long held to 
mean that if Germany continued its unrestricted use of submarines the United States 
would break relations and declare war. By a careful analysis of documents from the 
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, which contain letters and 
notes passed between German and American diplomats, this dissertation has shown that 
the American response was clearly different. It has shown that with the specific terms of 
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the statement outlined first in the Arabic pledge, seven months after the 'strict 
accountability' statement, and then later confirmed in the Sussex pledge, yet another 
seven months later, Wilson's 'strict accountability' was limited to repudiation of the 
event and reparations paid. This assessment illustrates that Germany's diplomacy 
regarding the use of submarines was designed to maintain American neutrality, while 
giving the submarines the widest range available to strangle Britain. 
The use of delays, vagueness, and conciliation in the name of maintaining U.S.-
German friendship created the situation from which Wilson's 'strict accountability' 
statement became defined in the Arabic and Sussex pledges as simply making 
reparations and repudiating the action. Because the reality of the 'strict accountability' 
language was that it did not mean that war was the only course of action for the United 
States regarding submarine warfare, Germany was able to dismiss the most egregious 
sinking of ships as accidents, reprimand the commander of the submarine in question, 
and commit to paying reparations to the families of those who lost their lives, all while 
the submarine flotilla still operated around the British Isles. 
Diplomatic Acquisition via Mexico 
The diplomatic experience Wilson, Grey, and Bethmann initially had with 
Mexico began before the First World War, but due to the complexity of Mexican 
internal issues and the country's location it played a pivotal role in the diplomacy of the 
war. Through diplomatic notes, memorandum, and letters found in the Woodrow 
Wilson Papers housed at Princeton University, this dissertation has established the 
continuity of policy the United States had with Mexico - intervention. Having done so, 
the evidence also shows that Wilson's diplomacy towards Mexico fostered already 
present feeling of hatred toward the United States among the Mexican people. 
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The evidence presented has shown that Wilson's decision to intervene at 
Veracruz led to a further souring of relations between the two neighbours. Additionally, 
Wilson's insistence on influencing who was the president of the country led to 
condemnation by Mexicans from all sections of society, and, importantly, to the 
German view that the historical conflict between Mexico and the U.S. could support 
their efforts to maintain American neutrality. 
Though Sir Edward Grey utilized Wilson's desire to remove Huerta in order to 
gain relief from higher tolls for British ships in the Panama Canal, he did so in a manner 
that elicited, and therefore established, feelings of friendship between Britain and the 
United States. By contrast, evidence presented such as letters between Bethmann 
Hollweg and Jagow found at the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Germany's Foreign Office 
worked to secure Mexico as a means to tie up American war materials and attention. 
Therefore, the evidence presented shows that German leaders believed that in the event 
of a break in relations with the United States, Mexican-American relations were simply 
an opportunity to distract Americans from the events in Europe. 
However, Zimmerman's decision to offer an alliance with Mexico if war with 
the United States became unavoidable has often been derided as one of the worst 
blunders in diplomatic history. By analysing available documents from U.S. and 
German archives, this dissertation concludes that these events were clearly part of 
Germany's continuing diplomatic policies and that Zimmermann's offer should be 
considered a shrewd attempt at negating America's potential impact on the war. 
Correspondingly, the evidence also demonstrates that were it not for the work of 
Britain's intelligence services and the decisions on how to utilize it by the Foreign 
Office, Zimmerman's telegram would not have been brought to the attention of the 
United States when it would have the greatest impact. 
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The Diplomacy of Peace 
Having outlined his desire to mediate an end to the bloodshed and the 
importance of maintaining America's neutrality to that end, Wilson inadvertently gave 
the belligerents a weapon to add to their diplomatic arsenals. Employing evidence from 
the archives of all three countries, this dissertation has shown that both Britain and 
Germany seized the opportunity to utilize the peace process as a major tool in their 
quest to acquire American support for their cause, and in doing so turned Wilson's 
stated desire to bring the war to an end against him. Again and again Wilson sent House 
to Europe to attempt to broker a peace deal. Evidence found in the Colonel Edward M. 
House Papers at Yale University as well as evidence from the Foreign Office Political 
Files at the UK National Archives, and the Politisches Archiv des Auswlirtiges Amt 
demonstrate that in every case the Foreign Ministers for Britain and Germany continued 
the use of delayed responses to President Wilson's peace queries in hopes of finding 
themselves in better positions to dictate the outcome of any peace offer. 
For her part, Germany used discussions of peace to position herself to win the 
war, either by utilizing submarines in a ruthless manner, or by delaying American entry 
into the war by attempting to frame the failure of peace as Allied insincerity and war 
mongering. If an acceptable peace came as a result, fine, but if not German authorities 
felt they would be positioned to keep the U.S. neutral. Britain, on the other-hand, used 
the potential of peace to attempt to bring about American intervention based on the 
premise that Germany, as the world's preeminent threat to peace, had to be conquered in 
order to save civilization and create a peace that would last. The common factor for both 
sides' diplomatic efforts was Wilson's desire for peace. 
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Final Thoughts 
The fact that the United States joined the Entente in fighting against Germany 
does not preclude the fact that Bethmann Hollweg, Jagow, Bernstorff, and Zimmerman 
worked within their diplomatic belief pattern and successfully maintained American 
neutrality until April 1917. This dissertation has demonstrated that Bethmann's 
diplomacy has to be considered successful, for despite the multitude of issues Germany 
was able to maintain U.S. neutrality until April 1917, thereby extending the time the 
German military had to win the war. American intervention occurred only after German 
political and military leaders deemed that without the use of the submarine it could not 
fight another year. 
British actions regarding issues surrounding their blockade could just as easily 
have led to a confrontation with the United States. As this paper has illustrated, 
however, it was Grey's well defined tactics that minimized issues with the United States 
and forced Germany to spend more time defending its actions to an increasingly pro-
British administration and press. As this critique has demonstrated, Britain's 
experienced diplomats played heavily on the values of Wilson and his advisors-
'fighting her [America's] fight', 'fighting to save civilization', and 'being fed on the 
same food' - to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two nations. The ability 
of the British Foreign Office to create a sense of oneness with Wilson and those who 
helped shape American policy was crucial to the creation of the pro-Ally position the 
United States found itself in April 1917. Without the work of Grey, Spring-Rice, among 
others, Wilson would not have found himself viewing Germany as a threat to 
'everything I [Wilson] hold dear in [the] world.' 
Through the same diplomatic actions of delay, vagueness, and conciliation, 
German and British diplomats worked tirelessly in an effort to acquire America's 
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services. The services required were quite different in theory, with Britain needing to 
pull the United States into the war and Gennany desiring continued American 
neutrality, but in essence the desired effect was the same - to utilize the U.S. for their 
own benefit. In the end it was a multitude of events that led to American entry into the 
First World War. The disclosure of the Gennan offer to Mexico, and the declaration of 
unrestricted submarine warfare and the subsequent sinking of multiple U.S. flagged 
ships around the British Isles, all played a role in Wilson's decision to ask Congress for 
war. As is demonstrated in this essay, Wilson, his policies, and America were guided 
through the maze of events from August 1914 to April 1917 by belligerent diplomats, in 
particular those from Britain and Gennany. Through skilled diplomacy Gennany was 
able to hold off U.S. entry for two and a half turbulent years, but it was Britain's own 
skilled, and ultimately more successful diplomacy that was to gain the benefits that 
would come with acquiring America. 
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